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 Abstract 
 
 
 
Vulnerability to poverty due to various forms of uninsured risks, idio-
syncratic or covariate, is common in several developing countries. Existing 
studies analyse the welfare costs of these adverse events by examining how a 
particular risk affects the ability of households to maintain consumption 
levels, often referred to as a test of consumption insurance. Such analyses 
are used as a justification for both introducing public insurance schemes and 
setting policy priorities. As a result, policy emphasis has been on designing 
schemes to deal with covariate risks as compared to health risks.  
 Set against this background, the first general objective of this thesis is 
to examine if reliance on tests of consumption insurance may be misleading, 
in particular, when it comes to ill-health. It approaches this by examining 
whether ill-health triggers different coping responses compared to other 
shocks and by investigating the channels of impoverishment due to ill-
health. The second general objective of the thesis is to investigate the effec-
tiveness and potential problems of (pilot) health insurance schemes in Sub-
Saharan Africa. In addition to a need for credible impact analysis, advocat-
ing the role of health insurance in breaking the bridge between ill-health and 
impoverishment requires an understanding of the potential problems of in-
formation asymmetry in insurance markets, namely, adverse selection and 
ex-ante moral hazard. To achieve these objectives the research presented in 
this thesis, which consists of five interrelated essays, employs three waves of 
panel household survey data and event history interviews in rural Ethiopia 
to (i) examine which shocks trigger which coping responses (ii) identify the 
channels of impoverishment due to ill-health (iii) evaluate the impact of a 
recently introduced voluntary Community Based Health Insurance scheme 
on household economic welfare and (iv) investigate whether it suffers from 
problems of adverse selection. The last essay uses two waves of panel 
household survey data and qualitative information from community meet-
 Abstract xix 
 
ings in rural Ghana to detect if ex-ante moral hazard is a concern in the 
Ghanaian National Health Insurance.  
The analysis presented in this thesis displays clear differences in coping 
strategies across shock types. Coping with relatively idiosyncratic health 
shocks is met by reductions in savings, asset sales and especially a far greater 
reliance on borrowing as compared to other shocks. Reductions in food 
consumption, a prominent response in the case of natural and economic 
shocks, is absent in the case of health shocks. A notable aspect of the analy-
sis is that informal safety nets and reliance on friends and family for sup-
port, at least in the form of gifts, even in the case of idiosyncratic shocks is 
virtually non-existent. Focusing on ill-health, the thesis finds evidence of 
substantial economic risk in terms of increased health expenditure and re-
duced agricultural productivity. Households cope by resorting to intra-
household labor substitution, hiring wage labor, borrowing and depleting 
assets. While households are able to maintain food consumption, imperfect 
insurance of non-food consumption is apparent. This effect is larger for 
households with the lowest ability to self-insure. The thesis argues that the 
relative insensitivity of food consumption should not be viewed as insurabil-
ity of food consumption against health shocks but rather as an indication 
that a reduction in food consumption is not a viable coping response to a 
health shock as it does not provide cash to meet health care needs. Main-
taining current consumption through borrowing and depletion of assets and 
savings is unlikely to be sustainable in the long term and displays the need 
for interventions that work towards reducing the financial consequences of 
ill-health. 
After assessing the economic costs of illness in rural Ethiopia, the thesis 
goes on to evaluate the impact of a pilot voluntary Community-Based 
Health Insurance (CBHI) scheme launched by the government of Ethiopia 
in 2011 on various measures of economic welfare. Enrolment is found to 
lead to a 5 percentage point – or 13 percent – decline in the probability of 
borrowing and is associated with an increase in household income. There is 
no evidence that enrolling in the scheme affects consumption or livestock 
holdings.  
Adverse selection is not found to be an issue in the pilot CBHI scheme. 
Households base expectations regarding future medical expenditure on past 
spending levels. However, there is high volatility in health expenditure sug-
gesting that the financial viability of the CBHI scheme is unlikely to be af-
fected by adverse selection. Although there is evidence that households are 
 able to anticipate health expenses to some degree, there is little or no evi-
dence that expectations influence the actual take up of health insurance.  
Ex-ante moral hazard (scaling back health-risk prevention efforts after 
insurance enrolment) is, however, found to be a challenge in the National 
Health Insurance (NHI) scheme of Ghana. The thesis finds that enrolment 
in the scheme negatively affects the use of insecticide-treated bed nets 
(ITNs), the most prominent malaria prevention strategy in malaria endemic 
areas.  
Overall, the findings suggest the following: i) Unlike previous claims, infor-
mal safety nets and reliance on friends and family for support, at least in the 
form of gifts, even in the case of idiosyncratic health-risks is missing. While 
informal borrowing to deal with idiosyncratic shocks does appear to provide 
some succour, it is often shunned for various reasons. This suggests a po-
tentially important role for formal protection systems. ii) Analysis of the 
conduits of impoverishment due to ill-health suggests that the adverse con-
sequences might be shrouded by coping responses that pass the immediate 
costs of ill-health to future periods (e.g. borrowing and asset sales). The in-
sensitivity of total consumption and food consumption to ill-health suggest 
that perhaps insurance schemes will not affect these outcomes at least in the 
short-run. The impact analysis also supports this claim. iii) Although there is 
evidence supporting the ability of households to anticipate health care ex-
penditure, there is little or no evidence that expectations influence the deci-
sion to take out health insurance. Even if this was the case, realization of 
expectations is far from perfect, suggesting that the financial viability of the 
scheme is unlikely to be heavily affected by adverse selection. iv) Analysis of 
the Ghanaian National Health Insurance scheme shows that there is a need 
to tackle changes in risk-taking behaviour which may be triggered by health 
insurance. While the introduction of co-payments is the most straight for-
ward policy implication, it is likely to compromise the move towards Uni-
versal Health Coverage. Complementary health education and awareness 
programs that highlight the health effects of reduction in one’s immunity as 
a result of frequent illness could be alternatives. 
 
  
Essays over de economie van gezondheidsrisico en verzeker-
ing 
 Samenvatting 
 
 
 
Kwetsbaarheid voor armoede als gevolg van verschillende vormen van op 
zichzelf staande en samenhangende onverzekerde risico’s komt veel voor in 
een aantal ontwikkelingslanden. In bestaand onderzoek worden de wel-
zijnskosten van deze negatieve gebeurtenissen geanalyseerd door het effect 
van een bepaald risico op het vermogen van huishoudens om het consump-
tieniveau te handhaven te onderzoeken. Dit wordt vaak omschreven als een 
toets van consumptieverzekering. Dergelijke analyses worden gebruikt als 
een rechtvaardiging van zowel de introductie van volksverzekeringen als het 
stellen van prioriteiten voor beleid. Hierdoor ligt de nadruk op het ontwerp-
en van verzekeringsstelsels voor samenhangende risico’s in tegenstelling tot 
gezondheidsrisico’s.  
 Tegen deze achtergrond is het eerste algemene doel van dit proef-
schrift om te onderzoeken of het misleidend kan zijn om te vertrouwen op 
toetsen van consumptieverzekering, met name wanneer het gaat om slechte 
gezondheid. Hiertoe is onderzocht of slechte gezondheid andere coping-
strategieën oproept dan andere tegenslagen en via welke wegen slechte ge-
zondheid leidt tot verarming. Het tweede algemene doel van het proef-
schrift is om de effectiviteit en de potentiële problemen van (proeven met) 
ziektekostenverzekeringen in Afrika ten zuiden van de Sahara te 
onderzoeken. Naast de behoefte aan een geloofwaardige analyse van de im-
pact, vereist een pleidooi voor de rol van ziektekostenverzekeringen bij het 
doorbreken van het verband tussen slechte gezondheid en verarming een 
begrip van de potentiële problemen van informatie-asymmetrie in verzeker-
ingsmarkten, namelijk negatieve selectie en moreel risico ex ante. Om deze 
doelen te bereiken is in dit onderzoek, dat bestaat uit vijf gerelateerde essays, 
gebruikgemaakt van een panelonderzoek onder huishoudens in drie rondes 
en zijn interviews op het platteland in Ethiopië gehouden om (i) te 
onderzoeken welke tegenslagen welke copingstrategieën uitlokken; (ii) na te 
 gaan via welke wegen slechte gezondheid leidt tot verarming (iii) de invloed 
van een onlangs geïntroduceerde vrijwillige Gemeenschapsgerichte 
Ziektekostenverzekering op het economisch welzijn van huishoudens te 
evalueren en (iv) te onderzoeken of daarbij sprake is van negatieve selectie. 
Het laatste essay is gebaseerd op enquêtes die zijn afgenomen in twee ron-
des van panelonderzoek onder huishoudens en op kwalitatieve informatie 
uit dorpsbijeenkomsten op het platteland in Ghana om erachter te komen 
of moreel risico ex ante een rol speelt in de Ghanese Nationale 
Ziektekostenverzekering.  
Uit het onderzoek in dit proefschrift blijkt dat er duidelijke verschillen 
zijn in copingstrategieën bij verschillende soorten tegenslagen. In 
vergelijking met tegenslagen die minder persoonlijk van aard zijn, spreken 
mensen bij gezondheidsproblemen eerder hun spaargeld aan of verkopen ze 
bezittingen, en sluiten ze vooral vaker leningen af. Een van de meest 
typerende reacties op natuurrampen en economische crises, een afname van 
de voedselconsumptie, komt niet voor bij gezondheidsproblemen. Een 
opvallend aspect van het onderzoek is dat er vrijwel geen sprake is van in-
formele vangnetten en hulp van vrienden en familie, in ieder geval niet als 
vriendendienst, zelfs in geval van persoonlijke tegenslagen. Uit deze studie 
blijkt dat slechte gezondheid een aanzienlijk economisch risico met zich 
meebrengt in termen van hogere ziektekosten en verminderde land-
bouwproductiviteit. Huishoudens gaan hiermee om door een beroep te 
doen op vervangende arbeidskrachten binnen het huishouden, betaalde ar-
beidskrachten in te huren, te lenen en bezittingen te gelde te maken. Terwijl 
de voedselconsumptie van huishoudens op peil blijft, blijkt de consumptie 
van andere goederen onvoldoende verzekerd te zijn. Dit effect is groter 
voor huishoudens die het slechtst in staat zijn zichzelf te verzekeren. In dit 
proefschrift wordt betoogd dat de relatieve onaantastbaarheid van voedsel-
consumptie niet opgevat moet worden als de verzekerbaarheid van voedsel-
consumptie tegen gezondheidsproblemen, maar eerder als indicatie dat een 
verminderde voedselconsumptie geen werkbare copingstrategie is bij ge-
zondheidsproblemen, omdat het geen geld oplevert om ziektekosten te 
dekken. Het handhaven van het huidige consumptieniveau door te lenen, 
bezittingen te verkopen en op spaargeld in te teren is op de lange termijn 
waarschijnlijk onhoudbaar en wijst op de behoefte aan interventies die 
gericht zijn op het verzachten van de financiële consequenties van slechte 
gezondheid. 
In dit proefschrift wordt een schatting gemaakt van de economische 
kosten van ziekte op het platteland in Ethiopië, waarna een evaluatie volgt 
van het effect van een door de Ethiopische overheid in 2011 uitgevoerde 
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proef met een vrijwillige Gemeenschapsgerichte Ziektekostenverzekering 
(Community-Based Health Insurance; CBHI) op verschillende maten van 
economisch welzijn. Deelname bleek te leiden tot een afname van 5 pro-
centpunt – of 13 procent – in de kans op lenen en hangt samen met een 
inkomensverhoging van huishoudens. Er zijn geen aanwijzingen dat 
deelname aan de verzekering invloed heeft op de consumptie of veehoud-
erij.  
Negatieve selectie blijkt geen rol te spelen in de proef met de CBHI. 
Huishoudens baseren verwachtingen over toekomstige ziektekosten op 
uitgaven in het verleden. Ziektekosten variëren echter sterk, waardoor het 
onwaarschijnlijk is dat de financiële uitvoerbaarheid van het CBHI-plan ge-
hinderd wordt door negatieve selectie. Hoewel er aanwijzingen zijn dat 
huishoudens ziektekosten tot op zekere hoogte kunnen voorzien, zijn er 
weinig tot geen aanwijzingen dat verwachtingen van invloed zijn op feit-
elijke deelname aan een ziektekostenverzekering.  
Moreel risico ex ante (afname van preventieve gezondheidsmaatregelen 
na het afsluiten van de verzekering) blijkt echter wel een probleem te vor-
men bij de Ghanese Nationale Ziektekostenverzekering (National Health 
Insurance; NHI). Uit het onderzoek blijkt dat deelname aan de verzekering 
een negatief effect heeft op het gebruik van met insecticiden behandelde 
muskietennetten, de belangrijkste methode om malaria te voorkomen in 
gebieden waar malaria endemisch is.  
 Op grond van de onderzoeksresultaten kunnen de volgende con-
clusies worden getrokken: i) In tegenstelling tot eerdere bevindingen blijkt 
het te ontbreken aan informele vangnetten en hulp van vrienden en familie, 
in ieder geval voor zover die als vriendendienst wordt geboden; zelfs in 
geval van persoonlijke gezondheidsrisico’s. Hoewel informele leningen om 
persoonlijke tegenslagen op te vangen wel enig soelaas lijken te bieden, 
wordt deze optie om verschillende redenen vaak niet gekozen. Dit wijst op 
een potentieel belangrijke rol voor formele beschermingssystemen. ii) Uit 
een analyse van de wegen waarlangs slechte gezondheid tot verarming leidt, 
komt naar voren dat de negatieve gevolgen wellicht verhuld worden door 
copingstrategieën waarmee de onmiddellijke kosten van slechte gezondheid 
worden doorgeschoven naar de toekomst (bijvoorbeeld leningen en de 
verkoop van bezittingen). Het gegeven dat slechte gezondheid geen effect 
heeft op de totale consumptie en de voedselconsumptie wijst erop dat ver-
zekeringsstelsels althans op de korte termijn mogelijk geen gevolgen hebben 
voor deze factoren. Deze conclusie wordt ook gesteund door de impact-
analyse. iii) Hoewel er aanwijzingen zijn dat huishoudens in staat zijn om 
 ziektekosten te voorzien, zijn er weinig tot geen aanwijzingen dat verwacht-
ingen van invloed zijn op de beslissing om een ziektekostenverzekering af te 
sluiten. En zelfs al was dit het geval, dan nog komen verwachtingen vaak 
niet uit, waardoor de kans dat de financiële uitvoerbaarheid van het stelsel 
gehinderd wordt door negatieve selectie waarschijnlijk klein is. iv) Uit het 
onderzoek naar de Ghanese Nationale Ziektekostenverzekering blijkt de 
noodzaak om in te spelen op veranderingen in risicogedrag die het gevolg 
kunnen zijn van een ziektekostenverzekering. De invoering van een eigen 
bijdrage is weliswaar de duidelijkste beleidsimplicatie, maar dit gaat 
waarschijnlijk niet goed samen met het streven naar een universele dekking 
van ziektekosten. Aanvullend gezondheidsonderwijs en bewustmakingspro-
gramma’s waarin gezondheidseffecten zoals een vermindering van de we-
erstand ten gevolge van vaak ziek zijn benadrukt worden, zouden alter-
natieven kunnen zijn. 
  
 
 
1 Introduction 
 
 
Households across the developing world are vulnerable to poverty due 
to various forms of uninsured risks, idiosyncratic or covariate (Gertler 
and Gruber 2002, Dercon et al. 2005, Wagstaff 2007, Hoddinot 2006, 
Islam and Maitra 2012, Sparrow et al. 2014). One of these sources of un-
insured risk is ill-health, which involves financial risk due to the direct 
and indirect costs of medical care and forgone income. The welfare im-
plication of these adverse events is often examined by assessing the ex-
tent to which a particular risk affects the ability of households to main-
tain consumption levels, often referred to as a test of consumption 
insurance (e.g. Gertler and Gruber 2002, Asfaw and Von Braun 2004, 
De Weerdt and Dercon 2006, Wagstaff 2007, Gertler et al. 2009, Davies 
2010). Justifications for introducing social insurance schemes and setting 
policy priorities often rely on tests of consumption insurance (e.g. Mor-
duch 1995, Gertler and Gruber 2002, Asfaw and Von Braun 2004). As a 
result, policy emphasis has been on designing schemes to deal with co-
variate risks as compared to health risks. 
However, recently, the World Health Organization and the World 
Bank have argued in favour of the introduction of various forms of pre-
payment methods in order to prevent the impoverishing effects of deal-
ing with out-of-pocket payments for health care and the deleterious ef-
fects of prolonged untreated illness (WHO and World Bank 2013). In 
part, the increasing proliferation of health insurance schemes in Sub-
Saharan Africa (SSA) emanates from such concerns. The recent intro-
duction of a pilot voluntary Community Based Health Insurance (CBHI) 
scheme in rural Ethiopia and Ghana’s National Health Insurance (NHI) 
scheme are two examples in this regard.1,2 Both aim at providing financial 
protection against illness related expenses and increasing access to mod-
ern healthcare (Mensah et al. 2010, USAID 2011). 
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Since July 2011, the Ethiopian CBHI, which is meant for households 
living in rural areas and for those employed in the informal sector, has 
been operating in thirteen districts (woredas) located in four regions 
(Amhara, Oromiya, SNNPR and Tigray) of the country. The eventual 
aim is to launch a nation-wide rollout of this pilot scheme.3,4 This de-
mand side intervention was preceded by the establishment of health 
posts and deployment of health extension workers to provide outreach 
services (FMoH 2005). The Ghanaian NHI scheme was introduced in 
2003 to replace the cash-and-carry system. It covers both the formal and 
the informal sectors.  
In addition to the need for credible impact analyses of such (pilot) 
schemes, advocating the role of health insurance in breaking the bridge 
between ill-health and impoverishment requires an understanding of the 
potential problems of information asymmetry in insurance markets, 
namely adverse selection and ex-ante moral hazard (scaling back preven-
tion efforts after insurance).5 Health insurance might impact a house-
hold’s economic welfare by serving as a risk management tool (e.g. re-
ducing inefficient precautionary savings) and by altering the mix of ex-
post coping responses adopted by households (World Bank 2014). While 
there is evidence on the impact of such interventions (see review by Me-
bratie et al. 2013a) on access to modern health care, there is little evi-
dence on the effect of such schemes on the economic welfare of poor 
households. Moreover, while both problems of adverse selection and ex-
ante moral hazard are well-established in economic theory, convincing 
empirical studies which provide evidence of adverse selection and moral 
hazard especially in developing countries is limited.  
Set against this background, the first general objective of this thesis is 
to examine if reliance on tests of consumption insurance may be mis-
leading, in particular, when it comes to ill-health. It approaches this by 
examining whether ill-health triggers different coping responses com-
pared to other shocks6 and by investigating the channels of impoverish-
ment due to ill-health.7  The second general objective of the thesis is to 
investigate the effectiveness and potential problems of (pilot) health in-
surance schemes in Sub-Saharan Africa. To achieve these objectives the 
thesis consists of five interrelated essays that aim to (i) examine which 
shocks trigger which coping responses (ii) identify the channels of im-
poverishment due to ill-health (iii) evaluate the impact of the Ethiopian 
CBHI on household economic welfare (iv) investigate whether it suffers 
 Introduction 3 
from problems of adverse selection (v) detect if ex-ante moral hazard is a 
concern in the Ghanaian National Health Insurance. 
The essays rely on panel data and qualitative data collection efforts 
which were undertaken in rural Ethiopia and Ghana. For the essays 
based on Ethiopia, the thesis draws on three-rounds of panel data col-
lected in March-April of 2011, 2012 and 2013. The first round was col-
lected a few months before the launch of the CBHI scheme and serves 
as a baseline. Sixteen districts located across four main regions of the 
country (Amhara, Oromiya, Tigray and SNNPR) are included in the sur-
vey. Within the districts a two stage sampling design, randomly sampling 
villages (six from each district) and the households (17 from each village) 
is used. The total sample size in the first round is 1,632 households 
comprising 9,455 individuals, of which 98 and 97 percent were success-
fully re-surveyed in 2012 and 2013. In addition to the household surveys, 
in January-February 2013, after analysing the household survey data, 
event history interviews were conducted with purposively selected 
households who had also been interviewed for the household survey. 
The thesis relies on 42 such in-depth interviews with household heads. 
 The essay on Ghana relies on two rounds of panel data gathered 
from 400 households who were surveyed in September 2007 and 2009.8 
The surveyed households are spread over eleven different communities, 
seven of which are located in Asutifi district and four in the adjacent 
Asunafo district of the Brong Ahafo region. Within these communities, a 
sample of households, proportional to the community’s population size, 
was randomly drawn. In addition, in June 2010 a series of participatory 
debriefing sessions on the outcomes of the study were organized in five 
of the surveyed communities.  
A more detailed description of the five essays is presented below. The 
first essay employs the baseline household survey data and event history 
interviews conducted in rural Ethiopia to investigate which shocks trig-
ger which coping responses and why. It distinguishes between health and 
non-health shocks and establishes that coping responses in the case of 
health shocks are different as compared to non-health shocks. The anal-
ysis provides insights on why previous studies have reported that con-
sumption is less sensitive to health shocks as compared to non-health 
shocks. The conclusion of this essay lays the groundwork for the subse-
quent essay. 
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The second essay employs all three survey waves and event history in-
terviews to examine the channels of impoverishment due to ill-health. It 
examines the immediate effects of a variety of ill-health measures on 
health expenditure and labor supply, the subsequent household coping 
responses, and finally the effect on household income and consumption. 
By providing a comprehensive understanding of the economic costs of 
illness, the essay displays the need for interventions that work towards 
reducing the financial consequences of ill-health.  
The third essay assesses the impact of CBHI on household consump-
tion, income, indebtedness and livestock holdings. The availability of a 
baseline and two follow up surveys offers an opportunity to conduct a 
credible impact evaluation and provide empirical evidence on the poten-
tial role that may be played by such schemes on household economic 
welfare. In doing so, the essay goes beyond the conventional emphasis 
on evaluating the impact of such schemes on access to healthcare access. 
Results suggest that the main benefit of the scheme is its effect on reduc-
ing the need to borrow and thereby potentially reducing vulnerability to 
other forms of shocks.  
The fourth essay employs a novel approach to investigate the preva-
lence of adverse selection in CBHI. Subjective probabilities of medical 
expenditures are elicited from respondents, and after assessing the validi-
ty of such data obtained from poor and less-educated individuals the es-
say examines whether or not expectations depend on past realized ex-
penditure, the extent to which expectations materialise and how far 
households’ expectations influence the decision to enrol in CBHI. The 
overall analysis suggests that adverse selection is unlikely to be of great 
concern in the case of the Ethiopian CBHI. 
The last essay investigates incentive problems in the Ghanaian Na-
tional Health Insurance (NHI), specifically whether or not enrolment in 
the NHI scheme leads to a decline in malaria prevention efforts (ex-ante 
moral hazard).9 It exploits the panel nature of the household survey to 
test whether enrolment negatively affects ownership and use of insecti-
cide-treated bed nets. Results suggest the presence of ex-ante moral haz-
ard.  
The concluding chapter of the thesis summarizes the key find-
ings and considers policy implications. 
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Notes 
 
1 Ethiopia is the second most populous country in Africa with 94.1 million peo-
ple in 2013. The country is categorized as a developing, low income country with 
GNI per capita of $470 in 2013. Despite impressive economic growth in recent 
years (10.4% in 2013), poverty head count ratio at national poverty lines amounts 
to about one-third (29.6% in 2011) of the population (World Bank 2013) while 
88% of the population is affected by multidimensional poverty according to the 
UN’s Human Development Report 2014. In 2013, the country ranked 173rd out 
of 187 countries in the Human Development Index. With high infant, under-five 
and maternal mortality, life expectancy at birth is about 63 years (UN 2014). 
 
2 Ghana is a lower middle income country with GNI per capita of $1770 in 2013. 
Although it recently departed the World Banks’s low income category, poverty 
head count ratio at national poverty lines amounts to about one-fourth (24.2 in 
2012) of the population (World Bank 2013). 
 
3 The scheme has recently been extended to 161 districts for further testing. The 
Ministry also plans to start a mandatory social health insurance for the formal 
sector as part of its health care financing strategy. Until recently, thirty-seven per-
cent of the national health expenditure (in 2007/08) was financed from out-of-
pocket payments (FMoH 2010). 
 
4 Woreda is an administrative unit. The country administration is divided into 
regions, regions into zones, zones into woredas, woredas into kebeles and in rural 
areas these kebeles are further divided in to gots. 
  
5 Both problems of information asymmetry could pose a potential burden for a 
health care system and, in the longer term, could be a hurdle for achieving UHC. 
 
6 Risk refers to the possibility of loss while shock refers to the realizations of this 
adverse possibility. Dercon et al. (2005) defines shocks as events that may lead to 
economic difficulties such as loss of household income, loss of productive assets, 
unexpected expenditure and/or reduction in consumption. 
 
7 In fact, analysis of the channels of impoverishment is becoming increasingly 
common (see for example, Gertler and Gruber 2002, Wagstaff 2007, Islam and 
Maitra 2010, Sparrow et al. 2014) although the focus is still on whether consump-
tion is insured or not. 
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8 Seven households could not be traced in the second round and were replaced by 
neighbouring households. 
 
9 Despite various interventions, malaria is still Ghana’s leading cause of mortality 
and morbidity and imposes a large burden on its health care system. 
  
 
2 Coping with Shocks in Rural Ethiopia1 
 
 
Abstract 
Based on household survey data and event history interviews under-
taken in a highly shock prone country, this paper investigates which 
shocks trigger which coping responses and why. We find clear differ-
ences in terms of coping strategies across shock types. The two relatively 
covariate shocks, that is, economic and natural shocks are more likely to 
trigger reductions in savings and in food consumption while the sale of 
assets and borrowing is less common. Coping with relatively idiosyncrat-
ic health shocks is met by reductions in savings, asset sales and especially 
a far greater reliance on borrowing as compared to other shocks. Reduc-
tions in food consumption, a prominent response in the case of natural 
and economic shocks is notably absent in the case of health shocks.  
Across all shock types, households do not rely on gifts from family and 
friends or on enhancing their labour supply as coping approaches. The 
relative insensitivity of food consumption to health shocks based on the 
shocks-coping analysis presented here is consistent with existing work 
which examines consumption insurance. However, our analysis leads to a 
different interpretation. We argue that this insensitivity should not be 
viewed as insurability of food consumption against health shocks but 
rather as an indication that a reduction in food consumption is not a via-
ble coping response to a health shock as it does not provide cash to meet 
health care needs. 
2.1 Introduction 
Rural households in developing countries such as Ethiopia confront a 
variety of risks and shocks which may render them vulnerable to severe 
economic deprivations. Acquiring a greater understanding of the risks, 
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vulnerabilities and coping mechanisms available to deal with the range of 
shocks faced by households is essential in order to prioritize and design 
appropriate social safety nets.2 In the absence of formal protection sys-
tems, the ability of households to protect themselves is influenced by the 
frequency, scope and intensity of shocks. Theoretically, it is for example 
expected that households are more likely to be able to insure themselves 
against relatively idiosyncratic shocks by drawing on informal risk-
sharing networks, as compared to common shocks that also affect other 
members of a village and thus render the risk pool weaker.  If some 
shocks are indeed more difficult to insure against than others, then spe-
cific policies designed to deal with less-insurable shocks are likely to be 
more beneficial in terms of alleviating economic hardship.  
Recognizing the role played by a range of natural, health and 
economic shocks in perpetuating poverty, a relatively recent strand of 
development research has been concerned with determining the effect of 
health and other shocks on consumption, income and labour supply. 
Typically such studies examine the effect of a single shock on a key wel-
fare measure, usually consumption, and focus on identifying the effect of 
past shocks on current household consumption.3 
While results vary across countries, in the Ethiopian context, 
Asfaw and von Braun (2004) conclude that food consumption is pro-
tected against the illness of the household head while non-food con-
sumption is not insured. In their multi-shock analysis on Ethiopia, Der-
con et al. (2005) show that droughts occurring in the five years before 
the survey reduce total annual per capita consumption by 20 per cent 
while illnesses reduce consumption by 9 per cent. Before concluding that 
the consequences of droughts are worse than illnesses or that health 
shocks do not affect food consumption, it is important to consider 
whether the coping responses to different types of shocks has a bearing 
on such outcomes. In the context of a formal test of consumption insur-
ance, Chetty and Looney (2006) argue that insurability of consumption 
should be interpreted with caution and that it is important to consider 
what underlies such a result. Drawing the conclusion that households are 
able to protect (current) consumption against a certain shock without 
considering the manner in which such protection has been achieved may 
be misleading especially if such protection has come at the cost of bor-
rowing or the sale of productive assets, with possible consequences for 
future consumption. 
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Obtaining a deeper understanding of household ability to re-
spond to and to insure against different types of shocks thus not only 
requires a multi-shock analysis but also an examination of coping mech-
anisms. While there are papers that have adopted such a multi-shock ap-
proach the bulk of the work adopts a partial approach and analyses the 
effects of a single shock or a limited set of shocks. Studies that have ana-
lysed the incidence, distribution and welfare implications of a broad 
range of shocks include Wagstaff and Lindelow (2010), Heltberg and 
Lund (2009) and Dercon et al. (2005). Such comparative studies are in-
formative and have challenged the conventional wisdom that covariate 
shocks such as crop failure are more difficult to deal with as compared to 
idiosyncratic shocks like illnesses.   
Motivated by the idea that the apparent insurability of consump-
tion for certain shocks vis-à-vis others may be driven by different coping 
responses to different types of shocks, this paper uses purposively col-
lected household data and event history interviews conducted in a highly 
shock prone country to investigate a relatively neglected question, that is, 
which shocks trigger which coping responses and why.  Similar to Wag-
staff and Lindelow (2010) and Heltberg and Lund (2009), the paper relies 
on cross-section data and a retrospective shock module to analyse the 
shock-coping strategy link. The paper adds to the scant literature on mul-
ti-shock comparative studies and is timely from a policy perspective as 
the Ethiopian government intends to upscale a community based health 
insurance (CBHI) scheme that was piloted in 2011.  
To preview our results, unlike recent multi-shock studies by 
Wagstaff and Lindelow (2010) and Heltberg and Lund (2009), we find 
that health shocks do not dominate in terms of frequency, natural shocks 
do. Health shocks are more likely to trigger borrowing and selling of as-
sets as compared to non-health shocks while natural shocks stand out in 
triggering a reduction in consumption and dissaving. Economic shocks 
and crime/conflict/family shocks do not seem to induce an active re-
sponse. The differential coping response to health and natural shocks 
highlights the different consumption effects associated with the two 
types of shocks and the underlying reasons for the apparent insurability 
of health shocks.   
The paper unfolds by providing in section 2.2 a description of 
the data and the sampling design. Section 2.3 discusses methods. Section   
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2.4 examines the frequency of shocks, their scope and distribution and 
presents a bivariate and a multivariate analysis of which shocks trigger 
which coping responses. Section 2.5 contains concluding observations. 
2.2 Data and Sampling 
This study is based on a household survey which covers four regions of 
Ethiopia (Tigray, Amhara, Oromiya, and SNNPR) and in-depth inter-
views with a selection of the households who were also included in the 
survey. From each of these regions, which together account for about 86 
percent of the country’s population (Population Census Commission, 
2008) four districts were purposively selected and within each district 6 
kebeles (peasant associations or villages) were randomly drawn.4 In each 
of the 96 kebeles, 17 households were randomly surveyed yielding a total 
of 1,632 households comprising 9,455 individuals.  
The survey was canvassed between March and April 2011 and 
contains information on a variety of individual and household socio-
economic attributes such as consumption expenditure, assets, household 
demographics, employment and household health conditions. The sur-
vey includes an extensive module to explore the comparative effect of 
shocks. The shock module asks households about their experience of 
unexpected events in the year before the survey. These include health 
related events (illness, death or disability), natural events (flood, storm, 
drought, untimely rain, insect damage, fire, frost), economic events 
(death of livestock, loss of equipment, unemployment, a decline in out-
put price5) and crime/conflict/family related events (conflict over land 
or water, divorce, theft of crops and theft of livestock). In addition, the 
survey enquires i) how strongly households are affected by these events, 
ii) how many households in the village are affected by the events and iii) 
which are the three most important coping responses used (if any).6  
In order to acquire a deeper understanding of why particular 
coping responses were chosen (or not) in response to a certain shock, in 
January-February 2013, after analysing the household survey data, event 
history interviews were conducted with purposively selected households 
who had also been interviewed for the household survey.7  From each of 
the four regions, a district with a relatively high burden of shocks was 
selected and within each of these four districts, households were sampled 
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based on the reported incidence and the severity of shocks they had ex-
perienced.8 A total of 42 households were interviewed. 
2.3 Methodological approach 
2.3.1 Incidence, scope and distribution of shocks 
We commence our analysis by providing an assessment of the incidence, 
scope (covariate or idiosyncratic) and distribution of shocks (who expe-
riences shocks). To enhance tractability we categorize information on the 
21 different events (or sub-types) into four major shock types: health, 
natural, economic and crime/conflict/family related shocks.  
To examine whether a particular shock is idiosyncratic or covari-
ate we follow Dercon et al. (2005) and assess responses to the question 
whether an event affected only the respondent household or other 
households in the same kebele as well.9 Even though it is hard to label a 
shock as purely idiosyncratic or purely covariate, as many shocks lie in 
between, we consider a shock as idiosyncratic if it is reported to have 
affected only that household and covariate if it affects at least some other 
households in the kebele.  
To examine the household characteristics that are related to the 
probability of facing shocks, we estimate probit models for each of the 
shock types on a vector of covariates, which includes measures of eco-
nomic status, human capital, demographics, religion and regional dum-
mies. The measure of economic status is based on an asset index con-
structed on the basis of a principal component analysis using 68 items 
that include housing features, land size, various consumption assets, farm 
equipment and livestock.10 Human capital is measured by education of 
the household head, the demographic variables include household size, 
age and sex of head and share of males and females in the household.  
2.3.2 Shocks and coping   
Coping, defined as actions undertaken by a household to accommodate 
the effect of a shock, is divided into six categories plus the option that 
the household did not adopt any active coping response. These six cate-
gories include the use of savings, reducing food consumption, selling 
assets (including food stocks), borrowing (from relatives, formal sources, 
neighbours, money lenders, and funeral and credit associations), receiv-
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ing gifts (in cash or in kind from informal groups, neighbours or the 
government) and labour supply based strategies (increasing own labour 
input, hiring in, sending out family members outside the kebele, working 
off-farm).  The categories borrowing and receiving gifts can be consid-
ered as external coping strategies while the remainder may be considered 
as internal (to the household) coping strategies. 
Using information from the survey as well as the in-depth inter-
views, we examine which shocks trigger which coping responses and 
whether coping responses vary by the severity of a specific shock.  We 
treat the probability of adopting a coping strategy as a function of the 
four shock types and a range of household and village characteristics, 
  
 .'')1(prob iiimi XSFCS   .  (2.1) 
We estimate a series of probit models for each coping response 
m  that household i  may adopt. Our main interest centres on the vector 
of coefficients   for shock variables S. The specification further con-
trols for an array of household and community characteristics X, which 
includes measures of i) economic status, ii) human capital iii) social capi-
tal iv) demographic features v) religion of the head and vi) regional 
dummies (see Appendix Table A2.1 and A2.2 for details). A clear limita-
tion of our analysis is that while (2.1) controls for a wide range of covari-
ates, the error term   might still include unobserved household-specific 
heterogeneity that may influence both the incidence of shocks and the 
choice of coping strategy, thereby potentially confounding the analysis. 
While we cannot deal with this issue directly, as we only have access to 
cross-section data, we do examine the sensitivity of the estimates by es-
timating a number of alternative specifications. These include estimates 
which control for Kebele (lowest administrative unit) fixed effects to 
control for unobserved heterogeneity and seemingly unrelated (linear) 
regressions which allow the error terms for the different coping respons-
es to be correlated. 
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2.4 Estimates 
2.4.1 Frequency and scope of shocks 
Figure 2.1 presents the frequency of shocks experienced by households. 
Not unexpectedly, we find that shocks are an important part of the life 
of rural households. Almost three quarters of our sampled households 
have faced at least one type of shock in the past 12 months, which is 
high.11 Many of these households have experienced multiple shocks 
(Figure 2.2). A third of the sample reported just one shock, while 21 and 
11 per cent of households have faced two and three shocks, respectively. 
A small percentage of households have faced at least five shocks (4 per 
cent).  
Figure 2.1 
  Incidence of shocks (per cent of households) 
 
 
Unlike Heltberg and Lund (2009) and Wagstaff and Lindelow 
(2010), health shocks do not appear to dominate in terms of frequency 
(see Figure 2.1).12 The most frequent are natural shocks (47%), while 
health and economic shocks each affect almost one third of the sampled 
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households. Shocks related to crime/conflict/family are not as frequent 
and are experienced by 7 per cent of the sampled households.  
Figure 2.2 
Number of shocks experienced (per cent of households) 
 
  
In terms of the scope of shocks (see Table 2.1), we find that 
health shocks are the most idiosyncratic of all shock types as about 84 
per cent of such shocks are reported to have affected only the household 
itself. This is expected in cases where the health shock is not an epidem-
ic. Natural shocks show a strong covariate pattern, with more than 92 
per cent having effects beyond the household. Economic shocks may 
also be classified as partially covariate as the majority of such shocks 
(66%) tend to affect more than the household in question. 
Crime/conflict/family shocks, on the other hand, seem relatively idio-
syncratic as 74 per cent of such shocks affect only the reporting house-
hold. 
As discussed in the introduction, the distinction between covari-
ate and idiosyncratic shocks has implications for the portfolio of availa-
ble coping strategies. Theoretically, households should be able to draw 
on informal risk-sharing networks (borrowing, social support and use of 
labour based strategies) to deal with health and crime/conflict/family 
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related shocks as these are relatively idiosyncratic. In contrast, for rela-
tively covariate shocks (natural and economic) of similar severity in 
terms of cost to an individual household, the potential to access informal 
support (or credit) or enhance labour supply may be reduced if the local 
community is also affected by the shock.13 The link between shock type, 
the available coping responses and the validity of the theoretically ex-
pected ability to cope with some shocks versus others is explored in 
more detail in the next section. 
Table 2.1 
 Scope of shocks 
 Affected 
only my 
household 
Affected 
some house-
holds in this 
Kebele 
Affected all 
households 
in this 
Kebele 
Affected 
this and 
nearby 
Kebeles 
Affected 
areas be-
yond this 
Kebele 
Health 83.89 14.04 1.69 0.00 0.00 
Natural 7.37 29.65 38.63 20.93 3.32 
Economic 34.26 12.89 30.67 17.46 4.40 
Crime/ con-
flict/family 
73.95 23.53 2.52 0.00 0.00 
Notes: All figures are in percentages 
 
2.4.2 Distribution of shocks 
Probit estimates (marginal effects) of the probability of experiencing 
each of the four shock types as a function of various traits are provided 
in Table 2.2.14 With regard to household wealth status, as reflected in the 
asset index, we find that households in the second and third quintiles are 
7 to 9 percentage points less likely to report a health shock as compared 
to the poorest quintile while the difference is not statistically significant 
for the other quintiles. The wealth gradient for economic shocks is also 
not systematically significant with only the second quintile having a sig-
nificantly higher chance of reporting an economic shock as compared to 
the poorest quintile. The case of a natural shock is mixed. While house-
holds in the second and third quintile have a higher probability of report-
ing natural shocks, those in the richest quintile are less likely to report 
natural shocks. The latter could reflect the fact that the richest house-
holds live in areas less prone to natural disasters such as floods. We do 
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not find any statistically significant wealth gradient for the case of 
crime/conflict/family shock.  
Turning to measures of human capital, consistent with the posi-
tive association between education and health, households where heads 
have informal education are about 13 percentage points less likely to re-
port health shocks as compared to households where heads have no ed-
ucation.  For higher education levels this difference is both statistically 
and economically insignificant perhaps reflecting a non-linear link be-
tween awareness of health conditions and the reporting of health shocks. 
The association between economic shocks and educational level of the 
household head appears to have a positive gradient. However, the only 
statistically significant difference is between households whose heads 
have primary education as compared to those with no education (about 7 
percentage points). There is no particular pattern between human capital 
measures and natural and crime/conflict/family shocks.  
Larger families are more likely to report having experienced a 
health, economic and natural shock. Perhaps this is not surprising as 
larger families, simply due to their size, may be more likely to experience 
these shocks. For the most part, the gender of the household head and 
gender composition of the household does not have a bearing on the 
probability of experiencing shocks.  
There is a clear link between geographical location and the preva-
lence of shocks. For instance, households in the Amhara region seem to 
be far more vulnerable to health, natural and crime/conflict/family 
shocks as compared to households in Tigray. Households in SNNPR are 
more likely to report health, economic and crime/conflict/family shocks 
as compared to their counterparts in Tigray. While households residing 
in Oromiya are more likely to experience health and 
crime/conflict/family shocks as compared to their counterparts in Tig-
ray, the differences are not as pronounced.   
Overall, the gist of the analysis is that while the link between the 
various traits and the shock variables varies across shocks, it is clear that 
shocks are not uniformly distributed. There are differences across geo-
graphical locations, levels of economic status and human capital endow-
ment and there is a need to control for such traits in equation (2.1). 
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Table 2.2  
Probability of experiencing a shock 
  Health Economic Natural Crime/conflict/family 
Economic 
status 
Asset quintile 2 -0.0699* 0.0846* 0.0957** -0.00228 
 (0.0368) (0.0484) (0.0461) (0.0165) 
Asset quintile 3 -0.0908** 0.0758 0.105** -0.0108 
 (0.0384) (0.0491) (0.0514) (0.0160) 
Asset quintile 4 -0.0592 0.0762 0.0550 0.00622 
 (0.0361) (0.0520) (0.0500) (0.0167) 
Asset quintile 5 -0.0574 0.0467 -0.0538 0.00337 
 (0.0437) (0.0615) (0.0583) (0.0193) 
Human capi-
tal (Head's 
education) 
Informal educ. -0.124*** 0.0275 0.00891 -0.0160 
 (0.0303) (0.0401) (0.0481) (0.0127) 
Primary educ. -0.0165 0.0699** 0.0435 -0.0134 
 (0.0299) (0.0343) (0.0313) (0.0130) 
Secondary (+) educ. 0.0244 0.0994 -0.0786 -0.00296 
 (0.0520) (0.0699) (0.0840) (0.0273) 
Demographics Household size 0.0236*** 0.0207*** 0.0180** -0.00495* 
 (0.00673) (0.00676) (0.00800) (0.00300) 
Age of head 0.000548 0.000479 -0.000532 -0.00137*** 
 (0.000861) (0.00110) (0.00113) (0.000481) 
Head sex (male=1) 0.0353 -0.00234 0.0524 -0.0132 
 (0.0393) (0.0428) (0.0436) (0.0202) 
Male share 0.00496 -0.0933 -0.120* 0.00987 
 (0.0657) (0.0655) (0.0712) (0.0272) 
Adult share 0.156** 0.128** 0.00389 -0.0339 
 (0.0638) (0.0643) (0.0745) (0.0275) 
Head’s reli-
gion  
Orthodox 0.202*** 0.109* -0.0648 0.0488*** 
 (0.0380) (0.0622) (0.0666) (0.0161) 
Protestant 0.168* -0.0296 0.0736 0.00128 
 (0.0885) (0.0669) (0.0925) (0.0304) 
Other religion 0.0232 -0.134* 0.0518 0.00568 
 (0.107) (0.0759) (0.146) (0.0506) 
Continued on next page 
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Table 2.2 (continued)  
Probability of experiencing a shock 
  Health Economic Natural Crime/conflict/family 
Region dum-
my 
Amhara 0.508*** 0.0589 0.295*** 0.200*** 
 (0.0483) (0.0801) (0.0614) (0.0435) 
Oromiya 0.116** -0.0889 0.0182 0.106*** 
 (0.0504) (0.0572) (0.0746) (0.0374) 
SNNPR 0.526*** 0.349*** -0.0896 0.123** 
 (0.0788) (0.0720) (0.0872) (0.0480) 
 Observations 1630 1630 1630 1630 
 Pseudo R2 0.1937 0.0871 0.0679 0.0925 
Notes: The reference category for the asset quintiles is the poorest quintile; the reference category for 
the measure of human capital is the head of the household has no education; the reference category for 
religion is Muslim and for the regional dummies is Tigray. 
Standard errors are in parentheses and allow for clustering at the Kebele level; ***,**,* refer to 1%, 5% 
and 10% level of significance respectively 
 
2.4.3 Shocks and coping responses: a bivariate analysis 
Households rely on multiple responses to deal with the effects of shocks 
while at the same time a substantial proportion of households (between 
13 and 37%) do not resort to an active response when faced by a shock 
(Table 2.3).  This may be due to an inability to undertake an active re-
sponse or perhaps that a shock is not particularly severe and does not 
require a response. For instance, in the case of health shocks the lack of 
a response may be due to lack of financial resources or because the con-
dition is minor.  We return to an exploration of the link between no ac-
tive response and severity of shocks in the following sub-section. 
With regard to internal coping responses, there is substantial var-
iation according to the type of shock experienced. We see that house-
holds tend to rely quite heavily on their own savings to cope with natural 
and economic shocks (41% and 37%, respectively) while drawing on sav-
ings is less likely in the case of health and crime/conflict/family shocks 
(about 16% of households). Similarly, we find that households are more 
likely to reduce their food consumption in the case of natural and eco-
nomic shocks (58% and 38% respectively) as compared to health and 
crime/conflict/family shocks (about 19%). A third internal household 
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response is the sale of assets to cope with shocks. Such a response may 
protect households in the short-run but may have adverse long-term 
consequences. While this may be the case, we find that household reli-
ance on this coping measure is relatively uniform across shocks and lies 
between 22 (economic shocks) to 30 per cent (health shocks).  Perhaps 
due to thin labour markets in rural Ethiopia, increasing household labour 
supply in response to a shock is not very common and is exercised by 
about 4 to 5 per cent of households. 
Table 2.3 
Coping responses and shocks: Descriptive statistics 
Coping response 
 
Per cent of households who used a specific 
coping response conditional on experiencing 
a shock 
 
 
Differences in proportions  
(p-values) 
 
Healt
h vs. 
Natu-
ral 
Health 
 vs. 
Crime/con
flict/famil
y 
Health  
vs. Eco-
nomic 
All shocks 
(N=1183) 
Health 
(N=509) 
Natural 
(N=771) 
Crime/con
flict/fami
ly 
(N=113) 
Econom-
ic 
(N=534) 
Dissaved 39 15.72 
 
40.86 
 
16.81 
 
37.08 
 
0.000 0.773 0.000 
Reduced food consump-
tion 
50 19.06 
 
58.24 
 
18.58 
 
38.20 
 
0.000 0.908 0.000 
Sold assets (incl. food 
stocks) 
35 29.86 
 
28.66 
 
27.43 
 
21.72 
 
0.644 0.608 0.003 
Borrowed 16 18.47 
 
8.17 
 
1.77 
 
11.61 
 
0.000 0.000 0.002 
Received support 4 4.72 
 
2.46 
 
3.54 
 
2.25 
 
0.029 0.586 0.029 
Labor supply based strat-
egy 
7 4.72 
 
5.19 
 
4.42 
 
3.93 
 
0.704 0.895 0.534 
No coping response 30 21.41 
 
13.36 
 
30.09 
 
37.08 
 
0.000 0.047 0.000 
Notes: The last 3 columns report p-values from a test of equality of proportions. 
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A key external coping response that may postpone the adverse 
effect of shocks is borrowing. About 18 per cent of households who face 
health shocks borrow in order to cope with costs of treating illnesses 
while this is much less common for other shock types – 12 per cent in 
the case of economic shocks, 8 per cent for natural shocks and 2 per 
cent for crime/conflict/family shocks. In terms of the source of borrow-
ing, the bulk of the loans, across all shock types but especially in the case 
of health shocks, are provided by relatives and neighbours (Table 2.4). 
Reliance on money lenders, arguably the worst form of credit (in terms 
of interest rate and repayment conditions) is not very common.  The 
qualitative interviews revealed that most households consider borrowing 
as a last resort (93%). Respondents provided four reasons for avoiding 
this coping response. First, they dislike borrowing from money lenders 
as the repayment period is short and the pressure involved may ruin rela-
tionships with the lender. Second, even though households tend to bor-
row from relatives and neighbours they have to pay interest if the loan is 
for longer than a short time-period, usually about a month.15 Third, 
households with no livestock and land are required to provide a guaran-
tor and this may not always be possible. Fourth, households are reluctant 
to borrow as it is considered a loss of face/pride and psychologically dis-
comforting. For instance, a male respondent of Abua Kokit Kebele in 
Amhara Regional State mentioned, 
“… borrowing from people is like syphilis. I cannot sleep and want the 
earth to swallow me every moment I see the lender” [interview conducted 
on February 1, 2013].  
 
Contrary to conventional wisdom (see Dekker 2004; de Weerdt 
and Dercon 2006; World Bank 2013), gifts, either in cash or kind from 
family, friends, neighbours and other informal groups is not a common 
response and reliance on this source ranges from a low of about 2 per 
cent in the case of economic shocks to 5 per cent in the case of health 
shocks.16 The qualitative interviews confirm the low reliance on gifts 
from family and friends. Not only is such support almost non-existent 
but almost all the households that were interviewed mentioned that they 
did not like to ask for help as it would hurt their pride/self-esteem and 
expose their inability to cope with a shock. For instance, a male respond-
ent of Kebabi Kebele in Tigray region stated,  
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“I really don’t like to ask people to give me something or to help me. I 
prefer to sell  what I have and if need be to collect and sell fire wood” [in-
terviewed on January 21, 2013] 
A female respondent from the same area said,  
“I prefer selling what I have. I have never borrowed but people may give 
you if you ask for it when you face such problem. If I face a strong prob-
lem of that kind, I prefer borrowing [as opposed to asking for a gift] and 
then repay the money by selling some stuff” [interviewed on January 21, 
2013]. 
Table 2.4 
Sources of borrowing 
 Percent of households who borrowed from [source] given shocks 
Source of bor-
rowing 
All 
shocks 
(N=1183) 
Health 
(N=509) 
Natural 
(N=771) 
Crime/conflict/family 
(N=113) 
Economic 
(N=534) 
Relatives 8 10.41 
 
4.54 
 
1.77 
 
3.93 
 
Neighbours 4 6.29 
 
1.17 
 
- 
 
2.81 
 
Money lenders 1 1.18 
 
0.39 
 
- - 
Formal sources 3 1.18 
 
2.20 
 
- 5.24 
 
Iddir 0.4 0.98 
 
- - - 
Iqqub 0.2 - - - 0.37 
 
 
While we cannot comment on the magnitude of the reliance on 
different coping responses (for instance, the amount of money borrowed 
or value of assets sold) it is clear that households are more likely to rely 
on internal coping response in the face of natural and economic shocks 
as compared to health and crime/conflict/family shocks and on external 
coping responses, that is, borrowing when faced with health shocks.17 
These differences may be due to a number of factors. First, the greater 
reliance on internal household coping responses in the face of natural 
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and economic shocks may be attributed to the nature of the shocks in 
the sense that both natural and economic shocks are relatively covariate 
and it may be difficult to rely on external coping responses, especially 
borrowing from friends and relatives, the dominant sources of credit, 
when a shock affects an entire community. On the other hand, health 
and crime/conflict/family shocks are characterized as relatively idiosyn-
cratic and households may indeed be able to resort to external coping 
responses under such circumstances. Second, by their very nature, as 
compared to non-health shocks, coping with an episode of ill-health re-
quires immediate access to liquid resources (cash) to finance lump-sum 
out-of-pocket health expenditure and hence the greater reliance on bor-
rowing as opposed to responses such as a reduction in food consump-
tion.18 Consistent with this claim, the qualitative information shows that 
26 of 42 interviewees borrowed to cope with health care and of these 65 
per cent borrowed because they needed urgent health care either on a 
non-market day or at a time when they judged that the market price of 
the food stocks and the assets they owned was unfavourable.19 However, 
shortly after, almost all of them repaid their loans by selling assets (main-
ly livestock but also food stocks).   
2.4.4 Coping, shock severity and multiple shocks  
The correlation between the reported severity of a shock (household was 
slightly, moderately or strongly affected) and the associated coping re-
sponses is shown in Table 2.5.  
Across all shocks we find the proportion of households report-
ing no active response declines as the severity of shock increases. This is 
particularly pronounced in the case of health and economic shocks. In 
the case of health shocks the lack of an active response declines from 31 
to 17 per cent when moving from slightly to strongly affected by the 
shock, while in the case of economic shocks the decline is from 66 to 35 
per cent. These patterns support the notion that the lack of an active re-
sponse, as displayed in Table 2.3, may in part be construed as evidence 
of a minor shock.  
With regard to the four main coping responses, the proportion 
of households who reduce savings and consumption, sell assets or bor-
row is an increasing function of the perceived severity of shocks. For 
example, the percentage of households who borrow more than doubles 
for almost all shocks as we go from the least to the most severe category. 
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Asset sales also show the same pattern except in the case of natural 
shocks. With regard to health shocks, as severity increases a greater pro-
portion of households are forced to rely on asset sales and borrowing. 
For example, to cope with the most severe health shocks 38 per cent of 
households resort to sale of assets, while this is 31 per cent in the case of 
crime/conflict/family shocks and somewhat lower for other shock types 
(27 and 24 per cent for natural and economic shocks, respectively). Dif-
ferences across shocks is more pronounced in the case of borrowing 
with 25 per cent of households resorting to it in the case of the most se-
vere health shock while the figures range between about 3 per cent for 
the most severe crime/conflict/family shock to 14 per cent for a strong 
economic shock.  
Reliance on friends and family especially in the case of the more 
idiosyncratic shocks (health and crime/conflict/family shocks) is also 
linked to shock severity. In the case of health (crime/conflict/family) 
shocks only 2 (3.7) per cent of households rely on such support when 
faced with a minor shock while the figure is 9 (7.7) per cent in the case 
of a strong shock. Enhancing labour supply is not receptive to the se-
verity of the shock as it probably depends on labour market opportuni-
ties rather than household willingness to supply labour. 
2.4.5 Shocks and coping: multivariate analysis  
A complete set of the multivariate coping response analyses is provided 
in Appendix Table A2.1, while estimates of the key variables of interest 
are displayed in Table 2.6.20 Economic and natural shocks, that is, shocks 
that are relatively covariate in nature are more likely to trigger dissaving 
and a reduction in food consumption. For instance, households experi-
encing economic and natural shocks are 27 (24) and 30 (41) percentage 
points, respectively, more likely to dissave (reduce food consumption) as 
compared to households that do not experience such shocks. They also 
engage in asset sales (10 to 16 percentage points) but this coping re-
sponse is far less likely as compared to coping by reducing savings and 
food consumption. Coping by relying on support from friends and fami-
ly is not a viable response. 
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Table 2.5 
 Coping response by reported severity of shocks (% of households) 
 
 
Coping response 
Health Natural 
Slight  
n=202 
Moderate 
n=123 
Strong 
n=162 
Differences 
in propor-
tions-  
Slight vs. 
Strong 
(p-values) Slight 
n=49 
Moderate 
n=250 
Strong 
n=470 
Differences 
in  
proportions-   
Slight vs. 
Strong 
(p-values) 
Disaved  11.39 16.26 22.84 0.003 30.61 45.60 39.36 0.231 
Reduced food 
consumption 8.42 29.27 27.16 0.000 42.86 72.00 52.77 0.187 
Sold assets (incl. 
food stocks) 25.74 30.89 38.27 0.010 32.65 32.00 26.60 0.364 
Borrowed  11.88 24.39 24.69 0.001 6.12 5.20 10.00 0.381 
Received support 1.98 3.25 9.26 0.002 0.00 2.00 2.98 0.221 
Labor supply 
based strategy  6.44 4.07 3.70 0.244 6.12 6.40 4.47 0.599 
No coping re-
sponse 30.69 15.45 17.28 0.003 16.33 9.20 15.11 0.821 
 
Coping response 
Crime/Conflict/family Economic 
Slight  
n=27 
Moderate 
n=43 
Strong 
n=39 
Differences 
in propor-
tions-  
Slight vs. 
Strong 
(p-values) 
Slight 
n=61 
Moderate 
n=150 
Strong 
n=315 
Differences 
in  
propor-
tions-   
Slight vs. 
Strong 
(p-values) 
Disaved  14.81 11.63 25.64 0.290 26.23 40.67 36.83 0.113 
Reduced  food 
consumption 14.81 25.58 15.38 0.949 24.59 48.00 36.51 0.073 
Sold assets (incl. 
food stocks) 14.81 34.88 30.77 0.137 9.84 22.00 24.13 0.013 
Borrowed  0.00 2.33 2.56 0.402 6.56 8.67 13.97 0.112 
Received support 3.70 0.00 7.69 0.504 1.64 0.67 2.86 0.589 
Labor supply 
based strategy  3.70 2.33 7.69 0.504 8.20 6.00 1.90 0.008 
No coping re-
sponse 33.33 32.56 28.21 0.656 65.57 30.67 35.24 0.000 
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Table 2.6 
Probability of relying on a specific coping response  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES Dissaved 
Reduce food 
consumption  Sold asset  Borrowed  
Received 
Support   
Adjusted 
labour supply  
No cop-
ing re-
sponse 
                
Shocks        
Crime/conflict/family 0.0861 0.0320 0.142*** -0.0240 0.0117 -0.00464 0.173*** 
 (0.0596) (0.0683) (0.0586) (0.0316) (0.0161) (0.0192) (0.0608) 
Health shock 0.174*** 0.0201 0.170*** 0.152*** 0.0336*** 0.0137 0.0314 
 (0.0480) (0.0481) (0.0407) (0.0236) (0.0116) (0.0128) (0.0420) 
Economic shock 0.267*** 0.241*** 0.0979*** 0.0678*** 0.00403 -0.00512 0.227*** 
 (0.0408) (0.0435) (0.0372) (0.0247) (0.00599) (0.0128) (0.0403) 
Natural shock 0.301*** 0.406*** 0.162*** 0.0348* 0.00232 -0.00218 0.0693** 
 (0.0480) (0.0453) (0.0356) (0.0234) (0.00586) (0.0127) (0.0351) 
Observations 1,175 1,175 1,175 1,175 1,175 1,175 1,175 
Pseudo R2 0.139 0.311 0.107 0.100 0.236 0.187 0.246 
Notes: Selected marginal effects from a probit model are reported (see Appendix Table A2.1 for the full specification); 
standard errors are in parentheses and allow for clustering at the kebele level; ***,**,* refer to 1%, 5% and 10% level of 
significance, respectively.  
 
Coping with health shocks, which are relatively idiosyncratic and 
trigger a need for cash to meet treatment costs, are met mainly by a re-
duction in savings, asset sales and borrowing. Comparisons across shock 
types reveal several clear differences. First, while households experienc-
ing a health shock are 15 percentage points more likely to borrow as 
compared to those who don’t, the corresponding figures for economic 
and natural shocks is 7 and 3 percentage points. 
Given the nature of shocks (covariate) and the main source of 
borrowing (relatives and neighbours) it is likely that borrowing as a via-
ble coping response is constrained when households experience natural 
and economic shocks. Second, a reduction in food consumption is not 
associated with a health shock. This is consistent with the argument that 
given the immediate need for cash to cover treatment costs, a reduction 
in food consumption is perhaps not always a viable response when 
households face a health shock. Based on the qualitative interviews we 
found that although the sale of food stocks and a reduction in food con-
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sumption are two different coping responses in the household survey, 
for several households selling food stocks was synonymous with a reduc-
tion in food consumption.21 Hence, while health shocks may also tend to 
lead to a reduction in food consumption through sales of food stocks the 
effect may be postponed due to the immediate reliance on borrowing.  
Third, although not overwhelming there is some support from family 
and friends, and households that experience health shocks are 3 percent-
age points more likely to receive support as compared to households 
who do not experience such shocks. Fourth, in the case of health shocks 
it seems that all households experiencing such events adopt an active 
coping response. This is in stark contrast to the other shocks where there 
is evidence that a substantial proportion of households do not respond 
actively. In addition to the possibility that the shocks are minor and do 
not require a response, it is possible that in the case of covariate shocks 
coping responses may be limited and households may ‘do nothing’ as a 
last resort.22 
2.5 Concluding remarks  
Motivated by the idea that the apparent insurability of consumption for 
certain shocks vis-à-vis others may be driven by different coping re-
sponses to different types of shocks, this paper used data from a highly 
shock prone country, Ethiopia, to investigate a relatively neglected ques-
tion, that is, which shocks trigger which coping responses and why. This 
question is important as the insurability of contemporaneous consump-
tion against certain shocks compared to others may lead to misleading 
policy priorities regarding the need for various safety nets. Differences in 
consumption effects may in fact be caused by differences in coping re-
sponses to different shocks. This study examines these possibilities. 
We found that natural shocks dominate in terms of frequency 
and have affected almost half of all sampled households in the past 12 
months, while economic and health shocks have each affected about a 
third. Crime/conflict/family related shocks are rare and have been expe-
rienced only by 7 per cent of the households. In terms of scope, natural 
and economic shocks may be characterized as relatively covariate, or par-
tially covariate, as their effects tend to be widespread and may affect 
multiple households simultaneously, as opposed to health and 
crime/conflict/family shocks which are relatively idiosyncratic. 
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Consistent with theoretical expectations, we found clear differ-
ences in terms of coping strategies across shock types. The two relatively 
covariate shocks – economic and natural – were more likely to trigger 
dissaving and a reduction in food consumption while the sale of assets 
and borrowing was a relatively less likely response. Coping with health 
shocks which typically trigger a need for cash to meet treatment costs 
was met by reductions in savings, asset sales and especially a far greater 
reliance on borrowing from informal sources as compared to other 
shocks. Reducing food consumption, a prominent response in the case 
of covariate shocks, was notable due to its absence in the case of health 
shocks. The lack of reliance on such an approach is consistent with the 
need for cash to treat health shocks which cannot be readily met by re-
ducing food consumption.  While relying on informal networks for bor-
rowing and support is far more likely in the case of relatively idiosyncrat-
ic health shocks, a notable feature is that across all shock types, 
households do not tend to rely much on borrowing, support from family 
and friends or on enhancing their labour supply as coping approaches. 
Furthermore, as clearly displayed by the qualitative data, households do 
not like to rely on their networks for gifts and when they do borrow 
from family and neighbours it is a last resort, and an intermediate strate-
gy as households attempt to repay as soon as possible by selling assets. 
Households were also reluctant to borrow as they have to pay interest 
unless a loan is for a short period, and because borrowing is associated 
with a loss of pride.      
The links between the coping response and the shocks reported 
in this paper are consistent with the results in Asfaw and von Braun 
(2004) and Dercon et al. (2005) but suggest a different interpretation.  
According to Asfaw and von Braun (2004), total (purchased and own) 
food consumption is insured against illnesses experienced by the house-
hold head while non-food consumption is not. As they state in their pa-
per “the hypothesis of food consumption insurance cannot be rejected 
in the case of total food consumption, implying that basic items that 
come from own production and from external sources (gifts) are better 
insured and insensitive to the illness of the head”. An alternative inter-
pretation of this finding, given the minor role played by gifts from family 
and friends, is that a reduction in food consumption is not sensitive to 
health shocks as such reductions are not a viable coping response to a 
health shock. Instead, consistent with the reduction in non-food con-
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sumption, households resort to measures such dissaving, borrowing and 
sales of assets in order to generate financial resources needed to deal 
with the health shocks. This may potentially postpone the adverse ef-
fects.  Flores et al. (2008) argue along similar lines and point out that ig-
noring the possibility that health care may have been financed through 
borrowing and asset sales contributes to under estimating health shock’s 
impoverishing effect as current consumption appears unaffected.   
The analysis presented in the paper relied on cross-section data, 
which remains vulnerable to unobserved heterogeneity as there may be 
unobserved household specific traits that influence both shocks and cop-
ing strategies. While we do control for a wide range of observed charac-
teristics and examine the sensitivity of the estimates in a number of ways, 
the cross-section nature of the analysis remains a limitation. Notwith-
standing this shortcoming, the analysis clearly shows that informal safety 
nets and reliance on friends and family for support, at least in the form 
of gifts, even in the case of idiosyncratic shocks is virtually non-existent. 
While informal borrowing to deal with idiosyncratic shocks does appear 
to provide some succour, it is often shunned. This suggests a potentially 
important role for formal protection systems. Since 2005, to deal with 
covariate shocks, the Ethiopian government has been operating the Pro-
ductive Safety Net Programme (PSNP). However, there is as yet no na-
tionwide programme to provide financial protection against out-of-
pocket expenditures needed to deal with health shocks. As shown in the 
paper, given the frequency of such events, and the sale of assets and the 
indebtedness generated by such shocks there is a need for health insur-
ance schemes which work towards mitigating the financial consequences 
of health shocks.23 Whether the recently launched community based 
health insurance scheme can play such a role is a question that requires 
further scrutiny. 
 
Notes 
 
1 This paper is published in Journal of Development Studies, Vol. 50(7), (2014):  
pages 1009-1024. It is also available as Institute of Social Studies Working Paper 
No. 560 (2013) and African Studies Centre Working Paper No. 110 (2013). A 
Policy Brief version has appeared in the bulletin of the Organization for Social 
Science Research in Eastern and Southern Africa, OSSREA Bulletin XI No. 1 
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(February 2014) and African Studies Centre Infosheet 22 (2014). The paper is co-
authored with Anagaw Mebratie, Robert Sparrow, Degnet Abebaw, Marleen 
Dekker, Getnet Alemu, and Arjun S. Bedi. The manuscript benefited from useful 
comments and suggestions of two anonymous referees. 
 
2 Shocks are defined as the unexpected occurrence of a certain event without re-
gard to the magnitude of the effect. Other studies define the term as “adverse 
events that lead to reduction in income, consumption or loss of assets” (e.g. Der-
con et al. (2005)). 
     
3 Typically such papers examine whether current household consumption is af-
fected by a shock that has occurred in the past and interpret the lack of a negative 
effect on consumption as a sign that households are able to insure themselves 
against the consequences of a shock. See for example, Kochar (1999), Gertler and 
Gruber (2002), de Weerdt and Dercon (2006), Hoddinot (2006), Wagstaff (2007), 
Gertler et al. (2009), Islam and Maitra (2012) and Sparrow et al. (2014). For in-
stance, Islam and Maitra (2012) have examined the effect of health shocks in 
Bangladesh, Kochar (1999) studies the effect of an agricultural shock in India, 
Wagstaff (2007) looks at the effect of health shocks in Vietnam and Hoddinot 
(2006) analyzes the effect of drought in Zimbabwe. 
 
4 The study is a part of a larger project designed to investigate the effect of a re-
cently introduced pilot community based health insurance scheme. From each 
region four districts were selected. Three of these are districts where the pilot 
health insurance scheme is being offered and one is a control district. 
 
5 An increase in the price of goods and price of inputs was omitted as inflationary 
pressure has been the norm in Ethiopia for the last few years. 
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6 The survey asked the following questions 1) How strongly is the household af-
fected by these shocks? a) slightly b) somewhat c) strongly. 2) How many house-
holds were affected by this shock? a) only my household b) some households in 
the Kebele c) all households in the Kebele d) this Kebele and other Kebeles nearby e) 
affected areas beyond this Kebele. 3) Mention three most important coping re-
sponses used by the household. The code for the coping response employed in-
cludes: reduce savings, reduce household food consumption, sell assets, sell food 
stocks, borrow from -relatives, -neighbours, -money lenders, -formal sources, -
iddir (funeral societies), -iqqub (credit associations), cash transfers from fami-
ly/friends/neighbors, increase in labor supply, increase hired labor input, send 
out family member to find work outside Kebele, new marriage, help from informal 
group in kind/ labor, help from neighbors in kind/labor, other (specify) and no 
coping. Unfortunately we do not have information on the intensity of the coping 
response, that is, the extent of the reduction in consumption or the amount of 
borrowing. 
 
7 Interviews were conducted with the household head or the spouse when the 
head was not available. 
 
8 We included 12 households who had been slightly affected by a health shock 
and 30 households who had been moderately or strongly affected by a health 
shock in 2012. The initial idea was to sample about 16 households per region.  
However, in each of the regions after about 7 to 8 interviews it was found that 
there was not much variation in the responses (so called saturation) and hence 
the final sample was reduced and the analysis presented here is based on 42 
households. 
 
9 The exact question in our survey is - How many households were affected by 
this shock? a) only my household b) some households in the Kebele c) all house-
holds in the Kebele d) this Kebele and other Kebeles nearby e) affected areas beyond 
this Kebele. 
 
10 A Spearman rank correlation of the quintiles of asset and consumption ex-
penditure is 0.52. More than 34 per cent of the observations are classified in the 
same quintile by both measures while 27.7 per cent of observations are classified 
differently by more than one quintile. This is very similar to DHS report by 
Rutstein and Johnson (2004). 
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11 Based on a three year recall period, Heltberg and Lund (2009) find that in Paki-
stan about two-thirds of the households have faced at least one type of shock. 
Based on a five year recall period, Dercon et al. (2005) find that in rural Ethiopia 
almost all households have suffered from at least one type of shock. 
 
12 Although comparisons are difficult due to differences in categorization, Der-
con et al. (2005) also find a broadly similar pattern. In their paper, drought (52%) 
is the most common shock followed by illness (39%). 
 
13 Sen (1981) has documented that covariate shocks like drought lead to a col-
lapse in demand for local services/crafts such that non-farm income activities 
cannot compensate for lost crop income. Based on an empirical study in West 
Africa, Fafchamps et al. (1998) show that non-farm income is positively correlat-
ed with covariate shocks affecting crop income. 
 
14 We do not control for occupation as the main occupation of the household 
head for 90 per cent of the households in the sample is agriculture. 
 
15 Respondents indicated that, if needed, they can and have borrowed from family 
and friends and do not need to pay any interest as long as they repay in a short 
time-period. In Amharic they used the term ‘ye élet bidir’. The literal translation is 
‘a loan for days’. On further probing it seemed that as long as the loan is repaid in 
about less than a month then there are no interest payments. 
 
16 In Tanzania, de Weerdt and Dercon (2006) show a private gift is one of the 
coping strategies in 60 percent of the shocks, while it is considered very im-
portant in 29 per cent of shocks. Although not directly comparable as the paper 
combines gifts and informal loans, in Zimbabwe, Dekker (2004) reports that as-
sistance from family and friends is the most frequently used manner of dealing 
with a shock. As mentioned earlier in the text we make a distinction between 
gifts, which do not need to be repaid and interest free loans which do need to be 
repaid. Our survey data show that most households borrow from friends and 
relatives (see Table 2.4) but loans have to be repaid and our qualitative analysis 
reveals that if a loan is for longer than a month interest is charged regardless of 
the source of the loan. 
 
17 Regardless of the type of shock, the qualitative interviews revealed a clear pref-
erence for internal coping responses as opposed to external coping responses. 
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Selling assets, mainly livestock but also crop output is the preferred coping re-
sponse if a household has no savings. 
 
18 While some health care services (for example, ante-natal care) are available 
without a fee, for the most part, health care services require cash payment. It is 
not possible to access health care services on credit. Cash may thus be needed for 
transport, consultation, medication and in some cases food and lodging and in-
formal fees. 
 
19 The other main reason, expressed by 27 per cent of the respondents, to resort 
to borrowing was lack of livestock or shortage of crop output when they need 
urgent health care. 
 
20 To examine the robustness of the estimates we (i) used a linear probability 
model and estimated seemingly unrelated regressions which allow error terms of 
the various coping response regressions to be correlated. The estimates are very 
similar to those reported in Table 2.6 (ii) estimated a linear probability model in-
cluding kebele fixed effects. Differences between the estimates reported in Table 
2.6 and specifications that included kebele fixed effects are minor and are availa-
ble in Appendix Table A2.3 and A2.4. 
 
21 16 of the 17 households which resorted to selling food stocks equated it with a 
reduction in consumption. 
 
22. We also estimated specifications where the probability of using a particular 
coping strategy was treated as a function of the number of each shock type expe-
rienced by a household as opposed to the incidence of a shock (see Appendix 
Figure A2.1). There are minor differences between the two sets of estimates and 
the narrative emerging from both sets of estimates does not differ. These esti-
mates are provided in Appendix Table A2.5 and A2.6. 
   
23 In Uganda, Dekker and Wilms (2010) have shown that health insurance pro-
tects households by reducing the amount that they borrow and by reducing asset 
sales when they face health shocks. 
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Channels of Impoverishment due to Ill-
Health in Rural Ethiopia1 
 
 
Abstract  
We use three years of household panel data and event history inter-
views to analyse the effects of ill-health on household economic out-
comes in Ethiopia. We examine the immediate effects of a variety of ill-
health measures on health expenditure and labor supply, the subsequent 
household coping responses, and finally the effect on household income 
and consumption. We find evidence of substantial economic risk in 
terms of increased health expenditure and reduced agricultural produc-
tivity. Households cope by resorting to borrowing and depleting assets. 
While households are able to maintain food consumption, we observe 
imperfect insurance of non-food consumption. This effect is larger for 
households with the lowest ability to self-insure. Maintaining current 
consumption through borrowing and depletion of assets is unlikely to be 
sustainable and displays the need for interventions that work towards 
reducing the financial consequences of ill-health. 
3.1 Introduction 
In recent years academic and policy debates on poverty dynamics in low-
income rural settings have highlighted the impoverishing effects of ill-
nesses due to unexpected expenditure on health care and foregone in-
come. The bulk of the existing studies on the economic consequences of 
ill-health have focused on consumption (for example Cochrane 1991; 
Foster 1994; Townsend 1994; Asfaw and von Braun 2004; Dercon et al. 
2005; Gertler et al. 2009; and Davies 2010). The mixed evidence on the 
ability of households to insure consumption against ill-health warrants 
studies that examine the channels through which ill-health affects con-
sumption and how households cope with the effects of ill-health. Identi-
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fying the channels through which ill-health influences consumption is 
instructive in order to understand the longer-term effects of ill-health 
and to determine the scope and welfare effects of public interventions.2 
A topical body of empirical literature has assessed the various 
links in this causal chain from ill-health to household consumption and 
potential poverty traps.3 The contribution of this study to this growing 
literature lies in the richness of the data employed. First, this paper builds 
on Yilma et al. (2014), which is restricted to cross-section data, and of-
fers a more comprehensive analysis of different channels through which 
household economic welfare is affected in rural Ethiopia. We use three 
years of household panel data combined with event history interviews 
conducted with households that have recently experienced an episode of 
ill-health, to analyse the effect of a variety of ill-health measures on 
household economic outcomes. We examine the immediate effects of ill-
health on health expenditure and labor supply, the subsequent household 
coping responses and finally the effects of ill-health on household in-
come and consumption. The existing literature on Ethiopia is restricted 
to examining the direct effect of ill-health on consumption (Asfaw and 
von Braun 2004; Dercon et al. 2005).     
Second, in addition to examining a range of channels and eco-
nomic outcomes we employ four ill-health measures of varying severity 
which reflect different dimensions of ill-health. The magnitude of ill-
health effects on economic welfare depends on the severity and type of 
health measure being used. For instance, Gertler and Gruber (2002) find 
that minor illnesses (change in head’s illness and chronic symptoms) are insured 
while less frequent and severe illnesses (limitations in physical functioning) are 
not. Other papers report similar findings.4 The existing evidence on 
Ethiopia (Asfaw and von Braun 2004; Dercon et al. 2005) does not make 
a distinction in terms of the severity of illness and results are mixed. 
While Dercon et al. (2005) reject the hypothesis of full consumption in-
surance against the ‘illness of a household member’, Asfaw and von Braun 
(2004) find that food consumption is protected against the ‘illness of the 
household head’ while non-food consumption is not insured. Distinguish-
ing between measures of ill-health is important for a better understand-
ing of the conduits of impoverishment as it is plausible that the nature of 
ill-health matters for coping responses.  
To preview our results, we find strong evidence that ill-health 
leads to an increase in health expenditure and a reduction in crop output, 
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and relatively weaker evidence that it leads to a drop in labor supply and 
total income. The effect on crop output occurs despite suggestive evi-
dence of intra-household labor substitution, which may point to labor 
productivity differences and the use of productive resources for financ-
ing health care. Households cope by depleting livestock and by borrow-
ing. While households are able to protect food consumption, we reject 
full consumption insurance in the case of non-food consumption partic-
ularly for households with the lowest ability to self-insure.  
The Government of Ethiopia is currently considering a nation-
wide roll-out of a pilot community based health insurance (CBHI) 
scheme which was introduced in 13 districts in mid-2011. Our results 
suggest that such health insurance schemes are likely to protect house-
holds against impoverishment by reducing their exposure to health ex-
penditure and by reducing the need to borrow and resort to the sale of 
assets.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 outlines 
a framework which guides the subsequent analysis. Section 3.3 describes 
data and methods. Section 3.4 presents estimates while section 3.5 con-
tains concluding observations. 
3.2 Analytical framework 
As depicted in Figure 3.1, the two immediate effects of ill-health are its 
effects on labor supply and on health expenditures.  Depending on its 
severity, ill-health may affect both labor productivity and labor supply. 
Whether this translates into a reduction in crop output (income) in the 
current context, where households are primarily engaged in self-
employed agriculture, is not clear. First, as noted by Kochar (1995), it 
depends on whether illness occurs in the slack or peak seasons. Second, 
since the need for specialized skills may not be as high as compared to 
other occupations, there is a greater possibility for intra-household labor 
substitution. In addition, hiring in wage labor and/or inter-household 
labor substitution, for example, through local labor sharing arrangements 
may also help mitigate the labor supply consequences of ill-health, alt-
hough hiring in labor does entail costs. Overall, the effect on income will 
depend on the effectiveness of a household’s coping strategy, that is, 
whether it is possible to compensate for the entire reduction in labor 
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supply and whether there are productivity differentials between the sick 
member and substituted labor. 
Figure 3.1 
Conduits of impoverishment due to ill-health 
 
Ill-Health of Household 
Head 
 
Reduction in labor supply/ 
productivity 
 
Increased Health Expenditure 
Coping Responses  
1. Intra-household labor substitution 
2. Sell livestock 
3. Borrow 
Crop output/Income 
Consumption 
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Conditional on seeking medical care, the second source of financial risk 
is increased health expenditure. The implications of this for household 
income and consumption depend on how health care is financed. First, 
households may rely on savings (including sale of food stocks) to meet 
such costs. To the extent that the use of savings to finance medical care 
curtails the ability of households to invest or purchase agricultural inputs, 
it may translate into reductions in crop output (income) and consump-
tion. Second, households may sell livestock – the key household asset – 
and/or borrow in order to finance health care needs.5 Such coping re-
sponses are likely to have deleterious consequences for future income 
and consumption, but they may allow households to protect current 
consumption. There are other coping possibilities, such as remittances 
from friends and relatives, which may have limited consequences for fu-
ture income and consumption.6 Notwithstanding this possibility, the 
main point is that focusing only on consumption provides an incomplete 
picture of the consequences of ill-health.  
Following the process illustrated in Figure 3.1, we begin by ex-
amining the immediate effect of ill-health/health status of a household 
head on labor supply and health expenditure, followed by an assessment 
of the coping responses adopted by households.7 Specifically, we consid-
er the effects on intra-household labor substitution, livestock holdings 
and borrowing.8 Finally, we provide an assessment of the effects of ill-
health on income and consumption.  
3.3 Data and Methods 
3.3.1 Data 
The study is based on three rounds of a panel household survey data col-
lected in 16 rural districts (Woredas), located in four regions of Ethiopia 
(Tigray, Amhara, Oromiya, and SNNPR) that together account for about 
86 percent of the country’s population (Population Census Commission, 
2008).9 The surveys were conducted in March-April 2011, 2012 and 2013 
and were purposively designed to gather information on a variety of ill-
health measures of varying severity and to enable an analysis of the vari-
ous channels through which these measures may influence household 
economic welfare. Within each district the surveys were canvassed in six 
randomly chosen Kebeles (peasant associations or villages). In each of the 
96 Kebeles, 17 households were randomly surveyed, yielding a total of 
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1,632 households comprising 9,455 individuals. Of the original sample of 
households, 98% and 97% were re-surveyed in 2012 and 2013, respec-
tively. 
The survey contains information on a variety of individual and 
household socioeconomic attributes such as consumption expenditure, 
crop output, off-farm income, on-farm and off-farm labor supply, live-
stock holdings, household demographics, employment and household 
health conditions. The survey contains a detailed health module that asks 
respondents to provide for each household member age 6 and older, in-
formation on general health status (excellent, very good, good, poor, 
very poor), incidence of illnesses experienced in the two months preced-
ing the survey, information on prolonged illnesses expressed as experi-
encing symptoms for more than 30 days, and information on the ability 
to carry out their activities of daily living (ADL). The ADL includes (i) 
stand up after sitting down, (ii) sweep the floor, (iii) walk for 5km or for 
an hour (if age 10 and older), (iv) carry 20 litres of water for 20 meters (if 
age 15 and older), and (v) hoe a field for three hours (if age 15 and old-
er). The responses are then coded as ‘can do it easily (code= 1), with a little 
difficulty (code=2), with a lot of difficulty (code=3) and not at all (code=4)’. 
In order to acquire a greater understanding of the mechanisms 
depicted in Figure 3.1, in January-February 2013, event history interviews 
were conducted with purposively selected households who had also been 
interviewed for the household survey. From each of the four regions, a 
district with a relatively high burden of ill-health was selected, and within 
each of the four districts, households were sampled based on the report-
ed incidence and severity of ill-health that they had experienced. A total 
of 42 households were interviewed.10  
3.3.2 Measures of ill-health 
We use information from the health module of the survey to construct 
four variables which capture the health status of a household head.  First, 
any illness experienced in the two months preceding the survey may be 
characterized as a short-term measure of health status, which reflects less 
severe illnesses and with which it might be easier to cope. Second, longer 
spells of illness, reflected by illness symptoms that have been persisting 
for 30 days or more, may have more serious labor supply consequences 
and require costlier medical treatment. Third, self-assessed health (SAH) 
status is a measure that covers multiple dimensions of health.     
 Channels of Impoverishment due to Ill-Health in Rural Ethiopia 39 
A key issue with the use of self-reported illness and the SAH 
measure is that they are likely to be affected by a household’s cultural 
and socio-economic background (Schultz and Tansel 1997; Islam and 
Maitra 2012).11 For instance, the definition of good health is likely to vary 
by wealth and educational status. In addition, for the same objective 
health condition, it is possible that the better-off or those who are more 
informed, report a higher incidence of illness (Sindelar and Thomas 
1991). Although these are valid concerns, the panel structure of the data 
allows us to control for household fixed effects which should mitigate 
concerns about the effect of wealth and educational status on self-
reported illnesses.  
Perhaps a more objective health status indicator that is negatively 
related to income and education (Schultz and Tansel 1997; Gertler and 
Gruber 2002) is the ADL index, which is based on five self-rated abilities 
to carry out specific tasks. In contrast to self-reported illness measures, 
the ADL index is less likely to be endogenous to some of the outcome 
variables (for instance, labor supply). Our computation of this index fol-
lows Gertler and Gruber (2002) and Gertler et al. (2009) and is based on 
the algorithm developed by Stewart et al. (1990), 









scoreMinimumscoreMaximum
scoreMinimumTscore
ADL ii
 
where iTscore  is the sum of the scores on all the activities of 
daily living reported by individual i , while the minimum and maximum 
score relate to the minimum and maximum Tscore  in the data. The in-
dex takes the value one if an individual cannot perform any of the five 
activities (or is the least able individual in the sample) and a value of zero 
if the individual can perform all activities easily (or is the most able in the 
sample).  
Descriptive statistics for the four health measures are provided in 
Table 3.1. In 2011, about 20% of household heads reported that they 
had experienced an illness in the two months preceding the survey. In 
2012 and 2013 the incidence of illnesses was lower at 13.5 and 15.3%, 
respectively. The incidence of prolonged (and perhaps more severe) ill-
nesses was lower and ranges between 5.4 to about 9%, depending on the 
year. The share of household heads reporting poor or very poor health 
status ranges between 6 to 9%. Consistent with the low incidence of 
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poor health status, the ADL index ranges between 0.051 and 0.080, 
which indicates that, on average, household heads are readily able to car-
ry out most of the activities of daily living. Over time, based on all four 
measures, there are changes in health status, although poor self-assessed 
health status and the incidence of prolonged illnesses are relatively stable 
(about 11% of household heads report a change) as compared to recent 
illnesses (24%) and the ADL index (30%). The fluctuation in the ADL 
index is similar to findings reported in Gertler and Gruber (2002) and 
Gertler et al. (2009).  
 
Table 3.1 
Summary statistics of health measures of the household head 
Health measures Mean /  
percent of household heads 
Change 2011-2012 
(percent of household heads) 
Change 2012-2013 
(percent of household heads) 
2011 2012 2013 Improve Same Worsen Improve Same Worsen 
Activities of daily 
living (ADL) index 
0.051 
(0.147) 
0.058 
(0.159) 
0.080 
(0.187) 
10.7 74.1 15.2 14 66.1 19.9 
Prolonged illness 
(symptoms for more 
than 30 days) 
9.1 5.4 6.2 7.8 88.1 4.1 4.3 90.4 5.3 
Illness in the two 
months preceding the 
survey 
20.1 13.5 15.3 15.9 74.4 9.7 10.8 76.7 12.5 
(Very) Poor Self-
Assessed Health Sta-
tus  
6.1 6.2 8.9 4.5 90.9 4.6 4.9 87.2 7.8 
Notes: All health measures except for the ADL index are dummy variables. For ADL standard deviations are reported in 
parentheses. Number of observations in 2011, 2012 and 2013, depending on the health measure, range between [1627-
1632], [1582-1597] and [1566-1583] respectively.  
   
3.3.3 Outcome variables 
We measure household expenditure on health care by aggregating costs 
incurred for outpatient and inpatient care, including traditional treat-
ments. This includes expenditure on consultation, diagnostic tests, medi-
cine and transportation. Information on outpatient care was reported for 
the two months preceding the survey while information on inpatient care 
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was provided for the twelve months preceding the survey. We extrapo-
late the health care costs incurred for outpatient care and use annualized 
health expenditure as our outcome variable of interest.12  
The employment module of the survey records each household 
member’s (age 6 and older) engagement in on-farm and off-farm activi-
ties in the four weeks preceding the survey.13 The information includes 
the number of days worked and the average number of hours per day 
worked on both types of activities. The two variables that we use to cap-
ture labor supply are the total number of hours worked (both on and 
off-farm) in the four weeks preceding the survey by the household head 
and the rest of the members of the household. 
Table 3.2  
Means and standard deviations of outcome variables 
Outcome varia-
bles 2011 2012 2013 
Outcome varia-
bles 2011 2012 2013 
Total consumption 249 
(162) 
367 
(692) 
406 
(529) 
Goats # 0.957 
(3.754) 
1.04 
(3.834) 
1.109 
(3.235) 
Food consumption 206  
(138) 
303 
(679) 
340 
(515) 
Sheep # 1.331 
(2.764) 
1.365 
(3.153) 
1.377 
(2.957) 
Non-food consump-
tion 
43 
(42) 
64 
(83) 
66 
(61) 
Calves # 0.651 
(1.019) 
0.687 
(1.238) 
0.654 
(1.944) 
Crop output (year) 7758 
(14137) 
10781 
(23369) 
11409 
(16184) 
Bulls # 0.366 
(1.013) 
0.338 
(1.085) 
0.371 
(1.417) 
Total income (year) 9354 
(17306) 
12024 
(18572) 
13574 
(17222) 
Oxen # 1.061 
(1.139) 
1.031 
(1.53) 
1.042 
(1.198) 
Health expenditure 
(year) 
359 
(1276) 
393 
(1624) 
353 
(1405) 
Total labor supply 
(household) 
229 
(247) 
225 
(213) 
262 
(215) 
Outstanding loan 666 
(1450) 
635 
(1432) 
798 
(1970) 
Total labor supply 
(head) 
92 
(77) 
89 
(76) 
102 
(82) 
 
  
 Total labor supply 
(others) 
137 
(206) 
137 
(170) 
160 
(177) 
Notes: Unless specified the variables are in monthly terms; standard deviations are in parentheses; Number of 
observations in 2011, 2012 and 2013, depending on the outcome variable, range between [1539-1632], [1473-1599] 
and [1471-1583] respectively. 
  
Information on household holdings of livestock, the main 
household asset used to cope with the financial consequences of ill-
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health, is recorded for goats, sheep, calves, bulls and oxen. We use the 
number of different types of livestock owned rather than their monetary 
values. While this measure is less susceptive to reporting mistakes, it 
clearly does not account for differences in the quality of livestock. It is 
possible that using the number of different livestock may lead to an un-
derestimate of the effect of ill-health on livestock ownership if house-
holds replace livestock that has been sold by smaller and lower quality 
animals. The probability of borrowing and the monetary value of all out-
standing loans at the time of the survey are used to measure indebted-
ness. 
Our measure of household income consists of two elements – 
the value of crop output and off-farm income. The survey gathered in-
formation on household annual output of 33 different crops. We use 
information on the per unit sales price of each crop to calculate the value 
of crop production. If a household did not sell a particular crop then we 
use the median district price of that crop to value crop output.14 Off-
farm income is calculated by multiplying the number of days worked in 
the past month by remuneration per day.15  
Our surveys collected information on the quantity and monetary 
value of 41 food items consumed in the week preceding the survey and 
expenditure on 34 non-food items in the past month or year. This in-
formation is used to compute monthly per adult equivalent food and 
non-food consumption expenditures (excluding health expenditures).16 
Table 3.2 provides summary statistics of the outcome variables.  
3.3.4 Methods 
The empirical model that we use to examine the various channels out-
lined in Figure 3.1 is similar to the specification used in a number of 
studies in this genre (Gertler and Gruber 2002, Asfaw and von Braun 
2004, Genoni 2012) and is written as, 
 
ivtivt
j
jivtvtivt εXλHβθTααY Δ+Δ+Δ+++=)(Δ ∑10  (3.1) 
For household  i  located in village v , we model changes in an 
outcome variable of interest ( ivtY ) as a function of a time dummy (T), a 
 Channels of Impoverishment due to Ill-Health in Rural Ethiopia 43 
village fixed effect ( v ), changes in the health conditions of the house-
hold head ( ivtH ), and changes in a vector of controls ( ivtX ) which 
includes household economic status (main occupation of the household 
head, asset index quintiles, membership in a productive safety net pro-
gramme), demographics (age, sex and religion of the head, log household 
size17 and the age-sex composition of the household), human capital (ed-
ucational status of the head), social capital (if the household has some-
one to rely on in times of difficulties), the incidence of shocks in the 
twelve months preceding the survey (economic, natural and crime-
conflict related) and a random error term ( ivt ).
18 Our focus is on the 
coefficient,  , which reflects the sensitivity to ill-health.19 We estimate 
several variants of (3.1) using different empirical methods, depending on 
the nature of the dependent variable, and provide robust standard errors 
clustered at the village level. 
  The use of a difference specification allows us to identify the ef-
fect of ill-health on various outcomes after controlling for the effects of 
time-invariant observed and unobserved variables. For instance, a 
household’s unobserved health endowment is likely to be correlated with 
the ill-health measures and labor supply and might confound estimates 
of the effect of illness on labor supply. However, as long as such en-
dowments are time-invariant, estimates based on (3.1) will not be affect-
ed.20 The set of village fixed-effects controls for village-specific differ-
ences in, among others, susceptibility to covariate shocks. To control for 
time-varying household specific shocks we estimate (3.1) with the inclu-
sion of a set of variables that captures the incidence of natural, economic 
and crime/conflict related shocks.  
Despite relying on a difference specification and the inclusion of 
various controls, there are additional empirical issues that warrant a dis-
cussion. For a number of the outcome variables, such as health expendi-
ture or the value of outstanding loans, the distributions are censored at 
zero and skewed. One possibility is to work with logged values of the 
variables and we do so in the case of consumption where we log con-
sumption before differencing. For the other outcome variables, due to 
zero values we work with levels. However, since the outcome variables 
are in first differences, skewness is minimized even without a log trans-
formation.21 Thus, similar to Gertler and Gruber (2002), the tables re-
ported in the main body of the paper are based on using OLS or logit 
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models with changes in log consumption and changes in levels of other 
outcomes as dependent variables.  
Nevertheless, as a robustness check and to probe the sensitivity 
of our results to the choice of specification, we also use several alterna-
tive models that are commonly applied to deal with such non-normal 
distributions. Following Genoni (2012), who argues that a quartic root is 
a good approximation to the log transformation for positive values, we 
also estimated (3.1) using changes in the quartic root of the outcome var-
iables (Appendix Table A3.2). With regard to health expenditure, Buntin 
and Zaslavsky (2004) note that zero observations can be accommodated 
without difficulty by employing one part generalized linear models. To 
this end, we also estimated the effect of ill-health on health expenditure 
using a Poisson fixed effects model (Appendix Table A3.3).22 Finally, we 
estimated equation (3.1) by adding 1 to the variables with zero outcomes 
and then taking logs and differencing the variables (Appendix Table 
A3.4). 
Changes in the health measures used in (3.1) and a number of the 
outcome variables may be simultaneously determined. For instance, 
household-specific changes in income due to crime or conflict may also 
have adverse effects on health outcomes. Several remarks are in order. 
First, we explicitly control for the incidence of natural, economic and 
conflict/crime related shocks in (3.1). Second, we use several measures 
of ill-health and while the self-reported illness measures are more likely 
to be susceptible to feedback effects it is less likely that the ADL index is 
as prone to such feedback effects. For instance, concerted labor effort is 
more likely to translate into illness as compared to influencing the ability 
of individual to engage in various activities of daily living.  
The effect of ill-health on consumption estimated with equation 
(3.1) may also be misleading if ill-health alters preferences. Conventional 
tests of consumption insurance assume that preferences are stable. How-
ever, if changes to health status induce changes in consumption prefer-
ences then this may confound the estimates of   in equation (3.1). In 
our empirical work we control for changes in demographic variables that 
may lead to a preference shift. Furthermore, we examine the effect of ill-
health affecting a household head on household consumption. Consider-
ing that the average household size in our baseline data is almost six, it 
seems unlikely that the health of the head will drive changes in house-
hold consumption preferences. To assess potential preference shifts we 
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use a test suggested by Gertler and Gruber (2002). We examine how es-
timates of (3.1) vary by the ability of a household to self-insure.23 If the 
effect of ill-health on consumption is due to changes in the budget con-
straint, then full consumption insurance will be less likely to hold as the 
ability to self-insure reduces. On the other hand if health induced prefer-
ences play a dominant role then the effect of ill-health on consumption 
should not be correlated with the ability to self-insure. Our measure of 
self-insurance ability is household ownership of livestock (sheep, goats, 
calves and bulls) in the first round of the survey. As discussed earlier, 
selling livestock, especially smaller ruminants, is often used to finance 
health care and in the current context serves as our measure of the ability 
of a household to self-insure.24  
A final concern is that the introduction of the community based 
health insurance scheme during the time period covered by the data may 
potentially confound estimates based on (3.1). While an evaluation of the 
scheme is beyond the scope of this paper and the variable is excluded 
from our baseline specification we do examine the sensitivity of our es-
timates to household uptake of the scheme (Appendix Table A3.1, A3.5 
and A3.6).  
3.4 Estimates  
3.4.1 Effects on health expenditure and labor supply 
Estimates of the effect of the four health measures on annual health ex-
penditure are reported in column 1 of Table 3.3. All the measures show 
that experiencing an illness or deterioration in health status leads to a 
statistically significant increase in health expenditure. For instance, 
households experiencing an illness in the two months preceding the sur-
vey are likely to experience an 874 Birr increase in annual household 
health expenditure while those who experience prolonged illness may 
expect to spend about 1,100 Birr on health care. These figures amount to 
between 4.1 and 5.3% of annual household consumption in 2012.25 A 
change in the household head’s health status to poor/very poor is asso-
ciated with an expenditure increase of about 793 Birr a year while a dete-
rioration in the ADL index of 0.2, which is equivalent to a movement 
from being able to easily do all the activities included in the index to an 
inability to execute one of them, is associated with additional expendi-
tures of about 334 Birr a year.26 Although the magnitudes of the esti-
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mates are not directly comparable, the statistical significance and signs of 
the estimates are robust to quartic root and log transformations (Appen-
dix Table A3.2 and A3.4), and estimation by Poisson fixed effects, Gen-
eralised Linear Models and Two Part Models (Appendix Table A3.3).  
Table 3.3 
Effect on health expenditure, labor supply and income 
 Health ex-
penditure 
Labor supply 
(head) 
Labor supply 
(others) 
Labor supply 
(household) 
Crop out-
put 
Total 
income 
ADL index 1,670*** -17.06* 36.94 25.31 -3,180 -3,527 
 (542.8) (9.463) (30.16) (35.56) (2,048) (2,476) 
Prolonged illness 1,108*** 1.355 20.82 21.22 -1,247* -802.3 
 (301.5) (4.767) (12.91) (14.17) (637.2) (1,933) 
Illness 873.9*** -0.260 16.50** 15.52 -2,008** -564.6 
 (168.1) (3.307) (7.889) (9.724) (914.5) (850.5) 
(Very) poor SAH 792.7*** -12.23*** 10.54 -4.556 -1,234* -1,577 
 (254.0) (4.648) (14.78) (17.27) (687.5) (1,006) 
Notes: Each coefficient is from a separate linear regression of equation (3.1). Number of observations ranges between 
[2664-3106]. Not reported but included in the specification are village fixed effects and measures of economic status, 
human capital, social capital, demographics, religion, year and shock dummies. Clustered standard errors (at 
Kebele/village level) are reported in parentheses.  
Statistical significance: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. 
 
 
Column 2 of Table 3.3 provides estimates of the effect of the 
various health measures on the labor supply of the household head while 
columns 3 and 4 contain labor supply estimates for other household 
members and the household as a whole, respectively. Deteriorations in 
self-assessed health status and in the ADL index are associated with re-
ductions in labor supply of between 12 and 17 hours per month (13 to 
19% of average household head labor supply in 2012). The two other 
illness measures do not translate into statistically discernible effects on 
the labor supply of the household head, at least in our baseline specifica-
tion. It is of course possible that the household head continues to supply 
the same amount of labor but is not as productive, an issue we are not 
able to test directly. Our robustness check for quartic root transfor-
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mation (Appendix Table A3.2) shows statistical significance for three out 
of four ill-health measures while the log transformation shows statistical 
significance for all of the ill-health measures (Appendix Table A3.4). 
Given the more conservative baseline estimates, we conclude that there 
is weak evidence of negative labor supply effects. 
3.4.2 Coping Responses  
We do not find strong evidence that a decline in the labor supply of the 
household head is matched by an increase in the labor supply of other 
members of the household. Although all coefficients are positive, it is 
precisely estimated only in the case of recent illnesses. The overall out-
come of this process of adjustment is that at the level of the household 
an illness episode or deterioration in health status does not translate into 
a reduction in labor supply.27 Our robustness checks for quartic root and 
log transformations show statistically significant over-compensation for 
illnesses, which might be due to productivity differences. The event-
history interviews also provide evidence of intra-household labor substi-
tution which support the suggestive statistical evidence. For instance,  
  
“I mostly feel sick partly due to old age but my children are healthy. In this 
month, I went to a private clinic in Woreta [nearest town] due to a worm 
in my foot... It took about 15 days till I completed the medication and I 
was not working but my children did the work well. All of them are 
grown-ups and I have educated them. [Male respondent, Woji Arbamba 
Kebele of Amhara region, Interview conducted on 31st January 2013]”  
While households might be able to (over-) compensate for 
health-induced reductions in the labor supply of the household head, due 
to differences in productivity or the need to raise resources to finance 
required health care there may still be negative consequences.28 In addi-
tion to loss of income such consequences include loss of leisure time, 
and if households draw on child work then it may come at the cost of 
school attendance. The event-history interviews show that the choice can 
be difficult especially if households need to rely on school-going chil-
dren,  
 
“My husband had something in his leg over a weekend… In total he was 
sick for over two weeks and did not do anything. He wanted our son to 
48 CHAPTER 3 
 
miss school and work on the field but my son refused as it was exam time. 
I supported him because his attendance at school for the whole year 
would mean nothing if he doesn’t sit for an exam. We then left the farm 
unattended. There was some crop output eaten by livestock during that 
time. The animals belonged to our relatives and we couldn’t sue them. 
[Female respondent, Woji Arbamba Kebele of Amhara region, Interview 
conducted on 1st February 2013]”  
We are not able to identify, at least statistically, the effects of ill-
health on the use of wage labor as a coping response (due to data una-
vailability). However, the event history interviews reveal that households 
do use this option. As mentioned by one of the respondents, 
 
“Recently I had typhoid… Because we may lose output/ income when we 
fall ill, I employed labor for 500 birr to transport my harvest. I wouldn’t 
have spent this much if I was not ill. There is no one to do the work at 
home as my husband is in a seasonal migration and my children are too 
young. [Female respondent, Kebabi Kebele of Tigray region, Interview 
conducted on 22 January 2013]”  
Other coping responses include borrowing and the sale of assets. 
Estimates of equation (3.1) for the probability of borrowing and the 
amount of the loan are provided in columns 1 and 2 of Table 3.4, while 
the remaining columns pertain to the effects of ill-health on household 
livestock holdings. All measures of ill-health lead to an increase in the 
probability of having an outstanding loan. Depending on the health 
measure, the probability of borrowing is 1.7 to 2.6 times higher if a 
household head has experienced a negative health change, while 3 of the 
4 health measures are associated with increases in the amount of the 
loan. For a household head experiencing deterioration in physical func-
tioning equal to the average observed for the sub-sample that saw a fall 
in the ADL index (0.22 points), loan amounts may be expected to in-
crease by 93 Birr. Illnesses and unfavourable changes in SAH are associ-
ated with increases in borrowing of 277 and 289 Birr, respectively. Pro-
longed illness is also associated with an increase in the loan amount but 
the coefficient is not statistically significant.29 To place this effect in per-
spective, consider that the increases in borrowing associated with chang-
es in the three health measures (which are statistically significant) amount 
to between 25 and 36% of the increase in health expenditure induced by 
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these measures.30  Our robustness checks confirm this conclusion (Ap-
pendix Table A3.2 and A3.4). 
Consistent with the comments distilled from the event history in-
terviews we find that households tend to sell smaller ruminants in re-
sponse to ill-health. As shown in Table 3.4, a worsening of the SAH sta-
tus of the household head and a decline in the ADL index are both 
associated with declines in household holdings of sheep.31 The estimates 
imply that for every 10 households that experience a decline in SAH sta-
tus, almost 4 sell a sheep to finance health care needs. In the case of the 
ADL index, for every 10 household heads who experience the average 
deterioration observed in the sample about 1 will sell livestock (sheep). 
There is no effect on household holdings of bulls and calves while 
change in ADL has some negative effect on ox holdings. As discussed 
earlier, focusing only on the number of animals may not provide a com-
plete picture as smaller and lower quality sheep/goats may have replaced 
household livestock holdings.  
Table 3.4  
Effect on indebtedness and asset stock 
 Any loan Loan 
amount 
Goat Sheep Bulls Calves Oxen 
ADL index 2.575** 422.3** -0.198 -0.620** -0.0659 -0.172 -0.164* 
 (1.170) (187.7) (0.377) (0.285) (0.0856) (0.109) (0.0891) 
Prolonged illness 1.666** 106.0 -0.152 -0.181 0.000700 0.0278 -0.0506 
 (0.345) (92.81) (0.137) (0.141) (0.0463) (0.0622) (0.0351) 
Illness 2.028*** 277.1*** -0.0552 -0.0568 0.0203 -0.0139 -0.0314 
 (0.295) (86.29) (0.0984) (0.110) (0.0468) (0.0441) (0.0289) 
Poor/very poor SAH 1.820*** 288.9** -0.127 -0.364** -0.0128 -0.0401 -0.0201 
 (0.383) (133.4) (0.130) (0.167) (0.0492) (0.0646) (0.0394) 
Notes: Each coefficient is from a separate regression of equation (3.1). The column labelled, “Any loan”, 
contains odds ratios from a logit fixed-effects model. Number of observations for this column ranges between 
[1892-1926]. The rest of the coefficients are from linear regression estimates of (3.1). Number of observations 
for these ranges between [3063-3110]. Not reported but included in the specification are village fixed effects 
and measures of economic status, human capital, social capital, demographics, religion, year and shock 
dummies. Clustered standard errors (at Kebele/village level) are reported in parentheses.  
Statistical significance: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. 
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3.4.3 Effect on income and consumption  
The analysis so far shows that the increase in health expenditure and the 
decline in the labor supply of the head of the household due to ill-health 
are somewhat compensated through increases in intra-household labor 
substitution, borrowing and sales of small ruminants.  Yilma et al. (2014) 
show that financial support from family and friends is very limited and in 
addition to sales of assets and borrowing, households rely on savings to 
meet their health care needs. As long as this saving is earmarked for pro-
ductive purposes, it might compromise productivity.  
Estimates reported in Table 3.3, columns 5 and 6 display a nega-
tive association between ill-health and crop output and between ill-health 
and total income. The estimates for crop output are statistically signifi-
cant and large while those for total income are also large but not statisti-
cally significantly different from zero. However, these imprecise effects 
for total income should perhaps not be interpreted as evidence of 
households’ ability to compensate for losses in crop output by resorting 
to off-farm income-generating activities, especially given the fact that the 
point estimates for two of the four ill-health measures suggest a larger 
decline in total income than crop output. In fact, the robustness checks 
for the quartic root and log transformations (Appendix Tables A3.2 and 
A3.4) show statistically significant negative coefficients in three of the 
four ill-health measures for total income.  
The observed decline in crop output despite finding no evidence 
of reduced total household labor supply could suggest that intra-
household labor substitution involves a cost in terms of reduced labor 
productivity. Alternatively, the event history interviews tend to suggest 
that crop output is affected by the diversion of household savings to fi-
nance health care needs as opposed to being used to buy agricultural in-
puts. For instance, consider, 
“My wife is sick of modern illness, TB. She is recurrently sick and goes to 
health facilities quite often. I spent around 5000 birr. Her illness has af-
fected our harvest. Because of health expenditure, I couldn’t buy inputs of 
production (high yield seeds and fertilizer) on time and hence, reduced my 
output. [Male respondent, Oumbulo Tenkaka Kebele of SNNPR, Inter-
view conducted on 11th February 2013]” 
“My daughter had a stomach complaint for more than a week. I took her 
to a traditional healer but she couldn’t get better. Then, I took her to a 
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health center... I spent 300 birr for that. Due to her illness, I didn’t work 
on my vegetable garden. As I used the money I put aside for seeds, I ran 
out of cash to buy the seeds to plant my vegetables. Although, after some-
time, I worked off-farm (dig-out sand and sell) and planted vegetables, I 
do not expect as much output as I planted it late. [Male respondent, Jara 
Damuwa Kebele of SNNPR, Interview conducted on 15th of February 
2013]”  
Finally, we examine the effect of ill-health on consumption, both 
for the full sample and for sub-groups based on self-insuring ability (own 
buffer stock/livestock or not). Focusing on the full sample, the estimates 
reported in Table 3.5 show that, regardless of the ill-health measure, 
there is no effect on total consumption. In fact, in the case of the ADL 
index there is a positive although statistically insignificant effect while for 
the other measures the coefficients are essentially zero.32 Food consump-
tion also displays a similar pattern except in the case of ADL where it is 
significantly positive. The estimates for non-food consumption are clear-
ly more sensitive to ill-health and in the case of prolonged illnesses the 
estimates indicate an 8% reduction in non-food consumption. For other 
measures non-food consumption remains unaffected. The finding that 
non-food consumption is more sensitive to ill-health than food con-
sumption is similar to results for Ethiopia reported in Asfaw and von 
Braun (2004) and Sparrow et al. (2014) for Indonesia.   
Conditioning on households’ ability to self-insure we find that 
across all health measures, those with a lower ability to self-insure expe-
rience a negative although statistically insignificant effect on total con-
sumption and food consumption. It is only in the case of non-food con-
sumption that such households experience large negative effects. 
Prolonged illness and deterioration in SAH are associated with a reduc-
tion of 15% and 26%.  Consumption for those with a greater ability to 
self-insure remains unaffected except in the case of ADL where we find 
a positive effect. The latter could happen if better-off households should 
(and are able to) consume more in order to recover faster. Furthermore, 
for the better off, a desire for a quicker recovery might also induce more 
expensive non-food expenditure that relate to costs of care. This hetero-
geneity supports the argument that the effects of ill-health on consump-
tion are driven by tighter budget constraints as opposed to preference 
shifts.  
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Table 3.5 
Consumption insurance 
  Total Food Non-food 
ADL index Full sample 0.116 0.158* 0.167 
  (0.0789) (0.0816) (0.117) 
 Poor -0.132 -0.0862 -0.165 
  (0.138) (0.153) (0.208) 
 Non-poor 0.222** 0.278*** 0.280** 
  (0.0958) (0.0916) (0.136) 
Prolonged illness Full sample 0.00522 0.0203 -0.0835* 
  (0.0292) (0.0327) (0.0454) 
 Poor -0.0807 -0.0747 -0.150* 
  (0.0516) (0.0653) (0.0888) 
 Non-poor 0.0424 0.0603 -0.0530 
  (0.0430) (0.0447) (0.0649) 
Illness Full sample 0.000158 0.00873 -0.0328 
  (0.0287) (0.0295) (0.0352) 
 Poor -0.0551 -0.0392 -0.0510 
  (0.0627) (0.0618) (0.0765) 
 Non-poor 0.0114 0.0190 -0.0326 
  (0.0306) (0.0319) (0.0394) 
(Very) poor SAH Full sample 0.0119 0.0262 -0.00925 
  (0.0382) (0.0389) (0.0512) 
 Poor -0.121 -0.0922 -0.265*** 
  (0.0793) (0.0836) (0.0929) 
 Non-poor 0.0590 0.0709 0.0775 
  (0.0432) (0.0440) (0.0554) 
Notes: Each coefficient is from a separate linear regression of equation (3.1). Number of 
observations for the full sample, ‘poor’ sample and ‘non-poor’ sample range between [2936-
3077], [747-783] and [2189-2294] respectively. Not reported but included in our specification 
are village fixed effects and measures of economic status, human capital, social capital, 
demographics, religion, year and shock dummies. All dependent variables are log-
transformed. Clustered standard errors (at Kebele/village level) are reported in parentheses. 
Statistical significance: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. 
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Additionally, the different patterns suggest that it is ill-health induced 
reductions in income and labor supply that influence consumption and 
not the reverse. The effect heterogeneity results presented here are simi-
lar to those found in Indonesia by Gertler and Gruber (2002), Gertler et 
al. (2009) and Sparrow et al. (2014). 
3.5 Concluding remarks  
This paper used three waves of panel data and event history interviews 
conducted in rural Ethiopia to examine i) the channels of impoverish-
ment due to ill-health ii) the coping responses adopted by households, 
and iii) the effects on current household economic welfare (income and 
consumption).  
We find that there is substantial economic cost due to forgone 
crop output and increased health expenditure. Although the labor supply 
of the household head declines due to ill-health, there is some evidence 
of intra-household labor substitution which limits the overall reduction 
in household labor supply. However, possibly due to productivity differ-
ences between the head’s labor and the substituted labor and diversion 
of productive resources for health care, there is a decline in crop output. 
We also find that ill-health is associated with asset depletion, increases in 
the probability of indebtedness and increases in the amount of outstand-
ing loans. We did not find evidence to reject the null hypothesis of food 
consumption insurance against ill-health. However, non-food consump-
tion declines for certain measures of ill-health. This effect is magnified 
for households with the lowest ability to self-insure.  
The results presented in this paper support the recent move of the 
Government of Ethiopia to expand and scale-up a pilot community 
based health insurance scheme. Given the effects of ill-health on asset 
depletion and household indebtedness, both of which are likely to exert 
negative effects on consumption in the long-run, such a scheme may 
provide protection against future vulnerability. 
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Notes 
 
1  An earlier version of this paper is available as Institute of Social Studies Work-
ing Paper No. 592 (2014). The manuscript benefited from useful comments and 
suggestions from conference participants at the Annual Bank Conference on Af-
rica, Paris, France (June 2014) and at the Nordic Conference on Development 
Economics, Helsinki, Finland (June 2014). The paper is co-authored with Ana-
gaw Mebratie, Robert Sparrow, Marleen Dekker, Getnet Alemu, and Arjun S. 
Bedi. 
 
2 See Chetty and Looney (2006) for an argument that social safety nets are valua-
ble even if consumption is not sensitive to ill-health. 
 
3 For instance, Mohanan (2013) considered the effects of accidents on debt and 
consumption; Sparrow et al. (2014) and Bales (2013) consider the effects of ill-
health on health expenditure, self-reported coping responses, income and con-
sumption; Genoni (2012) traces the effects on assets, transfers, income and con-
sumption; Islam and Maitra (2012) on assets, loans and consumption; Nguyet and 
Mangyo (2010) examine both labor supply and consumption; Wagstaff and Lin-
delow (2010) focus on health expenditure and consumption; Wagstaff (2007) on 
health expenditure, income and consumption; Lindelow and Wagstaff (2005) on 
labor supply, health expenditure and income; Gertler and Gruber (2002) on labor 
supply, health expenditure, income and consumption and Kochar (1995) on loans 
and income. 
 
4 For instance, based on data from the United States, Cochrane (1991) analyzed 
the effect of ‘short and long spells of illness (work days lost)’ on consumption growth 
and found that the former is insured while the latter is not. In an early study on 
India, Townsend (1994) reported that the ‘percentage of year that an adult male is sick’ 
has no effect on household consumption. More recently, using data from Bang-
ladesh, Islam and Maitra (2012) also find that household consumption is fairly 
well insured against ‘incidence of illness, number of days of sickness and death of the main 
income earner’. In contrast, Gertler et al. (2009) in Indonesia and Wagstaff (2007) in 
Vietnam report that consumption is sensitive to ‘limitations in physical functioning’, 
and ‘death of a working member, incidence of long spells of hospitalization and sizable drop in 
BMI of the head’, respectively. 
 
5 In his work on Ethiopia, Dercon (2004) notes that livestock is the most im-
portant marketable asset and accounts for more than 90% of the value of assets.  
The event-history interviews that we conducted revealed that selling livestock, 
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especially smaller ruminants (sheep and goats) rather than larger animals is a 
common coping response. 
 
6 While relying on family and friends for support is a potential coping strategy, in 
a related paper (Yilma et al. 2014) we find that only 5% of households who have 
experienced a health shock in the year preceding the survey relied on such sup-
port. 
 
7 We focus on the health status of the household head as it is likely that this indi-
vidual is the main bread winner. Asfaw and von Braun’s (2004) paper on Ethiopia 
also focuses on the health status of the household head. Other papers such as 
Gertler and Gruber (2002), Lindelow and Wagstaff (2005) and Nguyet and Man-
gyo (2010) also focus on the health status of the household head.  
 
8 In principle we should also examine the effect of ill-health on household savings 
and gifts from family and friends. Unfortunately, we do not have data on savings.  
 
9 The study is part of a larger project designed to investigate the effects of pilot 
community based health insurance (CBHI) scheme which was launched in mid-
2011. Twelve of the districts included in the survey host the CBHI scheme while 
one district in each region serves as a control. 
  
10 Interviews were conducted with the household head or the spouse when the 
head was not available. We included 12 households which had been slightly af-
fected by a health shock and 30 households which had been moderately or 
strongly affected by a health shock in 2012. The initial idea was to sample about 
16 households per region. However, in each of the regions after about seven to 
eight interviews it was found that there was not much variation in the responses 
(so called saturation), and hence the final sample was reduced.  
 
11 For formal sector employees there are concerns that individuals may report 
that they are ill in order to justify reduced labor supply (reporting bias for the sake 
of sick leave). This is unlikely in the current case of, mainly, a sample of self-
employed workers. 
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12 The three surveys were conducted at the same time each year. This reduces 
concerns regarding seasonal variations in health conditions. Estimates based on 
computing the health expenditure variable on the basis of adding outpatient 
spending in the last two months to inpatient spending in the last 12 months, in-
stead of extrapolating, lead to similar results. However, as may be expected the 
coefficients decline. 
 
13 About 75% of households work exclusively on-farm. 
 
14 If information on sales price was not available for particular crop in a particular 
woreda we worked with the median sales price for that crop in the zone. 
 
15 Information on off-farm income is restricted to those who work as employees 
and excludes income from off-farm self-employment. Income earned from such 
activities was not gathered. This is likely to lead to an underestimate of total in-
come for 93 households who (at baseline) reported that a household member was 
engaged in off-farm self-employment activities.  
 
16 We use the adult equivalent measures suggested by Dercon and Krishnan 
(1998). The average family size is about 4.8 adults. 
 
17 In the consumption regressions, we do not control for household size since the 
dependent variables are in per adult equivalent terms. 
 
18 The asset index is constructed on the basis of a principal components analysis 
of 68 items including housing conditions, land size, consumer durables, farm 
equipment and livestock. For specifications where livestock is a dependent varia-
ble we exclude the asset index. The productive safety net program is a social pro-
tection program intended for food insecure households. 
 
19 Specifically in the case of consumption, theory predicts that either through self-
insurance mechanisms (such as savings) or inter-household risk sharing arrange-
ments (support from friends and relatives) or borrowing and selling assets, 
households will aim to insulate consumption from transitory shocks to household 
income. That is, the coefficient on the measure of ill-health should not be statisti-
cally different from zero. Although households may adopt various coping 
measures, each of which might be difficult to observe, the test of full insurance 
measures the overall contribution of all coping responses. 
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20 Additionally, to the extent that the ill-health measures, and for that matter oth-
er variables, are measured with error, differencing the data will eliminate time-
invariant measurement error.  
 
21 Typically, for almost all the outcome variable, first differences are evenly dis-
tributed over negative and positive values around a zero mean.   
 
22 While we are more interested in health expenditure and not just the probability 
of incurring health expenditure we also estimated two part models considering a) 
probit for the probability of spending b) expected log health expenditure given 
spending using OLS c) expected health expenditure using a generalized linear 
model with log link and gamma distribution. Regardless of the model, as is dis-
cussed later in the text, we find that all four measures of ill-health are associated 
with increases in the probability of spending and the amount spent on health 
care. 
  
23 While the idea behind the test is the same, the manner in which we operational-
ize the ability to self-insure is different from that used by Gertler and Gruber 
(2002). 
 
24 The event-history interviews revealed households tend to selling sheep and 
goats rather than larger animals. Of the 1599 households in the second round, 
26% did not have any of these animals (buffer stock livestock) while the rest have 
at least one. 
 
25 In 2012, on average, annual household consumption was Birr 21,139 ($1,213). 
 
26 The mean change in the ADL index among those whose physical functioning 
declines is 0.22.  
 
27  In the case of three of the four illness measures, the increase in labor supply 
provided by other household members is larger than the reductions in labor sup-
ply. 
 
28 In Indonesia, Genoni (2012) also finds suggestive evidence for intra-household 
labor substitution. 
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29 In the case of quartic root and log transformations all measures of ill-health 
increase loan amounts. 
 
30 These percentages are based on estimates reported in Tables 3.3 and 3.4. In the 
case of SAH status, ill-health increases borrowing by 289 Birr and health expendi-
ture by 793 Birr. For illness the corresponding figures are 277 and 874 and in the 
case of ADL they are 93 and 367 (at the average change in ADL). 
 
31 We also estimated this effect using ‘Tropical Livestock Unit’ as a dependent 
variable. Results are statistically significantly negative only for ADL (results are 
not reported but could be available upon request). 
 
32 Gertler and Gruber (2002) and Gertler et al. (2009) reject the hypothesis of full 
consumption insurance against limitations in physical functioning. Using data 
from Indonesia, Genoni (2012) finds that neither consumption nor assets are 
responsive to limitations in physical functioning. In the current case, although 
there is no effect on consumption, we do find an increase in indebtedness and 
depletion of assets induced by limitations in physical functioning. 
  
 
4 
Impact of Ethiopia’s Community Based 
Health Insurance on Household 
Economic Welfare1 
 
 
Abstract 
In 2011, the Government of Ethiopia launched a pilot Community-
Based Health Insurance (CBHI) scheme. This paper uses three rounds of 
household survey data, collected before and after the introduction of the 
CBHI pilot, to assess the impact of the scheme on household consump-
tion, income, indebtedness and livestock holdings. We find that enrol-
ment leads to a 5 percentage point – or 13 percent – decline in the prob-
ability of borrowing and is associated with an increase in household 
income. There is no evidence that enrolling in the scheme affects con-
sumption or livestock holdings. Our results show that the scheme reduc-
es reliance on potentially harmful coping responses such as borrowing. 
This paper adds to the relatively small body of work which rigorously 
evaluates the impact of CBHI schemes on economic welfare. 
4.1 Introduction 
Various forms of health insurance have been advocated as market based 
risk-transfer mechanisms with the potential to guard against the impov-
erishing effects of ill-health (see Gertler and Gruber 2002, Xu et al. 2003, 
Asfaw and Von Braun 2004, Leive and Xu 2008). The recent prolifera-
tion of Community Based Health Insurance (CBHI) schemes in many 
developing countries emanates partly from a need to provide financial 
protection against unexpected health care costs and to enhance access to 
modern health care. As a prelude to national coverage, in June 2011, the 
Ethiopian Government introduced a pilot CBHI scheme in thirteen 
Woredas (districts) across the four main regional states that constitute 86 
percent of the population (Population Census Commission, 2008).2 The 
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aim of this paper is to examine the impact of this scheme on measures of 
household economic welfare: consumption, income, indebtedness and 
livestock.  
The economic burden associated with the incidence of ill-health 
has been documented in a recent but rapidly growing literature on pov-
erty dynamics. Most of these studies examine the consumption implica-
tions of health shocks while some delve into the portfolio of coping re-
sponses adopted by households.3 A number of studies show that 
households in the informal rural sector rely on traditional coping re-
sponses such as selling assets and informal borrowing to deal with the 
adverse consequences of ill-health (Heltberg and Lund 2009, Dekker and 
Wilms 2010, Sparrow et al. 2014, Yilma et al. 2014). These coping re-
sponses are not cost free but entail a compromise – protecting current 
consumption at the cost of future vulnerability (Flores et al. 2008).  
Health insurance primarily addresses out-of-pocket health ex-
penditure, one of two sources of household financial stress from ill 
health. The second source is forgone income due to declining capacity to 
work. While health insurance schemes are not designed to curb this 
source of vulnerability, they might still provide some protection to 
households’ agricultural income by facilitating early recovery and by re-
ducing pressure on households to reallocate resources meant for produc-
tive purposes (for instance, to buy fertilizers and high value seeds) to 
medical spending. By reducing reliance on potentially harmful coping 
responses, such as borrowing at usurious rates, health insurance schemes 
might protect household’s economic welfare both in the short and the 
long-run.  
Although analyses of the impact of health insurance has been the 
subject of a large body of empirical literature, much of this work has fo-
cused on health care utilization and out-of-pocket (OOP) health ex-
penditure or on induced behavioural responses such as moral hazard 
(Leon 2012). Reviews of the literature by Ekman (2004) and Mebratie et 
al. (2013a) conclude that the evidence base is questionable with regard to 
the financial protection provided by CBHI. The bulk of the CBHI evalu-
ation literature, with few exceptions4, relies on cross-section based asso-
ciation and does not identify causal effects. Ignoring self-selection in 
voluntary insurance uptake is likely to lead to biased estimates of the im-
pact of CBHI. 
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Moreover, while there are studies that examine whether health 
insurance helps protect income or wealth from declining due to ill-health 
(Levy 2002, Lindelow and Wagstaff 2005) or have studied the effect of 
such schemes on consumption (Wagstaff and Pradhan 2005), there are 
relatively few studies that have evaluated the impact of such schemes on 
indebtedness and livestock.  
This paper uses three rounds of household panel data – a base-
line and two follow-up surveys. The presence of a baseline survey ena-
bles us to examine self-selection and to control for both observable and 
unobservable time invariant factors which may affect self-selection. To 
identify the effect of the scheme on income, consumption, livestock and 
indebtedness we rely on both fixed effects and matching methods and 
compare results for different control groups (within and across pilot and 
non-pilot districts).   
We find that enrolment in the CBHI scheme decreases the prob-
ability of indebtedness by 13 percent. We also find a negative, yet impre-
cise, effect on the amount of outstanding loans. There is no statistically 
significant impact on livestock holding and consumption. However, crop 
output and total income increase by 9 to 10 percent of baseline values. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 
provides the context and design of the CBHI scheme. Section 4.3 de-
scribes the data. This is followed by a brief discussion on the how the 
scheme may be expected to influence outcomes. Section 4.5 describes 
the empirical approach and section 4.6 presents the results. Finally, sec-
tion 4.7 concludes.  
4.2 CBHI scheme design 
In June 2011, as part of the new health sector financing reform (HSFR) 
initiatives, the Ethiopian Government launched a pilot CBHI scheme in 
13 districts in the four main regions (Tigray, Amhara, Oromiya, and 
SNNPR) of the country.5 , 6 Regional administrative bodies selected these 
districts based on directives provided by the Federal Ministry of Health 
(FMoH). The selection criteria require that the districts fulfil five condi-
tions while in practice selection was based on two conditions: undertak-
ing HSFRs and geographical accessibility of health centers (located close 
to the main road).7  
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The community element to the CBHI scheme is that villages 
(Kebeles) decide whether or not to join (based on a simple majority 
vote), and are subsequently involved in management and supervision. 
Possibly due to prior sensitization activities, all villages in pilot districts 
voted in favour of the scheme. Once a Kebele agrees to join, household 
enrolment is voluntary. To reduce adverse selection, enrolment is at the 
household level rather than the individual (FMoH 2008). 
Table 4.1 
Premium and CBHI uptake per region 
Region Premium per month (ETB) CBHI uptake (%) 
For all core HH 
members 
Per each non-core HH 
member April 2012 April 2013 
     
Tigray 11 2.5 33.9 50.2 
Oromiya 15 3 44.2 44.5 
SNNPR 10.5 2.1 35.3 35.4 
Amhara 3 per any member 49.5 62.7 
Total   40.7 48.2 
Notes: A one-time registration fee of ETB 5.00 apply for all households; Payment interval: Tigray 
(annual), Amhara (biannual), Oromiya (annual or biannual), SNNPR (three times a year or quarter-
ly). Core household members include parents and their children below the age of 18. 
 
Benefit packages, registration fees, premiums and premium pay-
ment methods are similar within regions but vary slightly across regions 
(Table 4.1).8 While in Amhara region the unit of contribution is the indi-
vidual (ETB 3 per individual per month) in other regions it is the house-
hold. For core household members (parents and minor children), house-
hold level monthly premiums range between ETB 10.50 in SNNPR to 
ETB 15 in Oromiya (Table 4.1). For each additional non-core household 
member the monthly premium lies between ETB 2.10 and ETB 3.00.  
On average, the combined premiums for core household members (par-
ents and underage children) amount to about 1-1.4 percent of household 
monthly non-medical expenditure.9 The CBHI scheme is subsidized by 
both the central and regional/district governments. The central govern-
ment provides a general subsidy amounting to a quarter of the premium 
collected at district level while the regional and district level governments 
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cover the costs of providing a fee waiver for the poorest 10 percent of 
the population.10 
The benefit package includes both outpatient and inpatient ser-
vice utilization at public facilities. Enrolled households may not seek care 
in private facilities unless a particular service or drug is unavailable at a 
public facility. The scheme excludes treatment abroad and treatments 
with large cosmetic value such as artificial teeth and plastic surgery. The 
referral procedure requires members to visit health centers before they 
may be referred to hospitals (district or regional). Those who do not fol-
low this referral procedure need to cover half the costs of their medical 
treatment.11 In our sample, CBHI uptake reached 41 percent in April 
2012 and 48 percent in 2013 (see Table 4.1). This is comparable to the 
official overall figure reported by Abt Associates (45.5 percent in De-
cember 2012). Although there is not much of a difference between up-
take in April 2012 (41 percent) and uptake in April 2013 (48 percent), the 
speed of uptake is remarkable compared to experiences in other African 
countries. Uptake in Senegal after two years was 4.8 percent (Smith and 
Sulzbach, 2008), in Tanzania 2.8 percent after six years (Chee et al., 
2002), in Mali 11.4 percent after six years (Diop et al., 2006), and in 
Rwanda 35 percent after seven years and 85 percent after nine years 
(Shimeles, 2010).  
4.3 Data 
We use three-rounds of a household panel data set, collected in 
March/April of 2011, 2012 and 2013. The first round was collected a 
few months before the launch of the CBHI scheme and serves as a base-
line. Sixteen districts located across four main regions of the country 
(Amhara, Oromiya, Tigray and SNNPR) are included in the survey. For 
each region we include all three districts that implemented the CBHI pi-
lot and one selected non-pilot district. The non-pilot districts were cho-
sen based on the same criteria that were used to select the pilot districts. 
Within the districts we applied a two stage sampling design, randomly 
sampling villages (six from each district) and the households (17 from 
each village). The total sample size in the first round is 1,632 households 
comprising 9,455 individuals, of which 98 and 97 percent were success-
fully re-surveyed in 2012 and 2013. 
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The survey instrument contains information on a variety of indi-
vidual and household socio-economic attributes such as consumption 
expenditure, crop output, off-farm income, assets, outstanding loans, 
household demographics, employment and health conditions. The total 
value of all outstanding loans at the time of the survey is used to measure 
indebtedness. We record the number of various livestock types owned 
rather than their monetary values. It is important to acknowledge that 
although this is less prone to reporting error, we are not able to capture 
livestock quality and size differences. Our measures of income are value 
of crop output and total income in the past 12 months. The survey asks 
if a household produced any of 33 crop items listed and how much is 
produced. We calculate the value of crop production using the per unit 
sales price of each item. If the household did not sell that item we rely 
on the median price of that item in the district or zone. Crop output is 
the sum of the monetary value of all items produced in the past year. To-
tal income is the sum of crop output and off-farm income. Off-farm in-
come is calculated by multiplying the number of days worked in the past 
month with the average cash equivalent remuneration per day. Monthly 
off-farm income is multiplied by 12 to get annualized figures. This is 
then aggregated at the household level before adding it to crop output. 
Our measure of consumption is monthly non-medical per adult equiva-
lent consumption.12 The survey collected the quantity and monetary val-
ue of 41 food items consumed in the last week and consumption ex-
penditure on 34 non-food items in the past month or year, depending on 
the item. Both food and non-food consumption expenditures are then 
converted to their monthly equivalents, in per adult equivalent terms.  
In addition to the surveys, we also conducted event history inter-
views with 42 purposively selected households across the four regions. 
We make occasional references to this qualitative information. 
4.4 CBHI and expected effects  
In principle, since enrollment in CBHI enables access to free care, it 
might reduce the necessity to rely on coping responses that are less pre-
ferred by households. For example, Yilma et al. (2014) find that borrow-
ing is a last resort used by households primarily to meet urgent health 
care needs.13 Hence, we expect access to CBHI to reduce the probability 
of borrowing/indebtedness. Distress sales of livestock to finance urgent 
health care needs are also expected to decline. Hence, we expect an in-
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crease in livestock ownership.14 The possibility that insurance protects 
households against the income effects of health shocks has been noted 
in China (Lindelow and Wagstaff 2005). There are two ways in which 
CBHI might affect household income. First, it might reduce the negative 
impact on labor supply by facilitating early treatment and fast recovery. 
Second, as the following quotes suggest, credit constrained rural house-
holds tend to finance health care using cash that has been saved for buy-
ing fertilizers or seeds. Subsequent delays in production or loss of 
productivity might compromise household income. 
  
 “My wife is sick of modern illness, TB. She is recurrently sick and goes to 
health facilities quite often. I spent around 5000 birr. Her illness has af-
fected our harvest. Because of health expenditure, I couldn’t buy inputs of 
production (high yield seeds and fertilizer) on time and hence, reduced my 
output. [Male respondent, Oumbulo Tenkaka Kebele of SNNPR, Inter-
view conducted on 11th February 2013]” 
 
“My daughter had a stomach complaint for more than a week. I took her 
to a traditional healer but she couldn’t get better. Then, I took her to a 
health center... I spent 300 birr for that. Due to her illness, I didn’t work 
on my vegetable garden. As I used the money I put aside for seeds, I ran 
out of cash to buy the seeds to plant my vegetables. Although, after some-
time, I worked off-farm (dig-out sand and sell) and planted vegetables, I 
do not expect as much output as I planted it late. [Male respondent, Jara 
Damuwa Kebele of SNNPR, Interview conducted on 15th of February 
2013]” 
4.5 Methods 
The non-random nature of insurance uptake is an important empirical 
concern in identifying the causal effect of CBHI. Demand for health in-
surance may be driven by affordability or latent health status, in which 
case simple differences in outcomes between CBHI enrolled and non-
enrolled households may not be viewed as causal effects of the scheme. 
Tables 4.2 and 4.3 suggest non-random uptake. At baseline, households 
that subsequently take up CBHI have higher crop output and income, 
are more likely to have borrowed, have larger outstanding loans, and 
larger livestock holdings than households that do not insure.  
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Table 4.2 
 Baseline differences in outcome variables: insured vs non-insured 
 Insured house-
holds 
Non-insured households  
 All districts Pilot districts Control districts 
 (N=656) (N=911) (N=527) (N=384) 
     
Income     
Crop output 8499.0 
(9104.3) 
5985.0*** 
(7044.6) 
6551.3*** 
(7440.0) 
5212.8*** 
(6395.8) 
Total income 10017.2 
(9828.0) 
7091.8*** 
(7335.5) 
7757.6*** 
(8089.1) 
6196.2*** 
(6075.1) 
Consumption     
Total 244.7 
(146.9) 
249.4 
(170.4) 
241.9 
(162.5) 
259.6 
(180.5) 
Food 201.1 
(125.4) 
206.3 
(144.6) 
200.6 
(144.8) 
214.0 
(144.3) 
Non-food 43.8 
(39.6) 
43.0 
(45.1) 
41.2 
(37.7) 
45.5 
(53.6) 
Indebtedness     
Outstanding loan (%) 37.5 
(48.4) 
26.0*** 
(43.9) 
26.6*** 
(44.2) 
25.3*** 
(43.5) 
Total outstanding loan 880.3 
(1689.2) 
527.6*** 
(1259.3) 
492.8*** 
(1172.7) 
575.4*** 
(1369.5) 
Livestock     
Goats  # 1.2 
(5.3) 
0.8** 
(2.2) 
0.7** 
(2.2) 
0.8 
(2.1) 
Sheep # 1.8 
(3.0) 
1.0*** 
(2.6) 
0.9*** 
(2.2) 
1.2*** 
(3.0) 
Bulls # 0.4 
(1.4) 
0.3** 
(0.7) 
0.3* 
(0.6) 
0.3** 
(0.7) 
Calves # 0.8 
(1.2) 
0.6*** 
(0.9) 
0.6*** 
(0.9) 
0.5*** 
(0.8) 
Oxen # 1.4 
(1.3) 
0.8*** 
(1.0) 
0.9*** 
(1.0) 
0.8*** 
(0.9) 
Notes: Columns 1-4 report mean (standard deviation; Statistical significance refers to differences in means 
between the control group and the insured households: *** 0.01, ** 0.05, * 0.1. Crop output refers to total 
value of production in the past one year. Total income is the sum of crop output and off-farm income. All 
livestock types refer to number of livestock owned. All monetary values are in Ethiopian Birr (ETB) 
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Table 4.3 
 Baseline differences in covariates: insured vs non-insured 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 Insured 
households 
(N=656) 
All non-insured 
households 
(N=911) 
Non-insured in 
pilot districts 
(N=527) 
Non-insured in 
control dis-
tricts 
(N=384) 
P-
value 
Ho: 
(1=2) 
P-
value 
Ho: 
(1=3) 
P-
value 
Ho: 
(1=4)  Mean St.dev Mean St. dev Mean St. dev Mean St. dev 
Health measures            
Head ADL Index 0.044 (0.136) 0.054 (0.151) 0.063 (0.167) 0.042 (0.124) 0.181 0.033 0.792 
Any illness (%) 46.8 (49.9) 46.9 (49.9) 51.2 (50.0) 40.9 (49.2) 0.977 0.130 0.064 
Any chronic illness (%) 16.3 (37.0) 17.1 (37.7) 20.3 (40.3) 12.8 (33.4) 0.671 0.076 0.122 
Any paralysis (%) 4.9 (21.6) 3.4 (18.1) 4.4 (20.4) 2.1 (14.3) 0.143 0.677 0.024 
Any poor/very poor 
SAH (%) 
15.9 (36.6) 11.9 (32.3) 15.4 (36.1) 7.0 (25.6) 0.022 0.820 0.000 
Covariates            
Head does not work (%) 1.2 (11.0) 1.9 (13.5) 1.7 (13.0) 2.1 (14.3) 0.314 0.484 0.275 
Head farmer (%) 93.6 (24.5) 87.5 (33.1) 91.3 (28.3) 82.3 (38.2) 0.000 0.130 0.000 
Head domestic worker 
(%) 
2.6 (15.9) 5.7 (23.2) 3.6 (18.7) 8.6 (28.1) 0.003 0.313 0.000 
Head other employ-
ment (%) 
2.6 (15.9) 4.9 (21.7) 3.4 (18.2) 7.0 (25.6) 0.019 0.406 0.001 
PSNP  member (%) 25.8 (43.8) 20.9 (40.7) 10.3 (30.5) 35.2 (47.8) 0.022 0.000 0.001 
Asset quintile 1 (%) 10.5 (30.7) 24.9 (43.3) 23.3 (42.3) 27.1 (44.5) 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Asset quintile 2 (%) 15.5 (36.3) 23.3 (42.3) 22.2 (41.6) 24.7 (43.2) 0.000 0.003 0.000 
Asset quintile 3 (%) 19.4 (39.5) 21.2 (40.9) 21.1 (40.8) 21.4 (41.0) 0.377 0.468 0.439 
Asset quintile 4 (%) 23.9 (42.7) 17.8 (38.3) 18.2 (38.6) 17.2 (37.8) 0.003 0.017 0.011 
Asset quintile 5 (%) 30.6 (46.1) 12.8 (33.5) 15.2 (35.9) 9.6 (29.5) 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Social capital (%)a 40.5 (49.1) 35.6 (47.9) 34.4 (47.6) 37.2 (48.4) 0.051 0.033 0.306 
Head is male (%) 88.1 (32.4) 85.6 (35.1) 86.1 (34.6) 84.9 (35.9) 0.153 0.315 0.138 
Head age 47.3 (13.1) 45.6 (14.5) 46.4 (14.7) 44.5 (14.2) 0.022 0.319 0.001 
Head has no education 
(%) 
43.1 (49.6) 48.5 (50.0) 48.8 (50.0) 48.2 (50.0) 0.032 0.050 0.109 
Head education infor-
mal (%) 
15.9 (36.6) 11.2 (31.5) 10.2 (30.4) 12.5 (33.1) 0.007 0.005 0.137 
Head education prima-
ry (%) 
36.9 (48.3) 35.8 (48.0) 35.9 (48.0) 35.7 (48.0) 0.637 0.701 0.682 
Continued on next page 
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Table 4.3 (continued) 
 Baseline differences in covariates: insured vs non-insured 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 Insured 
households 
(N=656) 
All non-insured 
households 
(N=911) 
Non-insured in 
pilot districts 
(N=527) 
Non-insured in 
control dis-
tricts 
(N=384) 
P-
value 
Ho: 
(1=2) 
P-
value 
Ho: 
(1=3) 
P-
value 
Ho: 
(1=4)  Mean St.dev Mean St. dev Mean St. dev Mean St. dev 
            
Head education sec-
ondary or more (%) 
4.1 (19.9) 4.5 (20.7) 5.1 (22.1) 3.6 (18.8) 0.717 0.413 0.704 
Head Muslim (%) 18.8 (39.1) 32.5 (46.9) 17.1 (37.7) 53.6 (49.9) 0.000 0.457 0.000 
Head Orthodox (%) 64.6 (47.8) 41.9 (49.4) 54.1 (49.9) 25.3 (43.5) 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Head Protestant (%) 15.7 (36.4) 22.2 (41.6) 25.6 (43.7) 17.4 (38.0) 0.001 0.000 0.463 
Head other Chris-
tian/religion (%) 
0.9 (9.5) 3.4 (18.1) 3.2 (17.7) 3.6 (18.8) 0.001 0.004 0.002 
Log HH size 1.7 (0.4) 1.6 (0.4) 1.7 (0.5) 1.6 (0.4) 0.000 0.004 0.001 
Male (age<=5) share % 6.5 (10.4) 7.9 (12.1) 7.5 (11.8) 8.5 (12.6) 0.017 0.124 0.007 
Female (age<=5) share 
% 
6.5 (10.4) 8.1 (12.4) 7.4 (11.4) 8.9 (13.6) 0.010 0.165 0.001 
Male [6 18] share (%) 21.7 (17.1) 19.0 (17.1) 19.0 (16.8) 19.0 (17.6) 0.002 0.007 0.014 
Female [6 18] share (%) 19.2 (15.9) 18.5 (16.3) 18.7 (16.1) 18.3 (16.7) 0.437 0.604 0.410 
Male [19 45] share (%) 15.3 (13.0) 16.0 (13.6) 16.1 (13.8) 15.8 (13.3) 0.336 0.320 0.558 
Female [19 45] share 
(%) 
16.3 (11.7) 16.1 (11.4) 16.2 (12.0) 16.0 (10.6) 0.724 0.846 0.671 
Male [46 60] share (%) 4.6 (8.3) 3.8 (7.6) 3.6 (7.2) 4.1 (8.0) 0.045 0.026 0.328 
Female [46 60] share 
(%) 
5.3 (11.6) 4.8 (12.1) 5.0 (11.9) 4.6 (12.3) 0.420 0.640 0.345 
Male [60+] share (%) 3.3 (9.4) 3.0 (9.3) 3.5 (10.2) 2.3 (8.0) 0.579 0.673 0.092 
Female [60+] share (%) 1.2 (7.2) 2.8 (11.4) 3.0 (12.2) 2.5 (10.3) 0.002 0.002 0.022 
Health shock (%) 32.1 (46.7) 31.2 (46.3) 37.0 (48.3) 23.2 (42.3) 0.710 0.075 0.002 
Crime/conflict shock 
(%) 
5.6 (23.1) 7.7 (26.6) 8.9 (28.5) 6.0 (23.8) 0.116 0.030 0.820 
Economic shock (%) 37.7 (48.5) 30.3 (46.0) 36.2 (48.1) 22.1 (41.6) 0.002 0.604 0.000 
Natural shock (%) 45.5 (49.8) 49.0 (50.0) 49.3 (50.0) 48.4 (50.0) 0.176 0.189 0.359 
Notes: Columns 1-4 report mean and standard deviation. P-values for tests of differences in means are reported in columns 5-7; a 
social capital takes the value of 1 if the household has someone to rely on at times of difficulties. 
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However, we see little differences in consumption. A naive comparison 
of post intervention outcomes would overestimate the impact of CBHI 
on income and livestock and underestimate the impact on indebtedness. 
We therefore estimate a household fixed effects model that con-
trols for both observed and unobserved time-invariant confounding fac-
tors.  
itiittitit XTCBHIY           (4.1) 
where itY  is the outcome of interest for household i  at time t , the 
dummy variable itCBHI  indicates whether household i  is insured in year 
t , and T  reflects year dummy variables for each of the three years. 
Household fixed effects are captured by i  and it  is a random error 
term. Time varying controls itX  include demographics, various measures 
of socio-economic status, shocks and household head characteristics (see 
Table 4.3 for a list of covariates). We estimate the above equation with 
and without itX . If the confounding role of time-variant unobserved 
characteristics is minimal, then we would expect similar treatment effects 
across these two specifications.15 In addition, we also combine the fixed 
effects approach with propensity score matching (PSM). CBHI uptake is 
modelled as a function of baseline characteristics, and we estimate equa-
tion (4.1) only for households on common support.  
We have two groups of control households: uninsured house-
holds in pilot districts and households from non-pilot districts. Each 
control group introduces different sources of bias. For the pilot districts, 
the voluntary nature of the scheme could induce selection bias. The fixed 
effects would purge selection effects if these are based on time-invariant 
characteristics. Pilot districts are also prone to spill-over effects. Howev-
er, these are most likely to be relevant to health care use and not for 
economic outcomes, at least not in the short term.16  
The control districts are drawn from the same regions and fulfil 
the criteria stipulated by the government in selecting CBHI districts, 
while any remaining geographical differences will be controlled for by 
the fixed effects. Although, fixed effects cannot deal with aggregate 
shocks we explicitly control for information on 22 different shock types 
(natural shock, crime/conflict related shock, health shock and economic 
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shock). Our robustness check for excluding covariates also tests if the 
results are sensitive to excluding these shocks. 
Finally, there remains a possible confounding effect from other 
social programs that share targeting and selection criteria with the CBHI 
pilot. We are aware of only one such social safety net program in rural 
Ethiopia, the PSNP (Productive Safety Net Program). For both sets of 
control households, we estimate models with and without an indicator 
variable for PSNP.  
Table 4.4 
 Welfare effects of CBHI 
 FE with covariates FE with covariates after matching 
 All 
districts 
control 
districts 
Pilot dis-
tricts 
All 
districts 
control 
districts 
Pilot dis-
tricts 
       
Income       
Crop output 459.9 286.6 816.4* 418.6 243.8 785.4* 
 (477.4) (572.4) (460.7) (481.8) (573.8) (470.1) 
Total income 675.7 427.8 1,092* 593.9 338.2 1,027* 
 (571.3) (632.7) (593.6) (577.3) (633.7) (604.2) 
Consumption       
Total 18.01 25.03 12.38 -6.556 -1.874 -14.96 
 (27.45) (30.75) (33.02) (21.34) (24.82) (26.35) 
Food  18.59 26.94 10.87 -5.655 0.405 -16.18 
 (26.70) (29.95) (32.25) (20.67) (23.92) (25.68) 
Non-food 0.113 -1.044 2.436 0.0201 -1.285 2.467 
 (2.969) (3.581) (3.166) (3.047) (3.748) (3.228) 
Indebtedness       
Loan (0/1) -0.0506** -0.0540** -0.0340 -0.0483** -0.0484** -0.0341 
 (0.0222) (0.0237) (0.0238) (0.0225) (0.0235) (0.0243) 
Loan amount -44.87 -51.24 -16.72 -36.24 -38.18 -10.62 
 (69.76) (77.20) (70.32) (70.81) (77.93) (71.84) 
Continued on next page 
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Table 4.4 (continued) 
 Welfare effects of CBHI 
 FE with covariates FE with covariates after matching 
 All 
districts 
control 
districts 
Pilot dis-
tricts 
All 
districts 
control 
districts 
Pilot dis-
tricts 
       
Livestock       
Goats # -0.0835 -0.0357 -0.129 -0.0836 -0.0247 -0.136 
 (0.141) (0.124) (0.151) (0.145) (0.127) (0.156) 
Sheep # -0.0321 0.0237 -0.0808 -0.0336 0.0205 -0.0808 
 (0.113) (0.129) (0.114) (0.114) (0.130) (0.115) 
Bull # 0.0453 0.0421 0.0247 0.0458 0.0447 0.0209 
 (0.0362) (0.0415) (0.0349) (0.0368) (0.0425) (0.0356) 
Calves # -0.0177 -0.0360 -0.00440 -0.0210 -0.0380 -0.00400 
 (0.0631) (0.0547) (0.0647) (0.0644) (0.0562) (0.0664) 
Oxen # 0.0451 0.0590 0.0286 0.0439 0.0574 0.0277 
 (0.0452) (0.0480) (0.0467) (0.0464) (0.0495) (0.0483) 
Notes: The column headings refer to the choice of control group: all districts (all non-insured house-
holds included), control districts (only non-insured households in control districts included), and pilot 
districts (only non-insured households in pilot districts included). Standard errors (in parentheses) are 
clustered at the village level. Results are broadly similar when excluding the time-varying covariates. 
A list of covariates is given in table 4.3. In the case of livestock we exclude the asset index quintiles 
as the index includes number of livestock. Range of number of observations: first column (4230-4665), 
second column (2816-3101), third column (3153-3520), fourth column (4059-4483), fifth column (2722-
3003), sixth column (3053-3412). 66 out of 1548 observations are outside the common support region 
[0.086-0.869]. 
Statistical significance: *** 0.01, ** 0.05, * 0.1 
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Figure 4.1 
(Selected) outcome variables by insurance status across years
 
 
4.6 Estimates 
Table 4.4 presents treatment effects using different control groups. 
Across methods we find statistically significant positive impact on in-
come (crop output and total income) for the pilot district comparison 
only. While the magnitudes of the estimates decline as we exclude 
households that are off support, we find that crop output and total in-
come increase by ETB 785 and ETB 1027, respectively or 9 to 10 per-
cent of baseline values. While the coefficients are also positive when we 
use households in non-pilot districts as controls, the estimates are not 
precise. The results provide no evidence that CBHI affects household 
consumption, as the coefficients lack statistical significance and the mag-
nitudes are small.  
We find a negative impact on the probability of having outstand-
ing loans ranging between 4 to 5 percent, depending on methods and 
control groups, which translates to about 13 percent of baseline values.17 
Figure 4.1 shows that the source of this effect is a decline in the propor-
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tion of indebted insured households. There are also negative coefficients 
for the amount of outstanding loans although these are imprecise. Esti-
mates for all types of livestock are not statistically significant. 
4.7 Conclusion 
This paper explored the impact of Ethiopia’s CBHI pilot scheme on 
household economic welfare. We used three rounds of a household pan-
el dataset, which included one baseline and two follow-up surveys. We 
deployed different specifications of a household fixed effects model and 
compared results across different control groups (within and across pilot 
and non-pilot districts).  
We found that enrolment in CBHI decreases the probability of 
indebtedness by about 5 percentage points. Compared to the proportion 
of households who were indebted at baseline (37.5 percent), this effect 
corresponds to a 13 percent decline. We found no statistically significant 
impacts on consumption and livestock holdings while there is some evi-
dence that CBHI is associated with increases in annual crop output and 
total income of about 9 to 10 percent.  
Thus, the main benefit of the scheme is its effect on reducing the 
need to borrow and rely on savings. This may have longer-term benefits 
in reducing vulnerability to other forms of shocks. A related study has 
found a sharp impact on increasing health care utilization (Mebratie et al. 
2013b). The combined results provide support to the government’s re-
cent move to extend the CBHI pilot to a total of 161 districts for further 
testing. However, a nationwide scale up requires an examination of the 
scheme’s financial sustainability. 
 
Notes 
 
1 A shorter version of this paper is published in the World Bank Economic Review 
(forthcoming).  It is also available as Institute of Social Studies Working Paper 
No. 590 (2014). The manuscript benefited from useful comments and sugges-
tions from conference participants at the Annual Bank Conference on Develop-
ment Economics (ABCDE), Washington DC, USA (June 2014). The paper is co-
authored with Anagaw Mebratie, Robert Sparrow, Marleen Dekker, Getnet Ale-
mu, and Arjun S. Bedi. 
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2 This came following a successful low-cost health service extension program 
designed to increase the supply of preventive and basic curative health services.  
See its impact evaluation in Admassie et al. (2009). 
 
3 See, amongst others, Gertler and Gruber 2002, Wagstaff 2007, Wagstaff and 
Lindelow 2010, Islam and Maitra 2010, Genoni 2012, Sparrow et al. 2013, Mo-
hanan 2013. 
 
4 Jowett et al. (2003) for Vietnam, Levine et al. (2014) for Cambodia and Lu et al. 
(2012) for Rwanda, find statistically significant negative effects of CBHI on OOP 
health spending. Wagstaff et al. (2009) find no statistically significant effects for 
China. 
 
5 Although initially the plan was to launch the pilot scheme in 3 districts in each 
of the four regions, an additional district in Oromiya region volunteered to join 
the pilot scheme and was included. 
  
6 The main components of the health sector financing reform include revenue 
retention and utilization by health facilities, fee waiver and exemption of certain 
services, and establishment of private wings in public hospitals. 
 
7 The complete set of selection criteria include (1) Willingness of district authori-
ties to implement the scheme (2) Commitment of districts to support the scheme, 
(3) Geographical accessibility of health centers (4) Quality of health centers, (5) 
The implementation of cost recovery, local revenue retention, and public phar-
macy policies in health centers. 
 
8 The design of the scheme is based on a feasibility study conducted by an inter-
national consultancy company, Abt Associates, which is also responsible for im-
plementation and monitoring of the scheme in collaboration with relevant gov-
ernment bodies at the federal and local level. 
 
9  In 2011, monthly household non-medical expenditure was ETB 1103 (USD 1 
equals ETB 18). 
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10 These households are categorized as indigent groups (households without land, 
house, or any valuable assets). In December 2012 about 9 percent of total eligible 
households had received a fee waiver. 
 
11 Access to tertiary level care differs across regions. While in Oromiya coverage 
includes hospitals located outside the region, in SNNPR they may visit only the 
nearest public hospital. In Amhara and Tigray, CBHI enrollees may visit any pub-
lic hospital within the region but not outside the region. 
 
12 We adopt the age-sex based adult equivalent household size suggested by Der-
con and Krishnan (1998). 
 
13 Yilma et al. (2014) also show that selling assets and relying on savings are 
prominent responses to health shocks in these villages. 
 
14 However, if livestock is used as a saving mechanism and is used to pay for 
premiums, the effect of CBHI may not be clear. 
 
15 Results without covariates are reported in the Appendix, Table A4.1. 
 
16 We run a placebo test where treatment indicator takes a value of 1 if uninsured 
household lives in pilot district and 0 otherwise. We do not find any indication of 
spill-over effects. Results are reported in the Appendix, Table A4.2. 
 
17 The estimates for the pilot-district control group are, however, imprecise. 
  
 
5 
Households’ Expectations of Medical 
Expenditures and Insurance in Rural 
Ethiopia1 
 
Abstract 
The perceived risk of medical expenses is presumed to be the major 
determinant of health insurance enrolment. Yet little is known about the 
formation of such risk perceptions, including the extent to which they 
are based on past spending. Also lacking is evidence on the ability of 
households to predict their medical expenses. This paper reports on a 
unique elicitation of subjective probabilities of medical expenditures 
from rural Ethiopians who are offered the opportunity to purchase 
health insurance. We assess the validity of their responses and find pat-
terns which indicate that the data do contain information. We find that 
expectations are positively related to past expenses and that the correla-
tion with past medical spending exceeds the serial correlation in realized 
expenditures, suggesting that respondents overestimate persistence and, 
on average, underestimate the potential gains from insurance (since a 
large proportion of households spend nothing in a given year). Expected 
expenditure is weakly but significantly positively correlated with the 
spending that actually materialises. Despite being able to anticipate ex-
penses, to some extent, there is little or no evidence that expectations 
influence the decision to take out health insurance, although plans to in-
sure are positively related to the perceived dispersion of medical expens-
es.   
5.1 Introduction 
Reduction in exposure to medical expenditure risk underpins the case for 
social health insurance and is presumed to motivate enrolment in volun-
tary health insurance. Yet little is known about the incidence and magni-
tude of such risk in developing countries, and even less about the for-
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mation of risk perceptions. Cross-sectional measurement of inter-
household variation in medical expenditures confounds uncertainty faced 
by each household with differences in spending across households that 
are predictable from characteristics not fully observable in the data but 
known to the household (Flores and O’Donnell, 2013). Panel data of 
sufficient length to identify the stochastic properties of medical expendi-
tures, which would feed into a measure of risk at the household level 
(Newhouse et al. 1989; van Vliet 1992; Feenberg and Skinner 1994; 
French and Jones 2004; Kowalski 2015), are rare; possibly even non-
existent in a developing country context. Even if such data were availa-
ble, using them to infer perceived medical expenditure risk would in-
volve imposition of the assumption that expectations are formed ration-
ally on the basis of all information available. The validity of this 
assumption has not been tested. In fact, very little is known about how 
individuals forecast their health expenditures and their ability to do so in 
any context (Breyer et al., 2012).  
Improved knowledge of the formation of expectations regarding 
health care expenditure, perceptions of the associated financial risks and 
the degree to which the demand for insurance is related to such risks is 
essential for a better understanding of the functioning of insurance mar-
kets and social insurance programmes. Tests for adverse selection in 
health insurance based on the association between coverage and realized 
expenditures are plagued by the difficultly of disentangling selection 
from moral hazard (Chiappori, 2000). The relationship between forecast 
expenditure and subsequent enrolment potentially offers a more direct 
test. 
This paper reports on the elicitation of subjective probabilities of 
medical expenditures in rural Ethiopia. It examines the extent to which 
expectations appear to be based on past realized expenditures, among 
other characteristics, and whether uptake of community based health 
insurance (CBHI) is related to both the mean and dispersion of the dis-
tribution of expected medical expenses. CBHI, which has been advanced 
as an affordable and feasible form of health insurance in low-income, 
informal rural economies (Preker and Carrin 2004), might be expected to 
be particularly vulnerable to adverse selection because of its voluntary 
nature and the small size of the risk pool (see Wang et al., 2006; Parmar 
et al., 2012). This apprehension is justified if individuals base their expec-
tations and insurance purchases on determinants of medical expenditures 
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that the insurer is either not able to observe or, as in the Ethiopian pro-
gramme, premium is independent of individual risk. While rational 
agents will behave in this way, it is by no means obvious that unsophisti-
cated consumers, with little or no experience of health insurance, per-
haps little appreciation of factors that raise medical spending and possi-
bly limited ability to predict their expenses, will do so. Particularly, but 
not only, in low-income contexts, the questions of how expectations of 
medical expenses are formed and utilized are very much open. We ad-
dress these questions directly.  
Besides the relevance of our analysis to the operation of volun-
tary health insurance in low-income settings -- in particular in Ethiopia, 
where nationwide scale-up of the pilot scheme examined here is planned 
-- the paper makes a modest methodological contribution. The high de-
gree of risk exposure in low-income, rural settings has prompted experi-
mentation with the elicitation of subjective probabilities of economic 
outcomes (e.g. Delavande 2008; Bellemare 2009; Giné et al 2009; Santos 
and Barrett 2011; Delavande and Kohler 2012; McKenzie et al. 2013). 
The emerging consensus is that it is feasible to elicit informative expecta-
tions data from low-income, less-educated populations (Attanasio 2009; 
Delavande et al. 2011; Delavande, 2014). To the best of our knowledge, 
this is the first study to elicit beliefs about future spending on health care 
in any setting - high- or low-income. Respondents were asked to report 
probabilities that their spending on medical care would exceed certain 
thresholds. Clearly, the information content of such data depends on the 
ability of individuals with limited educational attainment to understand 
relatively complex survey questions and to express beliefs consistent with 
the basic laws of probability. A central aim of the study is to establish 
whether it is possible to collect data on expectations that are valid in the 
sense of being logically consistent and plausibly informative of beliefs 
about future spending on health care.  
We find that the bulk of the sample is able to respond sensibly to 
a seemingly abstract exercise of assessing the likelihood of future health 
scenarios and their associated medical expenses. Having verified the 
basic validity of the data, we make a distributional assumption that al-
lows us to derive the first two moments of the distribution of expected 
medical expenditure for each household. Subsequently, we examine the 
information respondents utilise in forming expectations of medical ex-
penditure, before evaluating the predictive value of expectations and, 
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finally, assessing the extent to which health insurance enrolment is predi-
cated on the expectation and perceived risk of medical expenses.  
To preview our results, we find that the sample average of the 
second moment of expected medical expenditure is substantially smaller 
than the cross-sectional variance in realized medical expenditure, con-
firming that cross-sectional measures confound risk with predictable het-
erogeneity across households. Expected spending is positively related to 
past levels to an extent that exceeds the serial correlation in realized ex-
penditure. This suggests that households underestimate volatility, which 
would reduce the perceived gains from insurance. Expected spending is 
positively correlated with realized spending in the period over which the 
forecast is made. After conditioning on observable covariates, expected 
expenditure still predicts realized spending (albeit weakly) suggesting that 
respondents hold some additional relevant information that is incorpo-
rated in their reported subjective probabilities.2 However, there is little or 
no evidence that expectations influence the decision to take out health 
insurance, although plans to insure are positively related to the perceived 
dispersion of medical expenses.   
The paper is organized as follows. Section 5.2 describes the con-
text, including the CBHI pilot, and the sampling design, and elaborates 
on the manner in which the subjective probabilities of health payments 
were elicited. Section 5.3 assesses the validity of the expectations data. In 
section 5.4, we derive moments of expected medical expenditure and 
compare them with past expenditure and with realized spending during 
the expectation period. Section 5.5 examines factors associated with the 
formation of beliefs concerning the mean and dispersion of future health 
spending. Section 5.6 assesses the accuracy of expectations and the ex-
tent to which they add value in predicting future spending. Section 5.7 
examines whether the distribution of expected expenditure is utilised in 
the decision to enrol in insurance. The final section offers concluding 
remarks. 
  
80 CHAPTER 5 
 
5.2 Survey data and belief elicitation instrument 
5.2.1 Context and sampling design 
Three rounds of household panel data were collected in 16 rural districts 
located in four of the nine regions of Ethiopia (Tigray, Amhara, Oromi-
ya, and SNNPR). These regions account for about 86 percent of the 
country’s population (Population Census Commission, 2008). Within 
each district, the first survey round was fielded in six randomly chosen 
Kebeles (lowest administrative unit) in March-April 2011. In each of the 
96 Kebeles, 17 households were randomly selected yielding a total of 
1,632 households comprising 9,455 individuals. After the introduction of 
the CBHI scheme in 12 of the 16 districts in June-July 2011, two follow-
up surveys of the same households, on which the bulk of the paper is 
based, were  fielded in March-April 2012 (N=1599 households) and 
2013 (N=1583).  
Within the 12 districts in which the insurance scheme operates, 
enrolment is voluntary at the household level. Premia vary across regions 
but not across households within regions.3 The benefit package is com-
prehensive including both outpatient and inpatient care with very few 
exclusions. There are no co-payments, provided higher levels of care are 
accessed through referral from a health center. Without a referral, 
households are liable for 50 percent of the cost of hospital treatment. By 
April 2012, the scheme had achieved an enrolment rate of around two-
fifths of households residing in the targeted districts, and by April 2013 
coverage had reached around one half.  
5.2.2 Elicitation of expectations 
A respondent, usually the head of the household or the spouse of the 
head, was asked about anticipated payments for health care and medi-
cines over the next 12 months. The belief elicitation proceeds by first 
asking preliminary questions to fix the range of the distribution of the 
expectation and then asking the respondent to report the probability of 
exceeding thresholds within this range (Dominitz and Manski 1997; 
Manski 2004; Attanasio and Augsburg 2012). The specific questions used 
to determine the minimum and maximum amounts were:  
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Imagine that no member of your household contracts a NEW serious illness or 
injury in the next 12 months. In such a case what would be the MINIMUM 
amount of money your household would have to pay for health care and medicines (in-
cluding transport costs) over the next 12 months? 
 
Imagine that at least one member of your household contracts a NEW serious ill-
ness or injury that requires treatment in a hospital in the next 12 months. In such a 
case what would be the MAXIMUM amount of money your household would have to 
pay for health care and medicines (including transport costs) over the next 12 months? 
 
The reference to a new illness is intended to ensure that long-
standing health conditions that will continue to require treatment and 
medication are not overlooked in reporting the minimum and that the 
maximum refers to expenses that would be incurred were health to dete-
riorate markedly. The reference to hospital treatment in the maximum 
question is intended to prompt thought of the most expensive scenario.  
After establishing the range, enumerators were instructed to 
compute three thresholds that divide the range into four equal intervals.4 
Respondents were then asked: 
 
  
How likely is it that the amount your household will spend on health care and medicines 
(including transport costs) in the next 12 months will be greater than: [amount defined 
by each of three thresholds]? 
(see scale below which goes from 0 to 10 where 0 indicates no 
chance of happening and 10 indicates will definitely happen) [ruler 
shown]. 
 
If the respondent was unsure but thought it was more likely that 
the household would spend more than the given threshold than not, 
then s/he was instructed to point somewhere between 0 and 10 but clos-
er to 10 than 0 (and vice versa). Enumerators were instructed not to 
prompt for revision even if the responses did not seem sensible, e.g., be-
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cause the reported likelihood of exceeding a higher threshold was greater 
than that reported for a lower threshold.  
5.2.3 Covariates 
The expectations questions were asked immediately after questions about 
the affordability of CBHI (for those enrolled) and after a series of ques-
tions about the incidence and economic consequences of illness and 
death in the household in the last 12 months. Respondents had therefore 
been primed to contemplate expenses that can arise from illness, injury 
and death. A preceding module recorded health care utilization and ex-
penditures incurred. For each episode of illness experienced by any 
household member in the previous two months, the respondent was 
asked to report the type and quantity of ambulatory health care received 
and the payments made for consultation and diagnostics, medicine, 
transport and other associated health care costs. Additionally, all hospi-
talizations of household members in the previous 12 months were re-
ported along with the costs incurred. The information on actual medical 
expenditure was recorded in all rounds of the survey, while the expecta-
tions were elicited in the last two rounds.  
A health module asked the respondent to report for each house-
hold member his or her general health status (excellent-very poor), 
chronic illness (defined as  symptoms lasting for more than 30 days), pa-
ralysis, limitations in performing activities of daily living and a variety of 
acute illnesses experienced in the last two months. In addition to the rich 
data on expectations, medical expenses and health, the surveys contain 
information on consumption expenditure, assets, occupation, housing 
conditions and amenities, demographics, education, religion, social capi-
tal and access to facilities. As is clear from Table 5.1, the sample house-
holds are predominantly agricultural, have very low levels of education 
and about a quarter are chronically food insecure which is indicated by 
their participation in a government safety net programme.5 
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Table 5.1 
 Sample means of basic household characteristics in 2012 
Household Head 
   
 
Male 0.84  
 
Age (years) 47.2  
 
No education  0.45  
 
Farmer  0.84  
 
Muslim  0.27  
Household   
 Number of persons 5.8  
 
Enroled in CBHI 0.31  
 
Someone in hhold reports poor/very poor health 0.13  
 Time to nearest health centre (minutes) 63  
 
Covered by safety net programme  0.23  
Number of observations  1599 
 Notes: The CBHI enrolment rate given here is for the whole sample and so is less than the two-fifths 
quoted in the text which refers to coverage in the districts in which CBHI is available. 
5.3 Validity of the expectations data 
Our first objective is to establish whether it is feasible to elicit informa-
tive data on expectations of medical expenditures in the context of a 
poor rural economy. This section examines the validity of the data by 
considering, seriatim, response rates, illogical responses and response 
clustering. 
5.3.1 Response rates  
Only 19 of 1,599 households surveyed in 2012 did not respond to all of 
the expectations questions, and there were only two such households in 
2013 (Table 5.2). Almost all of these incomplete responses did not report 
the minimum and/or maximum (12), or gave zero values for both (7), 
and subsequently were not asked to report subjective probabilities. Only 
one respondent in each wave gave valid minimum and maximum values 
yet refused to answer the probability questions. 
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Table 5.2 
 Expectations: non-response, enumerator errors & illogical responses 
 2012 2013 
   
Total number of observations 1599 1583 
   Non response 19 2 
   Enumerator error in calculation of thresholds 229 88 
       Those of which resulted in wrong ordering of thresholds 38 30 
Total usable observations 1542 1551 
   Illogical responses   
       One violation of monotonicity 66 127 
       Two violations of monotonicity 65 100 
       All reported probabilities zero  
46 28 
Observations with illogical responses 
177 255 
Total observations with logical responses 1365  
(85.4%) 
1303 
(82.3%) 
Notes: Observations are household respondents. `Non-response’ includes those not giving a minimum 
and/or maximum amount of health spending (11 in 2012, 1 in 2013), zero for both the minimum and max-
imum (7 in 2012, zero in 2013) and no probability despite providing a minimum and maximum (1 in both 
2012 and 2013). ‘Enumerator error in calculation of thresholds’ refers to errors in computation of k=(max-
min)/4, A=min+k, B=A+k or C=B+k. 27/32 (2012) and 33/57 (2013) enumerators made such errors. 
‘….wrong ordering of thresholds’ refers to violation of max>C>B>A>min. 18/32 (2012) and 23/57 (2013) 
enumerators made such errors. Total usable observations = 1599-19-38 in 2012 and 1583-2-30 in 2013. One 
(two) violation of monotoncity corresponds to P(X>A)<P(X>B) or (and) P(X>B)<P(X>C), with A<B<C by con-
struction.  Total observations with logical responses in 2012 and 2013 respectively = 1542-177 and 1551-
255. 
 
A non-response rate of only 0.7% is reassuring, suggesting that 
the exercise is not too abstract. But mere participation is no guarantee 
that responses contain information on beliefs held with respect to future 
spending on health care. A basic requirement for the data to be informa-
tive is that the expenditure reported in the negative scenario, that is, on-
set of new serious illness/injury that required hospitalization should not 
be lower than the expenditure reported for the most positive scenario, 
that is, no onset of any new illness/injury. Enumerators were instructed 
to prompt respondents to revise the amounts reported if this occurred, 
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which did happen relatively frequently.6 364 households (23%) in 2012 
and 314 households (20%) in 2013 were prompted to make a revision, 
suggesting a degree of difficulty in recognizing the brief scenarios as in-
dicative of the least and most expensive outcomes with respect to medi-
cal expenditures.7 Those prompted to revise their max/min values were 
more likely to report logically inconsistent probabilities (p value=0.000).  
Enumerators made mistakes in calculating the intended evenly-
spaced thresholds for 229 households (15%) in 2012 and 88 households 
(6%) in 2013 (Table 5.2). These errors do not emanate only from a few 
enumerators – in 2012 more than four-fifths of the enumerators made at 
least one mistake while this goes down to less than three-fifths in 2013. 
They are not fatal for the belief elicitation exercise provided that the 
thresholds calculated are in increasing order, even if they are not evenly 
spaced. This condition is violated only for 38 households in 2012 and 30 
households in 2013.  
In total, we lose 57 out of 1599 observations in 2012 and 
32/1583 in 2013 due to non-response or calculation errors. Households 
dropped are smaller, poorer and more likely to be headed by a female, to 
forgo health care when sick and to have a member with some sort of 
disability (Appendix Table A5.1). 
5.3.2 Illogical responses 
Consistency of responses with the axioms of probability requires that the 
reported probabilities of incurring health expenditure (X) in excess of a 
series of increasing thresholds (A<B<C) satisfy monotonicity: P(X >
A) ≥ P(X > B) ≥ P(X > C). Responses that do not satisfy this condi-
tion are labelled illogical. Of the usable observations, 131 (8.5%) in 2012 
and 227 (14.6%) in 2013 violated monotonicity at least once (Table 5.2). 
A further 46 and 28 in 2012 and 2013, respectively, reported zero proba-
bility of spending more than all three thresholds, which we also consider 
an error since the same respondents report a maximum possible ex-
penditure in excess of all three thresholds. In total, 177 respondents in 
2012 (11.5%) and 255 in 2013 (16.4%) reported probabilities that are 
logically inconsistent. This is higher than the 4 percent rate of logical re-
sponse errors found by Attanasio and Augsburg (2012) in their study of 
subjective income expectations in rural India using a similar instrument 
but is comparable to Dominitz and Manski’s (1997) finding of a 10 per-
cent error incidence for subjective expectations of income in Wisconsin.8 
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The higher error incidence compared with the Indian study may reflect 
greater difficulty in conceiving contingencies that lead to variation in 
medical expenses as compared to considering the likelihood of reaching 
certain levels of income.9  
Similar to those excluded because of non-response or enumera-
tor errors, households providing illogical responses are more likely to be 
poorer, smaller, less healthy and more likely to forgo health care for eco-
nomic reasons (Appendix Table A5.1). They are also less likely to be en-
rolled in the health insurance scheme and to be engaged in agricultural 
activities as their main occupation. 
5.3.3 Distribution of responses 
Distributions of the reported probabilities for each of the thresholds are 
presented in Figure 5.1. Two observations are particularly noteworthy. 
First, there is no bunching at focal responses of 0%, 50% or 100%, 
which is often a feature of subjective probability data (Kleinjans and van 
Soest 2014). The most likely explanation is our use of a 0-10 reporting 
scale (subsequently transformed), rather than 0-100. While the narrower 
scale would be anticipated to result in less variation, the lack of bunching 
suggests that the loss of information may not be so severe. 
The second observation is that there is a clear shift in the mass of 
the probability distribution from right to left as we move from the low-
est to the highest threshold. To an extent, this is inevitable since obser-
vations that violate monotonicity have been dropped. But the degree of 
the shift in the distributions is indicative of respondents understanding 
the question and reporting substantially lower, on average, probabilities 
as the threshold is raised.  
Overall, the high response rate, the majority of usable, logically 
consistent responses (85 percent in 2012 and 82 percent in 2013), the 
lack of bunching and the anticipated shift in the mass of the distribution 
as the threshold is raised suggests that the bulk of the sample is able to 
respond sensibly to a seemingly abstract exercise of contemplating and 
assessing the likelihood of future health scenarios and their associated 
medical expenses. This lends support to interpretation of the responses 
of each household as points on its cumulative distribution function of 
expected medical expenditure. 
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Figure 5.1 
 Distributions of reported probabilities of medical spending exceeding vari-
ous thresholds  
 
 
 
5.4 Distributions of expected medical expenditure 
Figure 5.2 shows the reported probability that medical expenditure falls 
within each of the four equally-spaced, household-specific intervals aver-
aged across households in the 2012 survey.10 On average, the responses 
show that the probability of health expenditure falling in in the lowest 
interval is the highest. Since, as will be confirmed below, many house-
holds incur no medical expenses, this suggests some consistency between 
the distribution of expected and actual expenditures. The average proba-
bility mass falls over the next two intervals, before rising slightly for the 
top interval. On average across households, the distribution of forecast 
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medical expenditures broadly resembles the right-skewed distribution 
familiar for actual medical expenditures, although the reason for the in-
crease in density at the top of the distribution is not obvious. It may be 
that respondents become anchored to the maximum value reported.11 
Figure 5.2 
Sample means of reported probabilities of medical expenditure lying in 
household-specific intervals, 2012 (N=1365)
  
Notes: A=min+k, B=A+k and C=B+k, where k=(max-min)/4. P(X>A), P(X>B) and P(X>C), where X 
is medical expenditure, are reported directly for each household, as are min and max. Proba-
bility of X lying in each interval is computed from these reported probabilities. Sample re-
stricted to observations for whom correct order of thresholds calculated and responses are 
logically consistent. 
 
5.4.1 Moments of the expected medical expenditure distributions 
We assume that a piecewise uniform distribution provides a reasonable 
approximation to the underlying probability distribution for each house-
hold and use this, along with the elicited subjective probabilities, to 
compute the first and second moments of the distribution of expected 
health expenditure in the next 12 months for each household.12 We do 
the same for the distribution of the logarithm of expenditures.  
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Table 5.3 
 Sample statistics of expected and realized medical expenditure, 2012 (ETB) 
   Cross-section statistics 
   Mean Std. 
dev. 
Min. Median Max. Obs. 
 Expected Expenditure (t+1)       
  Mean 461 562 2.40 305 6375 1365 
  Standard deviation 173 256 1.08 101 3320 1365 
  Coeff. of variation 0.35 0.18 0.02 0.34 1.08 1365 
 Realized Expenditure (t)       
  Simple extrapolation 393 1441 0 0 19830 1365 
  Regression extrapola-
tion 
390 1047 ~0 120 16476 1355 
If realized expenditure >0       
 Mean expected expenditure 
(t+1) 
520 641 21 326 6375 398 
 Realized expenditure (t) 1349 2418 6 480 19830 398 
Notes: Simple and regression extrapolation of realized expenditures refer to method of 
estimating annual spending on outpatient care from reported expenditure in past two 
months, as explained in text.  Sample size for regression extrapolation is slightly smaller due 
to missing values on covariates. ETB = Ethiopian Birr, US$1=ETB 17.42 (April 2012) 
 
The top panel of Table 5.3 provides sample summary statistics of 
parameters of the household-specific distribution of expected medical 
expenditure derived from the probabilities reported in the 2012 survey 
(see Appendix Table A5.2 for 2013). The mean of expected annual ex-
penditure (i.e. the first moment of the expectation distribution) ranges 
from ETB 2.40 (US$ 0.14) to ETB 6375 (US$ 365.97), with a sample 
mean of ETB 461 (US$ 26.41). Comparison with the distribution of real-
ized expenditures in the prior year is complicated by the fact that spending 
on outpatient care is reported for a period of two months preceding the 
survey. We approximate annual expenditure by simple extrapolation, i.e. 
multiplying outpatient expenditure by six and adding the result to inpa-
tient expenditure reported for the past twelve months. While this pro-
vides a credible estimate of mean annual expenditure across the sample, 
it will overestimate the inter-household variance. Therefore, we also pre-
dict outpatient expenditure in the last two months based on a Poisson 
regression (Jones, 2011) of reported expenditure on characteristics of the 
household that do not reflect acute illness and multiply the prediction by 
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six before adding inpatient expenditure (referred to in Table 5.3 as regres-
sion extrapolation).13 This gives the same sample mean as the simple ex-
trapolation method but a smaller variance, which in this case is underes-
timated.14  
The sample mean of the mean expected expenditure is about 
one-sixth greater than the mean of realized expenditures. The discrepan-
cy appears to be attributable to the large difference in the propensity of 
zero expenditures. Despite the large proportion of households with no 
reported spending on health care (71% by the simple extrapolation 
method), respondents seldom contemplate making no payments even 
when told to think of a scenario in which no new serious illness or injury 
is contracted and health spending is at a minimum.15 Restricting attention 
to households that incurred medical expenditures, the sample mean of 
these positive expenditures is 2.7 times the mean of the expected ex-
penditures. This difference partly arises from the simple extrapolation of 
two-monthly expenditures on outpatient care, which will greatly overes-
timate annual expenditures for some households. The median of realized 
(positive) expenditure is closer to that of expected expenditure, although 
the difference is still substantial. 
It is important to emphasise that the sample distribution of ex-
pected expenditures should not resemble that of realized expenditures. 
The former is a distribution of expectations, while the latter is a distribu-
tion of stochastic outcomes. The range and standard deviation of real-
ized expenditures should be, and are, much greater than the correspond-
ing sample statistics for the expected expenditure. 
For the purpose of gauging exposure to medical expenditure risk, 
comparison of the standard deviation of expected medical expenditure 
with the cross-sectional standard deviation of realized expenditure is of 
greater interest than comparison of the mean of expected expenditure 
with the sample mean of realized expenditures. The sample mean of the 
standard deviation of forecast expenditure is only one-sixth of the cross-
section standard deviation of realized expenditure based on the regres-
sion extrapolation approach, and an even lower proportion of the esti-
mate using simple extrapolation of outpatient expenditures. On average 
across the sample, the household-specific standard deviation of expected 
expenditure is less than the mean (mean coefficient of variation is a little 
more than a third), while, as is common with cross-section data on 
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health care costs (e.g. Van Doorslaer et al, 2007), the standard deviation 
across households is substantially larger than the sample mean. 
These comparisons suggest there is substantial overestimation of 
risk exposure using measures based on cross-sectional variance. Such 
measures confound risk with predictable heterogeneity across house-
holds. Measures of dispersion in the distribution of expected expenditure 
do not. They capture perceptions of risk exposure, at least to the extent 
that risk is interpreted as the variability one faces in a stochastic out-
come. The discrepancy between the two approaches to measuring medi-
cal expenditure risk would be substantially reduced by examining the 
cross-sectional variation in realized expenditures conditional on determi-
nants of spending that are observable in the data (Flores and O’Donnell, 
2013). But not all predictors that are known to the household are likely 
to be documented in the data, such that cross-sectional variance (of re-
siduals) is still likely to overestimate risk perceived by the household and, 
consequently according to theory, its demand for single-period insur-
ance. 
5.4.2 Correlation between expected and past medical expenditure 
The degree to which medical expenditures display persistence over time 
and the extent to which this is taken into account in the formation of 
expectations about future medical spending are of considerable im-
portance to the operation of health insurance markets (Breyer et al. 
2012). We begin to address these issues by examining simple correlations 
before turning to regression models. 
The serial correlation between actual health expenditure in ETB 
money values incurred in consecutive years is small and not significantly 
different from zero for either pair of years (Table 5.4, top panel). The 
correlation is even lower for expenditure on inpatient care, but it is not 
significant for spending on outpatient care either. These correlations are 
considerably smaller than those obtained for health care costs in Europe 
and the US (see Breyer et al. 2012 for a review).16, 17 One reason for this 
difference is that we have data on out-of-pocket payments (including 
transport costs), not health care costs, and because spending on outpa-
tient care is reported only for the last two months we cannot compute 
the correlation across years of annual expenditure. Month-to-month 
fluctuations in spending will lower the correlation in outpatient expenses 
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incurred over two periods of two months separated by one year relative 
to the correlation of annual expenditures over consecutive years.18 , 19 
Table 5.4 
 Correlation between realized medical expenditure in consecutive years 
  2011-2012 2012-2013 
ETB Amounts   
 Full sample   
  Total 0.033 (0.218) 0.020 (0.499) 
  Outpatient 0.030 (0.273) 0.015 (0.619) 
  Inpatient 0.001 (0.976) 0.007 (0.812) 
 Censored at 99th percentile of positive expenditures  
  Total 0.048 (0.074) 0.027 (0.370) 
  Outpatient 0.054 (0.045) 0.013 (0.656) 
  Inpatient 0.001 (0.976) 0.007 (0.812) 
Logs   
  Total 0.122 (0.000) 0.130 (0.000) 
  Outpatient 0.129 (0.000) 0.105 (0.000) 
  Inpatient 0.058 (0.033) 0.006 (0.838) 
 Notes: Total expenditure is computed by simple extrapolation method. Middle panel 
shows correlations with amounts above the 99th percentile of positive expenditures re-
placed with that percentile value. This censoring is done separately for each year and 
each distribution of total, outpatient and inpatient expenditure. p-value for test of zero 
correlation in parenthesis. Data in 2012 and 2013 are restricted to the sample with logi-
cal responses to expectations questions as detailed in Table 5.2. 
  
The serial correlation between actual health expenditure in ETB 
money values incurred in consecutive years is small and not significantly 
different from zero for either pair of years (Table 5.4, top panel). The 
correlation is even lower for expenditure on inpatient care, but it is not 
significant for spending on outpatient care either. These correlations are 
considerably smaller than those obtained for health care costs in Europe 
and the US (see Breyer et al. 2012 for a review).20,21 One reason for this 
difference is that we have data on out-of-pocket payments (including 
transport costs), not health care costs, and because spending on outpa-
tient care is reported only for the last two months we cannot compute 
the correlation across years of annual expenditure. Month-to-month 
fluctuations in spending will lower the correlation in outpatient expenses 
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incurred over two periods of two months separated by one year relative 
to the correlation of annual expenditures over consecutive years.22 , 23  
Serial correlation is partly reduced by extremely high expendi-
tures in one year that are not repeated. Censoring expenses at the 99th 
percentile of the distribution of positive expenditures increases the mag-
nitudes of the correlations and results in two becoming significant (Table 
5.4, middle panel). The distortionary effect of extreme amounts is also 
evident from the fact there is clear serial correlation in the logarithm of 
expenditure, particularly for spending on outpatient care (bottom panel). 
A second potential explanation for the low serial correlation is 
the much lower relative burden of chronic disease in Ethiopia compared 
with high-income countries.24 Notwithstanding the limitations arising 
from the two-month recall period for outpatient expenses, the apparent-
ly high degree of volatility in medical expenses would suggest that poten-
tial gains from risk pooling are substantial. 
Table 5.5 shows correlations between expected and realized med-
ical spending. In the second and third survey rounds, the respondent re-
ported subjective probabilities for spending anticipated in the year ahead 
and actual expenditures incurred over the last year/two months. In the 
first round, only realized spending was reported. Using the responses 
over all three rounds, we can examine the correlation between expected 
expenditure for the year ahead and actual spending up to three years 
previous.25 All correlations are positive. The one between expectations 
and three year lagged actual spending is the smallest and is not signifi-
cant. For both survey rounds, expectations are more closely correlated 
with spending over the last year than with spending in the year prior to 
the last (but this decline is statistically significant only for the later survey 
round).  This suggests that expectations are formed based on more re-
cent information. The positive correlations are not simply driven by the 
large proportion of households incurring no health expenditure expect-
ing to spend little in the future. In fact, when attention is restricted to 
households with positive past levels of spending, the correlations in-
crease (Table 5.5, bottom panel). 
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Table 5.5 
 Correlations between expected and realized medical expenditure 
  Expenditure expected in t+1 
Realized expenditure t=2012 t=2013 
 t-2                            N/A                        0.043 
 t-1                         0.128***                        0.069** 
 t                         0.136***                        0.221*** 
 t+1                         0.138***                           N/A 
If realized exp. >0   
 t-2                            N/A                         0.045 
 t-1                         0.143***                         0.089* 
 t                         0.192***                         0.334*** 
 t+1                         0.186***                             N/A 
Notes: Realized expenditure calculated by multiplying outpatient expenditure reported for 
last two months by six and adding result to inpatient expenditure reported for the last year.  
N/A - data on realized expenditure are not available. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
The significant positive correlation of expectations with past ex-
penditure is in contrast to the absence of serial correlation in actual 
spending (at least when measured in money values, not logs). While we 
must acknowledge again that our ability to estimate the latter is limited 
by the two-month recall period for outpatient expenses, this discrepancy 
is at least indicative of adaptive expectations, rather than rational expec-
tations, with the degree of persistence being overestimated. However, 
expectations are not entirely inaccurate. There is a significant positive 
correlation between the expectation for the year ahead derived from the 
subjective probabilities reported in 2012 and the expenditure that materi-
alised over the following year (Table 5.5, 1st column, 4th row). This indi-
cates that households are, at least to some extent, able to predict their 
future spending on medical care. 
5.5 Formation of medical expenditure expectations 
5.5.1 Predictors of the mean of expected medical expenditure  
In Table 5.6, we present least absolute deviations (LAD) and least 
squares regressions of the mean of log expected expenditure on past re-
alized expenditures and other household characteristics potentially rele-
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vant to the formation of expectations. The estimates may be interpreted 
as best linear predictions, revealing how expectations correlate with ob-
servable characteristics (Dominitz, 2001).  Past outpatient and inpatient 
expenditures incurred in the year in which expectations were elicited as 
well as expenditures incurred in the previous year are entered separately 
because it is plausible that differences in the nature of health conditions 
that result in outpatient and inpatient expenditures lead to differential 
weighting of them in the formation of expectations. The specification is 
consistent with adaptive expectations, which implies that expected 
spending is a weighted average of realized spending in previous periods 
(Nerlove, 1958), although we do not claim to be testing this hypothesis.26 
Inclusion of the lagged value of outpatient expenditure is particularly 
appropriate because of the two-month reference period that results in a 
partial measure of the information on such spending the household may 
utilise to predict spending in the coming year. Besides past expenditures, 
the regressions include indicators of: i) health (illness, sensory impair-
ment, disability, health self-assessed as poor/very poor and a recent 
death in the household); ii) socioeconomic status (wealth represented by 
quintile groups of a composite index of assets and housing conditions, 
participation in a safety net programme, possession of a savings account, 
occupation and education);  iii) health care coverage/access (CBHI en-
rolment, reported forgone care when sick and time to nearest health cen-
ter); iv) experience of an economic/crime/conflict/natural shock in past 
year; and, v) household size and demographics. Definitions and means of 
the covariates are provided in the Appendix, Table A5.3. The regressions 
presented in Table 5.6 are estimated from the pooled 2012 and 2013 ob-
servations.27 
The ordinary least squares (OLS) predictions account for around 
30 percent of the variability in the mean of expected expenditure across 
the sample indicating a good deal of systematic variation. The reported 
expected medical expenditures are very far from being pure noise.  
The pooled LAD and OLS estimates reveal that inpatient ex-
penditure in the last year and outpatient expenditure both in the last two 
months and in the two months preceding the previous survey are all sta-
tistically significant predictors of the mean of (log) expected medical ex-
penditure in the year to come. The latter is not significantly associated 
with expenses incurred on inpatient care in the year preceding the last. 
This may be because inpatient treatment is received for more acute con-
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ditions while outpatient expenditures include medication that can be tak-
en for more chronic conditions. Using the usual approximation, a 1% 
increase in inpatient expenditure over the last year is associated with a 
0.14% increase in the expectation of total medical expenditure in the 
coming year. The elasticity with respect to outpatient expenditure in the 
last two months is smaller, which is to be expected given the discrepancy 
in the reference periods.28 But expectations are also positively related to 
spending on outpatient care in the two months prior to the last survey, 
which is consistent with respondents forming expectations on the basis 
of average spending over a number of periods. The LAD estimates for 
outpatient expenses are a bit lower than the OLS estimates while the co-
efficients for inpatient spending are robust.  
Given the magnitude of expenditures on inpatient care, one ex-
pects that households can remember and report them accurately. Even if 
errors are made, provided the reported expenditures are those utilised in 
the formation of expectations of future spending, there will be no bias in 
the estimate of the association between expected and (perceived) past 
expenditure. However, expenditures on ambulatory care and medicines 
reported for the last two months are a noisy indicator of actual expendi-
tures on these items in the last year. We deal with this by instrumenting 
household reported outpatient expenditure in the two months before 
each survey with respective mean outpatient expenditure in the Kebele 
in which the household is located. Two stage least squares coefficients 
reported in the third column of Table 5.6 show substantial increases in 
the coefficients on each of the two instrumented expenditure variables, 
which become comparable to the elasticity estimated for inpatient ex-
penditure in the last year. Most of the coefficients of the other covariates 
remain similar in magnitude and significance to the OLS estimates. 
Expected spending on medical care appears to be very closely 
correlated with ability to pay. On the basis of the OLS estimate, the rich-
est quintile spends two-thirds more on medical care in the coming year 
than the poorest fifth of households. Households in which the head has 
some form of education expect to spend 8.4% more than those without 
any education. Expected spending is negatively associated with house-
hold participation in a safety net programme and whether a household 
has forgone care. Although neither of these relationships is individually 
significant29, both are consistent with the general pattern in the estimates 
which suggests that households expect to spend what they can afford.  
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Enrolment in the CBHI scheme is positively but not significantly 
correlated with expected medical spending. The point estimate suggests 
that households that require more time to travel to a health center expect 
to spend more. Although this is significant only for OLS, it is consistent 
with the inclusion of transport costs in the expenses respondents are in-
structed to report. Of the health variables, only illness with symptoms 
that have lasted for at least one month is significantly correlated with the 
mean of log expected medical expenditure. This variable loses signifi-
cance when outpatient expenditure in the last two months is instrument-
ed, which is consistent with both providing information on health that is 
utilised in the formation of expectations of medical expenses.30 Jointly 
the health variables are significant (p-value=0.055 for OLS). Households 
that reported having experienced a negative shock due to the local econ-
omy, weather, crime or conflict in the last year expect to incur greater 
expenditure on medical care in the coming year. Notwithstanding the 
fact that there has been some control for health, the most likely explana-
tion would appear to be illness or injury as the result of such an event. 
The demographic composition of the household appears to matter 
(jointly significant across all estimators). The coefficients are not pre-
sented but expected expenditure is lower in households that have a larger 
share of elderly (60+) females relative to all other demographic groups. 
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Table 5.6 
 Pooled regressions of the Mean of Log Expected Medical Expenditure  
  (1) (2) (3) 
 
LAD OLS 2SLS 
Ln(outpatient expense) t 0.0170* (0.00986) 0.0225*** (0.00762) 0.101** (0.0503) 
Ln(outpatient expense) t-1 0.0259** (0.0110) 0.0418*** (0.00876) 0.130*** (0.0419) 
Ln(inpatient expense) t 0.142*** (0.0305) 0.141*** (0.0219) 0.129*** (0.0251) 
Ln(inpatient expense) t-1 0.0159 (0.0299) 0.00439 (0.0222) -0.0126 (0.0244) 
Someone in household experienced:       
    Illness > 30 days 0.228** (0.0886) 0.173** (0.0754) 0.0585 (0.0948) 
    Sensory impairment 0.0279 (0.0775) 0.00896 (0.0613) 0.00626 (0.0617) 
    Paralysis/mobility issues -0.0547 (0.0741) -0.0163 (0.0586) -0.0463 (0.0628) 
    Poor/very poor health 0.118 (0.0731) 0.0826 (0.0729) -0.0264 (0.0828) 
    Death in last year 0.0583 (0.193) 0.149 (0.129) 0.0967 (0.140) 
2nd poorest assets quintile group 0.153* (0.0893) 0.208*** (0.0592) 0.199*** (0.0621) 
Assets quintile 3 0.269*** (0.0965) 0.298*** (0.0594) 0.291*** (0.0606) 
Assets quintile 4 0.287*** (0.0909) 0.404*** (0.0635) 0.375*** (0.0690) 
Richest assets quintile group  0.531*** (0.102) 0.669*** (0.0713) 0.621*** (0.0760) 
Covered by safety net programme -0.154** (0.0635) -0.0608 (0.0597) -0.0494 (0.0658) 
Has bank account 0.103 (0.0664) 0.0916 (0.0677) 0.0799 (0.0680) 
Non-agricultural employment 0.212 (0.149) 0.162 (0.129) 0.137 (0.126) 
Educated head 0.115** (0.0511) 0.0842** (0.0389) 0.0725* (0.0416) 
CBHI enrolled 0.0738 (0.0514) 0.0423 (0.0431) 0.0607 (0.0419) 
Forgone care when sick -0.133 (0.153) -0.116 (0.119) -0.0911 (0.125) 
Minutes to nearest health center 0.000766 (0.00067) 0.000778* (0.00047) 0.000702 (0.00049) 
Shock 0.151*** (0.0474) 0.106** (0.0500) 0.103** (0.0513) 
Ln(household size) 0.0870 (0.0935) 0.000928 (0.0606) -0.0635 (0.0697) 
Year 2013 0.234*** (0.0442) 0.298*** (0.0690) 0.331*** (0.0647) 
Constant 3.776*** (0.267) 3.588*** (0.200) 3.670*** (0.208) 
Observations 2,631  2,631  2,631  
R2/Pseudo R2 0.159  0.298  
 
 
F-test of joint significance (p-values):       
     All variables 0.000  0.000  0.000  
     Health variables 0.010  0.055  0.833  
     Age-sex composition 0.036  0.010  0.003  
Notes: Regressions also include the share of household member in ten gender specific age groups and district dummies. 
Standard errors in parentheses:  corrected for clustering at Kebele level for OLS and 2SLS; bootstrap standard errors 
with 200 repetitions for LAD. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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5.5.2 Revisions to the mean of expectations  
The fact that the means of the distributions derived from reported sub-
jective probabilities correlate with past realized expenditures, ability to 
pay proxies and health provides grounds to interpret these means as ex-
pectations of future spending on medical care. However, the associations 
could arise from confounding factors correlated with both the reporting 
of subjective probabilities and the regressors. We deal with time invariant 
confounders by estimating in first differences. If the associations are pre-
served, this would provide stronger evidence that the data contain in-
formation on expectations that are revised in response to changes in real-
ized expenditures, economic circumstances and health.  
Descriptive statistics of the cross-sample distribution of changes 
(between the 2012 and 2013 surveys) in the means of the distributions of 
the mean expected medical expenditure and of the changes in realized 
inpatient and outpatient expenditures are provided in Table 5.7. On av-
erage, across the sample, the mean of expected expenditure is revised 
upward. This is also apparent from the coefficients on the year dummy 
in Table 5.6. The correlation coefficient between change in the mean of 
expected expenditure and change in realized outpatient expenditure is 
0.061. The respective correlation with change in realized inpatient ex-
penditure is 0.075. Both are statistically significant at 5% level.   
Table 5.7 
 Sample statistics of changes in the mean of expected and realized medical 
expenditure, 2012-2013 (ETB) 
   Cross-section statistics 
   Mean Std. 
dev. 
Min. Median Max. Obs. 
Change in:       
 Mean of expected exp. 220 920 -4625 79 10050 1122 
 Realized inpatient exp. 15 644 -5000 0 12000 1122 
 Realized outpatient exp. -3 325 -3305 0 5800 1122 
Notes: Outpatient expenditure is for two months.  Sample is restricted to those reporting 
logical responses to expectations questions in both rounds. 
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The mean of log expected medical expenditure continues to be 
positively and significantly associated with realized outpatient and inpa-
tient expenditures (Table 5.8, column 1). The mean expected spending 
does appear to be revised upward when actual spending in previous pe-
riods increases. The coefficient on both past outpatient expenditures in-
crease somewhat relative to the levels estimates while that on inpatient 
expenditure in the last year falls. Inpatient expenditure in the previous to 
last year remains insignificant. Instrumenting the changes in outpatient 
spending with the Kebele specific mean changes results in increases in 
the outpatient coefficients. While most of the significant predictors in 
the models estimated in levels are no longer statistically significant, we 
continue to find that better-off households (in terms of asset quintiles 
and those with bank saving accounts) expect higher expenditure.  
As a further robustness check we altered the manner in which 
expected expenditure is defined. Rather than using the mean of log ex-
pected expenditure, which is derived under the assumption that the dis-
tribution is piece-wise uniform, we took the log of the mid-point of the 
reported minimum and maximum expected health expenditure.31 Regres-
sion results in both levels and differences are similar to those presented 
in Tables 5.6 and 5.8 (see Appendix Table A5.5).32  
5.5.3 Predictors of the standard deviation of expected medical 
expenditure 
We now examine whether there is systematic variation in the standard 
deviation of log expected medical expenditure that could possibly be in-
terpreted as differences in exposure to medical expenditure risk. LAD, 
OLS and 2SLS estimates in levels for essentially the same empirical spec-
ification as utilised for explanation of the mean of the expectation are 
presented in Table 5.9.33 These reveal much less systematic variation in 
the standard deviation, although predictions from the OLS estimates still 
account for ten percent of the cross-sample variability. Few of the co-
variates are statistically significant irrespective of the estimator. The 
standard deviation is predicted to be five percent lower in households 
that experienced a death in the preceding year. Possibly, this could be 
because the departure of a frail relative reduces uncertainty over medical 
expenses. Better-off households in the top sixty percent of the wealth 
distribution report expectations that imply a 4-7 percent greater standard 
deviation of medical expenditure. This is much less than the increase in 
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the mean expectation with wealth, implying that the coefficient of varia-
tion falls with wealth. Beneficiaries of the safety net program also report 
a 3 percent greater standard deviation of expected medical expenditure.    
The standard deviation of expected medical expenditures does not 
appear to be associated with past realizations of expenditure, health or 
access to health facilities. This may indicate that perceived exposure to 
medical expenditure risk does not vary with these factors. While the loca-
tion of the distribution of medical expenditures would be anticipated to 
vary with these factors, their implications for dispersion are indeed less 
obvious. It could be that the data reflect this.  
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Table 5.8 
 Regressions of the Mean of Log Expected Medical Expenditure (first differ-
ences) 
  (1) (2) 
 
OLS 2SLS 
        
Ln(outpatient expense) t 0.0386** (0.0148) 0.254*** (0.0778) 
Ln(outpatient expense) t-1 0.0507*** (0.0155) 0.283*** (0.0891) 
Ln(inpatient expense) t 0.115** (0.0466) 0.120** (0.0516) 
Ln(inpatient expense) t-1 -0.0350 (0.0475) -0.0586 (0.0570) 
Someone in household experienced:     
    Illness > 30 days 0.0490 (0.136) 0.0203 (0.139) 
    Sensory impairment -0.0277 (0.0962) -0.0445 (0.110) 
    Paralysis/ mobility problem 0.0674 (0.0863) 0.0477 (0.0872) 
    Poor/very poor health 0.141 (0.114) 0.00600 (0.122) 
    Death in last year 0.146 (0.238) 0.174 (0.273) 
2nd poorest assets quintile group -0.00513 (0.0955) -0.0708 (0.0975) 
Assets quintile 3 0.0893 (0.115) -0.00940 (0.129) 
Assets quintile 4 0.174 (0.120) 0.123 (0.132) 
Richest assets quintile group 0.562*** (0.148) 0.521*** (0.157) 
Covered  by safety net programme 0.176 (0.165) 0.252 (0.171) 
Has bank account 0.186* (0.111) 0.265** (0.110) 
Non-agricultural employment 0.182 (0.232) 0.0940 (0.244) 
Educated head 0.137 (0.0849) 0.102 (0.0933) 
CBHI enrolled 0.0161 (0.0787) 0.0445 (0.0746) 
Forgone care when sick -0.114 (0.142) -0.155 (0.174) 
Minutes to nearest health center 0.000817 (0.00102) 0.000813 (0.00113) 
Shock 0.0943 (0.0760) 0.107 (0.0789) 
Ln(household size) 0.365 (0.248) 0.446 (0.273) 
Constant 0.328*** (0.0687) 0.387*** (0.0616) 
Observations 1,097  1,097  
R2 0.079     
F-test of joint significance (p-values):     
     All variables 0.000  0.000  
     Health variables 0.636  0.977  
     Age-sex composition 0.512  0.418  
Notes: Regressions also include the share of household member in gender specific age groups. Standard errors 
in parentheses are corrected for clustering at Kebele level.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 5.9 
 Regressions of the standard deviation of log expected medical expenditure 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 
LAD OLS 2SLS 
Ln(outpatient expense) t -0.00122 (0.00304) -0.00149 (0.00317) -0.00723 (0.0166) 
Ln(outpatient expense) t-1 -0.00197 (0.00285) -0.000115 (0.00245) 0.000435 (0.0107) 
Ln(inpatient expense) t 0.0110 (0.00845) 0.00780 (0.00600) 0.00870 (0.00620) 
Ln(inpatient expense) t-1 -0.00889 (0.00734) -1.97e-05 (0.00743) 0.000283 (0.00764) 
Someone in household experienced:       
    Illness > 30 days -0.0286 (0.0219) -0.0153 (0.0206) -0.00920 (0.0262) 
    Sensory impairment -0.00785 (0.0168) -0.00909 (0.0148) -0.00811 (0.0147) 
    Paralysis/ mobility problem 0.00609 (0.0197) 0.0198 (0.0168) 0.0203 (0.0168) 
    Poor/very poor health -0.00484 (0.0187) 0.00275 (0.0202) 0.00811 (0.0245) 
    Death in last year -0.0629 (0.0434) -0.0501* (0.0291) -0.0517* (0.0294) 
2nd poorest assets quintile group 0.0240 (0.0160) 0.0139 (0.0159) 0.0146 (0.0161) 
Assets quintile 3 0.0456** (0.0195) 0.0359* (0.0186) 0.0365* (0.0187) 
Assets quintile 4 0.0549*** (0.0187) 0.0617*** (0.0194) 0.0626*** (0.0195) 
Richest assets quintile group 0.0768*** (0.0247) 0.0688*** (0.0215) 0.0700*** (0.0223) 
Covered  by safety net programme 0.0342* (0.0185) 0.0276** (0.0134) 0.0277** (0.0132) 
Has bank account 0.0106 (0.0200) 0.00268 (0.0160) 0.00345 (0.0156) 
Non-agricultural employment -0.00408 (0.0396) 0.0132 (0.0306) 0.0154 (0.0308) 
Educated head -0.00255 (0.0110) 0.00902 (0.0102) 0.00856 (0.0104) 
CBHI enrolled -0.0169 (0.0162) -0.00756 (0.0129) -0.00940 (0.0141) 
Forgone care when sick 0.0191 (0.0328) 0.0151 (0.0323) 0.0123 (0.0321) 
Minutes to nearest health center -0.000158 (0.00016) 0.000108 (0.00016) 0.000109 (0.000156) 
Shock -0.00414 (0.0126) 0.00530 (0.0124) 0.00550 (0.0125) 
Ln(household size) -0.0385* (0.0204) -0.0274 (0.0187) -0.0255 (0.0189) 
Year 2013 -0.000993 (0.0128) 0.00685 (0.0154) 0.00632 (0.0158) 
Constant 0.337*** (0.0480) 0.289*** (0.0405) 0.284*** (0.0422) 
Observations 2,631  2,631  2,631  
R-squared 0.070  0.099  
 
 
F-test (P-value) for joint significance:       
     All variables 0.000  0.000  0.000  
     Health variables 0.304  0.336  0.297  
     Age-sex composition 0.453  0.790  0.765  
Notes: Regressions also include the share of household member in gender specific age groups and district dummies. 
Standard errors in parentheses. Corrected for clustering at Kebele level for OLS and 2SLS. Bootstrap standard er-
rors with 200 repetitions for LAD. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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5.6 Predictive value of expectations 
We confirmed in section 5.4 that a household’s expectation of medical 
spending for 2013 is positively correlated with the expenditure that it 
does incur in that year (Table 5.5, 1st column, 4th row). The analysis con-
ducted in the previous section showed a good deal of systematic varia-
tion in the mean of expected medical expenditure with factors presumed 
relevant to future spending on medical care. But seventy percent of the 
variability in the mean of expectations remained unexplained. We now 
consider whether this unexplained variation in expectations is useful in 
predicting realized spending. If so, this would suggest that respondents 
hold information over and above that contained in covariates commonly 
available in surveys that enable them to form expectations that are 
somewhat accurate in predicting future medical expenses. And further-
more, that this private information is incorporated in reported subjective 
probabilities.  
 We employ a Generalised Linear Model (GLM) in which realized 
total medical expenditure is specified as an exponential function of co-
variates and estimate this by gamma Pseudo Maximum Likelihood 
(GPML) (Gourieroux et al 1984; Manning and Mullahy 2001; Santos Sil-
va and Tenreyro 2006). This is a commonly used estimator for medical 
expenditures (Jones 2011) and offers two main advantages in the present 
context. First, the estimator gives less weight to observations with a large 
conditional mean, which increases robustness to outliers that could arise 
from the potential measurement error in spending on outpatient care. 
Second, with a very large number of observations reporting no medical 
expenditure, substantial inconsistency could arise from adding an arbi-
trary constant to these zero values before taking logs and estimating in 
least squares (Santos Silva and Tenreyro 2006). GPML avoids this by 
taking the log of the conditional expectation and performs well even 
with a very large proportion of zero values in the sample (Santos Silva 
and Tenreyro 2011).  
Modeling total medical expenditure in 2013 as a function of the mean 
of log expected expenditure gives a significant GPML coefficient of 
0.228 (SE=0.115).34 This is consistent with the significant correlation 
coefficient given in Table 5.5 and implies that a one percent increase in 
the mean of expected expenditure is associated with an approximate in-
crease of 0.23 percent in the spending that does actually materialize. So, 
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expectations do have some predictive accuracy. Do they also have pre-
dictive value in addition to the forecast that can be made on the basis of 
observable covariates?  
The first column of Table 5.10 gives GPML estimates from a model 
that includes the 2012 values (and the 2011 value of total expenditure) of 
the same covariates used to predict the mean of expected medical ex-
penditure in Table 5.6. Lagged values of the covariates are used since, in 
a subsequent step, the objective is to test whether expectations add fur-
ther predictive power after conditioning on observable information 
available to be incorporated into the expectations. Both lags of past ex-
penditure are positively and significantly associated with actual expendi-
ture in 2013. So, the serial correlation in log expenditures shown in Table 
5.4 remains after controlling for covariates. Medical expenditure is also 
significantly associated with past health and it is substantially greater for 
households that were both the poorest and the richest according to the 
assets index in 2012. This may reflect a higher (unmeasured) disease bur-
den among the poorest and greater ability to pay of the richest.  Strong 
dependence on ability to pay is also reflected in the estimate of 86 per-
cent lower spending by those who report forgoing health care in the past 
due to economic reasons.35 A standard deviation increase in travel time 
(=45 minutes) to the nearest health center is associated with a one-fifth 
increase in expenditure.36 This is presumably due to the cost of transport 
that is included in the measure of medical spending.  
In the second column of Table 5.10, we add the mean of log expected 
expenditure. Realized expenditure is positively related to the expectation. 
The point estimate suggests that a one percent increase in the mean of 
expectation is associated with a 0.08 percent increase in actual expendi-
ture. This coefficient is not significant using a z-test but a likelihood ratio 
test rejects the model that excludes the expectation (LR=4.2, p-
value=0.0404). Further, in an alternative specification that uses the mean 
of expected expenditure, rather than the mean of the log, the expectation 
variable is significant (10%) even using an z-test.37  
The coefficients on the other covariates are generally robust to adding 
the expectations variable, while the coefficient on the latter falls by 
around two-thirds when covariates are added (from 0.228 in a bivariate 
model to 0.0799). Hence, most of the predictive value of expected ex-
penditure comes from processing information available in observable 
covariates. But respondents appear to have some residual information 
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relevant to their future medical expenditure that they draw on in answer-
ing the subjective probability questions.  
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Table 5.10 
 Estimates of Generalised Linear Model of realized total medical expendi-
ture in 2013 (Yt+1) 
  without expectations with expectations 
     
Et[lnYt+1] 
 
 0.0799 (0.113) 
ln Yt 0.119*** (0.0390) 0.117*** (0.0393) 
ln Yt-1 0.0622* (0.0333) 0.0604* (0.0325) 
Someone in the household experienced:     
    Illness > 30 days 1.029*** (0.343) 1.033*** (0.343) 
    Sensory impairment 0.0293 (0.273) 0.0501 (0.273) 
    Paralysis/ mobility problem 0.144 (0.280) 0.127 (0.279) 
    Poor/very poor health -0.342 (0.349) -0.354 (0.348) 
    Death in last year -0.867** (0.365) -0.875** (0.362) 
2nd poorest assets quintile group -0.584** (0.297) -0.615** (0.293) 
Assets quintile 3 -0.536* (0.302) -0.583** (0.296) 
Assets quintile 4 -0.653** (0.312) -0.699** (0.318) 
Richest assets quintile group 0.481 (0.352) 0.398 (0.357) 
Covered by safety net programme -0.0461 (0.380) -0.0365 (0.382) 
Has bank account -0.00318 (0.261) 0.0416 (0.272) 
Non-agricultural employment -0.0949 (0.627) -0.112 (0.621) 
Educated head -0.141 (0.232) -0.144 (0.231) 
CBHI enrolled 0.109 (0.252) 0.0884 (0.255) 
Forgone care when sick -1.995*** (0.586) -2.005*** (0.589) 
Minutes to nearest health center 0.00434** (0.00211) 0.00438** (0.00210) 
Shock 0.205 (0.186) 0.186 (0.187) 
Ln(household size) 0.685* (0.359) 0.702* (0.359) 
Constant 2.612*** (0.947) 2.235** (1.120) 
Wald test of joint significance (p-values): 
 
 
 
 
     Health variables 0.004  0.004  
     District dummies 0.000  0.000  
     Age-sex composition 0.000  0.000  
Log-likelihood -8497.9  -8495.8  
Observations 1,330  1,330  
Notes: Table gives GPML estimates of total realized medical expenditure in 2013 (t+1) as an exponential 
function of covariates. Et[lnYt+1] is the mean expectation at time t of log expenditure in t+1. All covariates 
are 2012 values with the addition of the 2011 value of total realized medical expenditure. Models also in-
clude the share of household member in gender specific age groups and district dummies. Standard errors in 
parentheses are corrected for clustering at Kebele level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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5.7 Do expectations influence the decision to insure? 
Reported expectations are related to past medical expenditures and they 
are positively correlated with realized expenditures. If indeed respond-
ents are able to use available information to anticipate, to some extent, 
their future medical expenses, then one might suppose that the infor-
mation incorporated in the reported expectations will be utilised in deci-
sions, such as that of whether to take out health insurance. The regres-
sions presented in Tables 5.6 and 5.8 show that the mean of expected 
medical expenditure is positively, but not significantly, associated with 
enrolment in the CBHI scheme. Even if one overlooks the lack of signif-
icance, it is not clear what to make of the fact that households with in-
surance report higher expected medical expenses.38 Coverage would be 
expected to reduce OOP payments, although the scheme has been found 
to have no significant impact on households’ medical spending while 
raising utilization of health services (Mebratie et al 2013b). The positive 
correlation may therefore reflect selection – households with greater ex-
pected payments are more likely to be enrolled.39 But testing this hypoth-
esis requires examination of whether expectations subsequently influence 
the decision to enrol.  
To do this, we restrict attention to districts in which the CBHI 
scheme was offered and to households within those districts that had not 
yet taken the opportunity to enrol by the time of the 2012 survey. For 
these households, we examine the relationship between the distribution 
of expected medical expenditures for the year ahead stated in 2012 and 
the propensity to take out coverage over the next year. Given the insur-
ance premium does not depend on individual risk, those who report a 
higher expectation in 2012 have a greater incentive to enrol by 2013.  
Besides adverse selection on expected expenses, insurance is presumed 
to be motivated by its potential to reduce the variability of expenses. If 
households hold information on the degree of dispersion in their future 
medical expenses that they are able to express in the subjective probabil-
ity questions and they do indeed seek to reduce this risk exposure, then, 
for a given degree of risk aversion, those who report a higher standard 
deviation of expected medical expenditure in 2012 will be more likely to 
have enrolled by 2013.  
In Table 5.11 we split households that were not enrolled in the CBHI 
scheme in 2012 according to enrolment status in 2013. One quarter of 
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households enrolled between the two surveys. For each group, we show 
in the top panel the sample means of the mean and standard deviation of 
expectations of the one-year-ahead medical expenditure stated in 2012. 
Contrary to the hypotheses that enrolment is motivated by adverse selec-
tion and risk exposure, there is no difference in either the means or 
standard deviations by insurance status.40 The bottom panel gives the 
parameters of the distributions of expected expenditure reported in 
2013. Those who enrolled between 2012 and 2013 reported subjective 
probabilities that imply a 38 percent higher mean and 31 percent higher 
standard deviation of expected expenditure than those who choose to 
remain without insurance. This is puzzling since coverage would be ex-
pected to reduce both the expectation and the dispersion of the distribu-
tion. It may be that changed circumstances, such as the onset of some 
health problem, caused households to revise their expectations upward 
and to insure. We turn to multivariate analysis to explore further whether 
enrolment is influenced by expectations.   
Table 5.11 
 Sample means of the mean and standard deviation of expected medical 
expenditure by 2013 insurance status for households not enrolled in 2012 
 Insurance status in 2013 
p-value of test equal-
ity of means  Enrolled Not enrolled 
Expectations reported in 2012    
 Mean 404  376 0.488 
 Standard deviation 154 153 0.958 
Expectations reported in 2013    
 Mean 632 462 0.013 
 Standard deviation 247 169 0.020 
     
No. of observations 127 353  
Notes: Sample restricted to districts in which CBHI is offered and to households who had not enrolled by 
2012. Only households who gave logical responses in both years are reported. The pattern of results for 
each year is robust to using all available responses in each year.  
 
The first column of Table 5.12 gives probit (marginal effects) esti-
mates of the probability of enrolling in the CBHI scheme by 2013 for 
those not enrolled in 2012 as a function of the mean and standard devia-
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tion of (log) expected medical expenditures reported in 2012 and socio-
demographic controls also measured in 2012. Past medical expenditure 
and health variables are excluded since these may provide information 
that is incorporated into expectations of future expenses that subse-
quently influence insurance enrolment.41 Neither of the marginal effects 
of the two expectation variables is significantly different from zero.42 
Households in higher wealth quintiles are more likely to insure. Enrol-
ment is positively associated with an indicator of the quality of care in 
the closest health facility.43  
Ability to pay appears to be a strong constraint on enrolment. Given 
this, it could be that households form plans to enrol based on expecta-
tions of medical expenses that they are not able to realise. To examine 
this hypothesis, we model the reported intention to enrol as a function 
of expectations and covariates. The sample is restricted to households 
that were not enrolled in 2012 and/or 2013 that were asked if they 
planned to enrol. Probit model (marginal effects) estimates are presented 
in the right-hand column of Table 5.12. While the coefficient of the 
mean of expected expenditure is not significantly different from zero, 
the standard deviation of expected expenditure is positive and statistical-
ly significant.44, 45, 46  A standard deviation increase in the latter variable is 
associated with an increase of 0.08 in the probability of reporting an in-
tention to enrol. This is consistent with perceived high volatility of medi-
cal expenses motivating plans to insure, even if these plans are not ulti-
mately implemented. Failure to fulfil plans may, but need not necessarily, 
represent time-inconsistency (Giné et al. 2014, Halevy 2015).47  
All in all, despite the fact that expectations do appear to be formed on 
the basis of relevant information, including past medical expenses, and 
are to a limited extent predictive of future expenses, there is no strong 
evidence that these expectations are used in decision making, at least 
with respect to health insurance enrolment. Greater perceived risk of 
medical expenses may raise the willingness to insure, if not actual enrol-
ment. 
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Table 5.12 
 Probit estimates of actual and planned enrolment in CBHI scheme for 
households not initially enrolled 
  
Actually enrolled by 
2013 Plan to enrol 
  
 
 
 
 
Mean log expected medical exp. 0.0254 (0.0235) -0.00761 (0.0193) 
Standard deviation log expected medical exp. -0.127 (0.0777) 0.323*** (0.0854) 
2nd poorest assets quintile group 0.0789 (0.0713) 0.135*** (0.0470) 
Assets quintile 3 0.165** (0.0715) 0.168*** (0.0531) 
Assets quintile 4 0.153** (0.0770) 0.162** (0.0638) 
Richest assets quintile group 0.159* (0.0814) 0.0860 (0.0701) 
Covered by safety net programme 0.0637 (0.0582) 0.0286 (0.0542) 
Has bank account 0.0892 (0.0738) -0.0847 (0.0625) 
Educated head 0.0386 (0.0347) -0.00759 (0.0351) 
Head of hhold holds official position 0.00144 (0.0486) 0.0657* (0.0392) 
Forgone care when sick -0.0358 (0.109) 0.0738 (0.0858) 
Minutes to nearest health center 0.000290 (0.000443) -0.000269 (0.000452) 
Quality of care at nearest health center 0.142*** (0.0542) -0.100 (0.0663) 
Ln(household size) 0.00252 (0.0519) 0.220*** (0.0598) 
Muslim 0.0335 (0.0761) -0.159** (0.0626) 
Tigray region 0.297*** (0.113) 0.223** (0.0943) 
Amhara region 0.220** (0.104) 0.0288 (0.102) 
Oromiya region 0.0619 (0.0985) 0.288*** (0.0908) 
Year dummy 
 
 -0.0304 (0.0393) 
  
 
 
 
Observations 592  1,068  
Pseudo R2 0.113  0.108  
Notes: The table shows probit marginal effects. The sample for the left-hand column includes all 
households that were not enrolled in 2012. The dependent variable is an indicator of whether the 
household had enrolled by 2013. The sample for the right-hand column includes all households that 
were not enrolled in 2012 and/or 2013. The respective dependent variable is an indicator of whether 
the respondent reported that the household planned to enrol. The models also include the share of 
household members in gender specific age groups. Standard errors in parentheses are corrected for 
clustering at Kebele level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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5.8 Conclusion   
Our unique elicitation of subjective probabilities of medical expenditures 
reveals that the majority of rural Ethiopians are able to provide logically 
consistent responses, in the sense of satisfying monotonicity, that corre-
late with past expenses and predict future spending. This positive finding 
echoes that of other exercises in the elicitation of probabilistic expecta-
tions of various outcomes conducted in developing countries (Attanasio 
2009; Delavande et al. 2011; Delavande, 2014). It suggests that meas-
urement of distributions of expected expenditure offers a feasible alter-
native to reliance on the cross-sectional variance of realized medical ex-
penses that, even after conditioning on covariates, is likely to 
substantially overstate the risk faced by any one household. But house-
holds do make mistakes in assessing their risk exposure. We find that the 
strength of the relationship between expected and past medical spending 
exceeds the degree of persistence in actual expenditure. Previously high 
spending households may therefore overestimate the extent to which 
they will gain from insurance. If these households were to respond to 
this misperception, then the selection would not be as adverse as would 
be presumed on the basis of the correlation between enrolment and past 
expenses. This is not to say that there is no scope for adverse selection. 
To a limited extent, expected expenditure predicts realized spending 
even after conditioning on covariates. But we find no evidence that 
households act on this private information. Expectations do not appear 
to influence the decision to take out health insurance. This is somewhat 
at odds with the literature, although evidence of behaviour responding to 
health expectations captured by subjective probabilities mostly comes 
from one country (Malawi) and one health condition (HIV/AIDS) 
(Delavande and Kohler 2012; Shapira 2013; de Paula et al. 2014).  The 
finding that plans to insure, if not actual enrolment, are positively related 
to the perceived dispersion of medical expenses suggests that the desire 
for insurance is (partly) driven by risk exposure. We can only speculate 
on why this motivation does not become effective demand. It could be 
lack of ability to pay, which does appear to be a strong determinant of 
insurance enrolment. Households living close to subsistence may be par-
ticularly prone to time inconsistency (Giné et al. 2014). From a distance, 
enrolment in health insurance to relieve stress caused due to volatile 
medical expenses can seem attractive. But when the time comes to pay 
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the premium, the urgency of other needs may take precedence over a 
payment to cover medical care that may not even be needed.  
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to elicit beliefs 
about future spending on health care. As such, it inevitably suffers from 
limitations that future research should take care not to repeat. First, a 
feature of medical expenditure data is that many households spend noth-
ing. Our instrument did not explicitly offer zero expenditure as a possi-
ble outcome. It would probably be preferable to first ask about the 
probability of spending anything at all on health care, and then the prob-
abilities of spending within categories over the range of positive 
amounts. Second, the instrument asked about expectations of medical 
expenditure over one year, while actual expenditure on ambulatory care 
was recorded for the past two months. This inconsistency, which ham-
pers comparison of the levels of expected and realized expenditure but is 
less of an impediment to correlation analysis, is not easy to resolve since 
extension of the recall period for ambulatory care is likely to increase 
measurement error. Nonetheless, consistency of the time span should be 
pursued. Third, the finding that expectations do not appear to influence 
the decision to insure may partly be due to the fact that two-fifths of 
households offered insurance had already enrolled by the time the first 
expectations data were collected. The remaining three-fifths do not ap-
pear to base their enrolment decision on expectations of medical spend-
ing captured by the subjective probability questions.  It would obviously 
be preferable in future tests for selection to collect expectation data from 
the time at which insurance is first offered. Notwithstanding these limita-
tions, we believe the findings from this study are sufficiently encouraging 
to warrant further research into how expectations of medical expendi-
tures are formed and utilized in a number of contexts. 
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Notes 
 
1 The paper is co-authored with Owen O’Donnell, Anagaw Mebratie, Getnet 
Alemu, and Arjun S. Bedi. 
 
2 Our results also suggest that much of the predictive power of expectations 
comes from observable characteristics. 
3 The premium ranges from 10 Birr (US$ 0.6) to 15 Birr per household per 
month. In one region (Amhara), the premium varies with household size (3 Birr 
per individual per month but all individuals in the household must still be en-
rolled). The central government subsidizes a quarter of the premium while district 
and regional governments are expected to cover the costs of providing a fee 
waiver to the poorest 10 percent of the population. 
 
4 Enumerators were instructed to compute the three cut offs as: A=min+X, 
B=A+X, C=B+X, where X=(max-min)/4.  
 
5 That is, the Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP). The programme oper-
ates in food insecure districts and targets food insecure households in such dis-
tricts. 
 
6 Refinement of the wording of the preliminary questions may be called for when 
this happens. 
 
7 For 37 (in 2012) and 24 (2013) households, information on whether they were 
prompted to revise their responses is missing.  
 
8 After prompting for revisions, the incidence of illogical responses dropped to 5 
percent in Dominitz and Manski (1997). Since a principal aim of the current 
study is to examine the ability of low educated individuals to report subjective 
probabilities, we decided not to allow revision, except with respect to the report-
ed minimum and maximum values. 
 
9 An additional potential explanation is that the current study did not coach re-
spondents in the provision of subjective probabilities using a practice question, 
while the Indian study did so using the probability of rain the day following the 
interview. 
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10 All the intervals are not equally spaced for the households in which the enu-
merators made errors in calculating the thresholds (see Table 5.2). The equivalent 
figure based on the 2013 data is similar with a slightly smaller peak in the first 
interval (see Appendix Figure A5.1). 
 
11 The median reported probabilities are very close to and follow the same gen-
eral pattern across the intervals as the means. Specifically, the medians in 2012 
(2013) respectively are: Min-A – 50 (40), A-B – 20 (20), B-C – 10  (10) and C-
Max – 20 (20). 
 
12 From only three subjective probabilities it is not possible to establish which 
type of distribution fits the data best (Attanasio and Augsburg, 2012).  
  
13 Covariates (see Appendix Table A5.3) include household size and de-
mographics, the head of household’s education and occupation, measures of 
economic status, dummies for household level chronic health problems, paralysis, 
self-assessed health status, difficulty in hearing or speaking and a death in the 
household in the previous year and 96 village dummies.  
 
14  The small difference in the two sample means is due to missing values of some 
of the covariates included in the regression model. 
 
15 In 2012, only 3 respondents (of the 1599) stated a minimum health expenditure 
of zero. Admittedly, this may reflect a deficiency in the question, which did not 
emphasise that zero expenditure was a permitted response. 
 
16 For example, van Vliet (1992) finds a correlation coefficient that ranges from 
0.21 to 0.27 for total health care costs in consecutive years in the Netherlands. 
Newhouse et al. (1989) also find a correlation coefficient that ranges from 0.09 to 
0.26. French and Jones (2004) find higher persistence in health expenditures of 
older persons in the US and Feenberg and Skinner (1994) find high persistence in 
larger health expenditures in the US.  
 
17 Switching insurance status between periods may affect the correlation 
coefficient if enrolment reduces health payments of the insured. Computing the 
correlations by spliting the sample in to those who remained uninsured in 
consecutive periods and those who get insurance in the second period confirm 
this for total health expenditure in 2012-2013 (0.034 vs -0.024) but not in 2011-
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2012 (0.037 vs 0.038). The difference is, however, not statistically significant for 
both pairs of years. 
 
18 For the correlations reported in Table 5.4, total expenditure is computed by 
simple extrapolation as described earlier. If, instead, we compute total expendi-
ture as the sum of outpatient spending in the last two months and inpatient 
spending for the last year, the correlations decline and are significant only in logs.  
 
19 Restricting the sample to households with positive expenditure in consecutive 
years raises the correlation (without reaching significance) for total and outpatient 
expenditure for 2011-12 but only for outpatient expenditure for 2012-13.  
 
20 For example, van Vliet (1992) finds a correlation coefficient that ranges from 
0.21 to 0.27 for total health care costs in consecutive years in the Netherlands. 
Newhouse et al. (1989) also find a correlation coefficient that ranges from 0.09 to 
0.26. French and Jones (2004) find higher persistence in health expenditures of 
older persons in the US and Feenberg and Skinner (1994) find high persistence in 
larger health expenditures in the US.  
 
21 Switching insurance status between periods may affect the correlation 
coefficient if enrolment reduces health payments of the insured. Computing the 
correlations by spliting the sample in to those who remained uninsured in 
consecutive periods and those who get insurance in the second period confirm 
this for total health expenditure in 2012-2013 (0.034 vs -0.024) but not in 2011-
2012 (0.037 vs 0.038). The difference is, however, not statistically significant for 
both pairs of years. 
 
22 For the correlations reported in Table 5.4, total expenditure is computed by 
simple extrapolation as described earlier. If, instead, we compute total expendi-
ture as the sum of outpatient spending in the last two months and inpatient 
spending for the last year, the correlations decline and are significant only in logs.  
 
23 Restricting the sample to households with positive expenditure in consecutive 
years raises the correlation (without reaching significance) for total and outpatient 
expenditure for 2011-12 but only for outpatient expenditure for 2012-13.  
 
24 Restricting attention to the sample of households who reported chronic illness 
in both periods raises the correlation coefficient of total medical expenditure sub-
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stantially to 0.062 for 2011-2012 and 0.097 for 2012-2013, although neither 
reaches significance. The correlation also rises, particularly for 2011-2012 if we 
exclude households that experience death of a household member between the 
two consecutive years. 
 
25 In the table, we show correlations with realized total expenditure computed by 
the simple extrapolation method (i.e. outpatient*6+inpatient). If instead with 
simply add two-monthly outpatient expenditure to inpatient expenditure, the cor-
relations generally decline somewhat in magnitude but maintain significance. 
  
26 The analysis is intended to be descriptive with the purpose of assessing wheth-
er the subjective probabilities reported are sufficiently correlated with factors one 
would anticipate may be utilised in the formation of expectations such that there 
are grounds to interpret the data as expectations. Testing a specific model of ex-
pectations formation would be difficult with the data available given the distinc-
tion between inpatient and outpatient in the realized, but not the expected, ex-
penditures, and the two month reference period for outpatient expenditure. 
 
27 OLS estimates based on the 2012 and 2013 observations separately show simi-
lar patterns although some estimates are no longer statistically significant in one 
of the two periods (See Appendix Table A5.4).  
 
28 A one percent increase in outpatient expenses in the last two months is likely to 
imply a less than one percent increase in annual expenditure assuming that the 
increase in not repeated in every other two monthly period throughout the year. 
 
29 The safety net programme is significant in the LAD regression. 
 
30 If the health variables are excluded from the OLS regression, then the coeffi-
cients on the past expenditure variables increase (results available on request). 
This is further indication that both sets of variables are capturing the extent to 
which expectations are formed on the basis of health-related information. 
 
31 Estimates are similar if we employ the mid-point of the logs of the reported 
minimum and maximum expected expenditure instead. 
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32 The increase in expectations with wealth is slightly stronger. Expectations in-
crease significantly with household size and the incidence of negative shocks. 
 
33 Estimates in first differences are provided in Appendix Table A5.6. 
 
34 Total realized expenditure is computed as outpatient expenditure in the last 
two months multiplied by six, plus inpatient expenditure in the last year. If we 
instead use total realized expenditure computed by simply adding the outpatient 
expenditure in the last two months with the inpatient expenditure in the last year, 
we find a significant GPML coefficient of 0.261 (SE=0.133). Coefficients in Ta-
ble 5.10 generally increase in magnitude and are robust in terms of significance 
when this alternative calculation of total realized expenditure is used. 
 
35 exp(-1.995)-1=-0.864. 
 
36 (exp(0.00454)-1)×45=0.1957. 
 
37 In the alternative specification, we also enter the lagged realized expenditures in 
levels rather than logs. As a further robustness check, we estimated by Poisson 
pseudo maximum likelihood, which weights all observations equally and so may 
be more sensitive to outliers, rather than GPML. In this case, the mean of ex-
pected expenditure is significant at 1%. Results from these alternative specifica-
tions and estimators are available on request. 
 
38 The CBHI scheme operates by issuing a card that entitles the holder to free 
care at contracted facilities. There is no payment and subsequent reimbursement. 
Hence, if a household takes its coverage into account in reporting expected ex-
penditure, it is likely to be reporting OOP payments and not the gross value of 
the health care anticipated to be accessed through insurance.  
 
39 Since there are no copayments under the scheme, moral hazard (with a high 
price elasticity) would not result in increased payments unless increased access to 
low levels of treatment resulted in referral to higher levels of treatment with asso-
ciated expenditures. But even if there were such an effect, anticipation of it would 
require very sophisticated agents, which villagers experiencing the first two years 
of operation of a health insurance scheme are unlikely to be.  
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40 The expectations of medical expenditure reported in 2012 could possibly take 
into account plans to enrol in the CBHI scheme in the coming year and the con-
sequences this would have for OOP payments. To take account of this possibil-
ity, we have restricted the sample further to households not enrolled in 2012 and 
who declare at that point that they have no plans to enrol. This does not change 
the conclusion of there being no significant difference in expectations between 
those who do and not subsequently enrol in either the bivariate analysis in Table 
5.11 or the multivariate analysis reported in Table 5.12. 
 
41 In fact, including lagged realized medical expenditure and health indicators has 
little or no influence on the magnitude and significance of the coefficients on the 
expectations variables. 
 
42 The mean and standard deviation of expected expenditure are highly correlated 
(ρ=0.788), which might be considered an explanation for neither being individu-
ally significant. When the model is re-estimated first including only the mean (and 
covariates) and then only the standard deviation, neither is significant. 
  
43 The perceived quality of care is reported by the head of the nearest health facil-
ity. The specific question is: “Do you think this health center is providing the 
expected standard of health care services?” This was asked in a survey of 48 
health centers (3 from each of the 16 districts) conducted in April-May 2011. 
Households were matched to health centers by proximity based on information 
collected from district health offices (Mebratie et al. 2015).   
44 A simple test of differences in sample means of the mean and standard devia-
tion of expected spending between those who plan to enrol and those who do 
not shows no significant difference in the expected mean (ETB 437 vs ETB 412) 
but significantly higher expected standard deviation for those planning to enrol 
(ETB 177 vs ETB 141). 
 
45 Estimates based on the 2012 and 2013 observations (not enrolled) separately 
are reported in Appendix Table A5.7. In both years, the expected mean and 
standard deviation coefficients are positive, and the latter is always statistically 
significant.  
 
46 Household size and whether or not the head of the household ever held an 
official position are also associated with plans to enroll. The explanation for the 
former is that premia is by and large set at the household level. The latter could 
 
120 CHAPTER 5 
 
 
be because holding an official position could relate to one’s awareness about the 
scheme. While these results didn’t come out for actual enrolment in the sub-
sample analysed here, Mebratie et al. 2015 found similar results for actual enrol-
ment in 2012.  
 
47 Of the households not enrolled in 2012, 59% (354/604) report that they plan 
to enrol in the CBHI scheme. Of those households, only 26% (91/354) had actu-
ally enrolled by 2013. Both the mean and standard deviation of expected expendi-
ture reported in 2012 are slightly higher for those who do realise their plan to 
enrol (mean: 414 vs 381, standard deviation: 164 vs 153) but neither difference is 
significant. 
  
 
6 
A Perverse ‘Net’ Effect? Health 
Insurance and Ex-ante Moral Hazard in 
Ghana1 
 
 
Abstract 
Incentive problems in insurance markets are well-established in eco-
nomic theory. One of these incentive problems is related to reduced 
prevention efforts following insurance coverage (ex-ante moral hazard). 
This prediction is yet to be tested empirically with regard to health insur-
ance, as the health domain is often considered relatively immune to per-
verse incentives, despite its validation in other insurance markets that 
entail adverse shocks. This paper tests for the presence of ex-ante moral 
hazard with reference to malaria prevention in Ghana. We investigate 
whether enrolment in the country’s National Health Insurance Scheme 
(NHIS) negatively affects ownership and use of insecticide-treated bed 
nets (ITNs). We use a panel of 400 households in the Brong Ahafo re-
gion for this purpose and employ a propensity-adjusted household fixed 
effects model. Our results suggest that ex-ante moral hazard is present, 
especially when the level of effort and cost required for prevention is 
high. Implications of perverse incentive effects for the NHIS are briefly 
outlined. 
6.1 Introduction 
“We have mosquito nets but we don’t use them. If you are insured it is 
easier to go to the hospital [in case of malaria] [..] Why would you spend 
GH¢8 on the bed net while you can take GH¢2 to go to the hospital?”   
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This attitude expressed during a community meeting on health care utili-
zation in the small village of Obenkrom in Central Ghana signals a po-
tential incentive problem related to health insurance. The possibility that 
preventive efforts are scaled back in response to insurance coverage is 
known in the insurance literature as ex-ante moral hazard, to be distin-
guished from ex-post moral hazard, which refers to increased demand 
for medical care once insured (Zweifel & Manning, 2000). While the 
health economics literature has mostly focused on the latter (Bhattachar-
ya & Packalen, 2008), we take prime interest in the ex-ante type of moral 
hazard and test for its presence in the case of malaria prevention, more 
specifically the use of insecticide-treated bed nets (ITNs) to protect 
against malaria-infested mosquitoes. We investigate whether insurance 
gives rise to perverse incentives for prevention by analyzing panel data 
collected among 400 households in central Ghana where malaria is en-
demic. 
According to the World Health Organization, there is little evi-
dence that Ghana managed to reduce malaria prevalence between 2000 
and 2009 (WHO, 2010). It is still the country’s leading cause of morbidi-
ty and mortality, accounting for an estimated 38 percent of all outpatient 
visits and 36 percent of all admissions into healthcare facilities. Its im-
pact in terms of mortality is most dramatic among children under five. 
The 2008 Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) revealed that malaria 
accounted for 43 percent of all deaths in children aged 29 days to 5 years 
and that roughly half these deaths occurred at home (PMI, 2010). Apart 
from a high disease burden, malaria also typically puts a heavy financial 
burden on affected households. Akazili et al. (2007) estimate for a dis-
trict in northern Ghana that the total cost of a malaria episode equals 
US$6.39, which is made up of US$1.87 in direct out-of-pocket expendi-
ture on treatment, and US$4.52 in foregone earnings due to working 
days lost. On an annual basis, the authors calculate that the cost of ma-
laria amounts to 34 percent of the income of a poor household (living on 
less than a dollar a day).  
Households can avoid the direct cost of malaria treatment by en-
rolling in Ghana’s National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS), which 
was launched in 2003 to provide Ghanaians with financial protection 
against negative health shocks. The scheme’s benefit package covers 
about 95 per cent of the country’s common health problems including 
malaria. Participation in NHIS, which is implemented at the district level, 
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requires households to pay an annual premium that is progressive with 
income (as well as an annual processing fee of about GH¢4). The mini-
mum premium, which applies to informal sector workers, is GH¢7.2 
(PPP$12.4) per annum, while the maximum premium currently stands at 
GH¢48 (PPP$82.6). The “core poor” (indigents) are exempted from 
premium payments as well as minors (under 18) and the elderly (over 
70). These waivers are partly funded by public sector employees, who 
tend to be levied a 2.5% social security contribution earmarked for 
NHIS. In return, these contributors are exempted from premium pay-
ment if they register for the scheme.  
However, insurance neither eliminates the disease burden from 
malaria (disutility of being sick) nor the indirect cost from foregone earn-
ings, which requires an effective prevention strategy instead. The most 
prominent of these in malaria endemic regions is sleeping under an in-
secticide-treated bed net (ITN), the effectiveness of which is corroborat-
ed in a number of studies. Estimates of reductions in child mortality as a 
result of ITN use range from 20% to 60% (e.g. Binka et al., 1996; 
D’Alessandro et al., 1995; Nevill et al., 1996; Phillips-Howard et al., 
2003). Besides, a high level of ITN coverage within a community reduces 
the overall infective mosquito population (Gimnig et al., 2003; Howard 
et al., 2000). Anecdotal and entomological evidence suggests that un-
treated nets in a relatively good condition can also protect against malaria 
(Guyatt & Snow, 2002). Their effectiveness notwithstanding, adoption 
and consistent use of bed nets is far from universal in Ghana. The 2008 
DHS revealed that 45 per cent of Ghanaian households owned at least 
one bed net (treated or untreated) and 33 per cent owned at least one 
ITN. A mere 15 per cent of the population actually slept under a net the 
night prior to the survey, although this percentage is almost double (28 
per cent) for children under five (GSS et al., 2009).          
This low uptake of nets partly stems from an information prob-
lem, as studies point out that people do not always associate malaria with 
mosquito bites (see e.g. Agyepong & Manderson, 1999; Ahorlu et al., 
1997; Hill et al., 2003). Even among bed net users it is often protection 
against nuisance of mosquitoes (and other insects) that motivates adop-
tion rather than malaria avoidance per se, as witnessed in Burundi (Van 
Bortel et al., 1996), Guatemala (Klein et al., 1995) and rural Cameroon 
(Louis et al., 1992). This likely occurs in Ghana as well, where Adongo et 
al. (2005) report for the north of the country that nets tend to be used by 
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adults instead of children because of the notion that adults need a good 
night’s sleep to prepare for next day’s work. The information failure also 
shows from the finding that bed nets are increasingly used for the in-
tended purpose when educational efforts regarding malaria transmission 
are stepped up (Agyepong & Manderson, 1999). Also, health education 
appears to stimulate bed net use, provided that the target group has a 
certain minimum level of trust in health workers (De Hoop & Van 
Kempen, 2010). 
 Other problems related to ITN use are the fact that nets reduce 
the risk of contracting malaria but cannot eliminate it altogether -the 
psychological effect of which varies with one’s risk attitude- and that 
ITN use is costly. The acquisition price of an ITN is not inconsiderable 
at about US$6.5 in commercial outlets, and even when distributed for 
free, ITN use entails ‘costs’ in terms of the (perceived) discomfort of 
sleeping under a bed net. Since insurance shifts the relative cost of pre-
vention and treatment in favor of the latter, the question is warranted 
whether insurance could negatively impact on ITN adoption (both own-
ership and use). This hypothesized negative effect highly depends on the 
particularities of the health shock these actions aim to avoid, their effec-
tiveness in doing so, the level of discomfort they entail and the degree of 
effort they require. In situations where preventive care itself is financed 
by the insurance scheme, this negative effect is likely to be small, unless 
the perceived discomfort of the preventive strategy and/or associated 
effort are excessive. In fact, Mensah et al. (2010), using cross-sectional 
data, have shown that NHIS in Ghana increases pre- and postnatal pre-
ventive care visits. These preventive measures, however, are in the insur-
ance package and cannot be used to argue against ex-ante moral hazard. 
ITN use, which is excluded from the benefit package, nonetheless re-
quires a different level of effort and might entail higher perceived dis-
comfort than the preventive check-ups analyzed in Mensah et al. (2010).  
To our knowledge, the interaction between insurance and malaria 
prevention has not yet been studied. However, we identified a small 
number of studies that provide insight in the impact of insurance 
schemes on other types of preventive health behavior in a developed 
country context. These studies and major reasons why ex-ante moral 
hazard received little attention in health insurance are outlined below. 
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6.2 Ex-ante moral hazard 
A host of empirical studies have documented ex-post moral hazard in 
health insurance in both developed and developing country contexts 
(see, for example, Asenso-Okeyere, 1998; Ekman, 2004; Harmon & No-
lan, 2001; Sapelli & Vial, 2003, Yip & Berman, 2001). By contrast, there 
is scant evidence on the existence of ex-ante moral hazard. While it tends 
to be cited as a possibility, it is often downplayed (Dave & Kaestner, 
2009). One reason not to consider ex-ante moral hazard as a serious 
problem is the idea that uncompensated loss of health is consequential 
(Cutler & Zeckhauser, 2000). Put differently, people are assumed not to 
take a gamble with their personal health or that of household members, 
at least not to the extent they would do with material resources. Second, 
most health insurance schemes have incomplete coverage, reducing the 
moral hazard problem directly. Kenkel (2000) points out that even under 
full coverage there will be a utility loss due to illness and posits that indi-
viduals will factor in forgone earnings and the agony of illness in their 
decision. 
The few empirical studies that have tested for ex-ante moral haz-
ard, which mainly concern developed country contexts, provide mixed 
evidence regarding its presence (Zweifel & Manning, 2000; Kenkel, 
2000). For instance, in the US the RAND Health Insurance Experiment 
revealed that habits like smoking, drinking and exercise are not signifi-
cantly affected by less generous health insurance (Newhouse, 1993). Us-
ing US data with naturally occurring exogenous variation in health insur-
ance, Card et al. (2008) also failed to find an association between 
insurance status and changes in smoking, exercise and weight. Testing 
for the same hypothesis in Britain, Courbage & De Coulon (2004) 
showed that preventive activities (smoking and exercising) are not affect-
ed by private health insurance. Trujillo et al. (2010) report a positive ra-
ther than a negative effect from insurance on prevention in a cross-
sectional study among diabetes patients in Colombia.   
On the other hand, a state-mandated health insurance for the 
treatment of diabetes, which is linked to obesity, was associated with 
higher bodymass index among diabetics in the US (Klick & Stratmann, 
2007). Also, Dave & Kaestner (2009) found evidence that health insur-
ance (Medicare) reduces prevention and increases unhealthy behaviors 
among elderly American men, i.e., when controlling for contact with 
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medical professionals. They argue that obtaining insurance has two po-
tentially offsetting effects on prevention. While it should reduce preven-
tion because insurance lowers the cost of medical care (ex-ante moral 
hazard), increased contact with medical professionals may alter infor-
mation on benefits of prevention and thereby stimulate it.  
Moreover, evidence supporting substantial ex-ante moral hazard 
is found in other insurance markets. For instance, a more generous au-
tomobile insurance is found to have caused a significant decrease in pre-
vention and an increase in accidents (Chiappori, 2000). Similarly, Cohen 
& Dehejia (2004) showed that compulsory car insurance laws are associ-
ated with increased car fatalities. More related to health shocks, an in-
crease in insurance generosity for workers’ accident compensation is 
found to be associated with more work place injuries (Fortin & Lanoie, 
2000; Kaestner & Carroll, 1997).  
The fact that empirical studies on car insurance and workers’ 
compensation show a significant ex-ante moral hazard is puzzling. A re-
duced prevention effort in driving and at work would result in adverse 
and mostly severe health shocks, which sits awkwardly with the idea that 
the health domain is relatively immune to perverse incentives regarding 
prevention. Why then do some empirical studies fail to detect ex-ante 
moral hazard? The timing of the materialization of the health risks in-
volved plays a potential role here. As Dave & Kaestner (2009) observe, 
the cost of inaction likely befalls individuals only in the longer run in the 
case of unhealthy behavior like smoking, so that the case for prevention 
is weak even without insurance, which attenuates a potential effect from 
insuring oneself. In our case, the benefits from ITN use are immediate 
and ex-ante moral hazard should thus manifest itself more clearly. This 
notwithstanding, the evidence on ex-ante moral hazard is still inconclu-
sive and its theoretical underpinnings require more careful testing.  
6.3 Empirical strategy  
6.3.1 Constructing the counterfactual 
Our identification strategy relies on households who change insurance 
status between two periods. As insurance uptake is non-random, con-
ducting a randomized controlled experiment is not possible in our case. 
Our analysis of the effect of insurance on ownership and use of bed nets 
follows a quasi-experimental approach that aims to mimic the experi-
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mental controlled trial by matching the treated households (insured) with 
the untreated households (uninsured) such that the only difference be-
tween the two is just the treatment variable (NHIS participation). 
More formally, we follow the potential outcome approach devel-
oped by Rubin (1974, 1978). The approach views causal effects as those 
that result from a comparison of potential outcomes defined on the 
same unit. Thus, the main challenge is to identify the counterfactual: how 
would a certain household have behaved if it had not taken insurance? 
Since this is by definition unobservable, we have to resort to a compari-
son with the non-insured, i.e., to compare ‘treated’ and ‘untreated’ units 
in impact evaluation jargon. Using the mean outcome of the untreated 
(non-insured) households as the counterfactual is naïve, since covariates 
that determine insurance uptake might also determine bed net use and 
ownership. If so, our estimate likely suffers from self-selection bias in a 
quasi-experimental set-up. In order to avoid this selection problem we 
have to call upon two identifying assumptions. The first is the condition-
al independence assumption (cf. Lechner, 2001), which implies that deci-
sions on bed net adoption are independent of selection into insurance, 
given a set of observable covariates that may explain insurance status but 
are not themselves affected by it. This may include relatively exogenous 
variables such as household composition, age, education levels and 
household wealth (e.g. land ownership). Rosenbaum & Rubin (1983) 
suggest the use of a balancing score that summarizes this (potentially 
large) set of observable covariates into a single indicator, viz. the proba-
bility of being insured conditional on this set of variables. Thus, we first 
predict the probability of selection (being insured) in a probit model and 
subsequently match insured and uninsured households based on this so-
called propensity score. However, to be able to meaningfully match in-
sured and uninsured households, they should be sufficiently alike, i.e., 
have similar propensity scores. This brings out the second identifying 
assumption of common support; there exists an overlap in propensity 
scores and there is no perfect predictability of insurance status given the 
set of observables. Under these two conditions our propensity score 
matching estimator is simply the mean difference in outcomes over the 
common support range, which is known in the impact evaluation litera-
ture as the “average treatment effect on the treated” (ATT).  
While the propensity-score matching estimator has the advantage 
of balancing households on observable factors along a single dimension 
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(the estimated propensity score), it has the disadvantage that it assumes 
selection is solely based on observable household characteristics. Even 
after balancing on the propensity score a household’s decision whether 
to be insured is not necessarily random. The insurance decision is a high-
ly complex one and may well be correlated with, among others, unob-
servable health shocks, risk attitude and time preferences, all of which 
may at the same time be correlated with ITN use.    
Studies have in fact underscored the importance of a household’s 
risk attitude in insurance decisions. The stronger a household’s aversion 
to risk, the higher the probability that a household takes up insurance 
(Monheit & Vistnes, 2008).  This aversion to risk is also what is sup-
posed to drive the adoption of ITNs. Time preference (e.g. myopia and 
hyperbolic discounting) is a closely related factor that affects both insur-
ance and prevention decisions. For example, Tarozzi & Mahajan (2011) 
establish in a randomized controlled trial that time preferences are 
strongly related to ITN uptake in the Indian State of Orissa, even more 
so than risk and cost preferences. Another type of attitude, particularly 
but not exclusively relevant in Sub-Sahara Africa, concerns a household’s 
beliefs regarding the causes of health problems and the extent to which 
one can control these. This boils down to whether one harbors tradi-
tional (animist) or modern views regarding ill health. In our sample we 
have substantial heterogeneity in this respect, as one in every five house-
holds reportedly believes that witchcraft (or another supernatural force) 
can cause malaria. The study by Jehu-Appiah et al. (2010) probes into 
such beliefs, asking respondents for example to what extent they agree 
with the following statement: “Health is a matter of fate (in the hands of 
God) and that insurance cannot help me deal with its consequences”. 
Such beliefs are shown to be relevant in explaining NHIS enrolment, at 
least for certain parts of the income distribution. Hence, selection on 
non-observable factors cannot be ignored.    
 When unobserved attitudes can be assumed to remain relatively 
fixed over time, as is likely to be the case for risk and time preferences as 
well as traditional beliefs regarding ill health, bias from selection on such 
unobservables can be avoided by comparing treated and untreated units 
in a panel structure. Therefore, a household fixed effects model is em-
ployed for our major specification. Unlike the propensity-score matching 
estimator, this model exploits the longitudinal nature of the data to ac-
count for time-invariant household-specific unobservable factors. The 
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propensity score matching is integrated in our fixed effects model, since 
we only estimate the effect of insurance on ITN adoption among the 
sub-sample of households that look alike according to the counterfactual 
constructed using the propensity score. A potential limitation of a 
household fixed effects model is that there might be unobservable fac-
tors that vary over time and are correlated with both the decision to be-
come insured and to adopt ITNs. In an attempt to account for these we 
control for health shocks, shifts in health information, and other time-
varying measures of income and socio-economic status in the form of 
robustness checks. Further sensitivity checks of the results are discussed 
in the final part of the paper.  
6.3.2 Sample description 
The study is located in Ghana’s Brong Ahafo region, which features the 
next-to-highest NHIS penetration rate of all regions in the country: 77 
percent of the population was enrolled in 2009, which compared favora-
bly with the national average of 62 percent (NHIA, 2009). Also, owner-
ship and use of ITNs is relatively high in Brong Ahafo compared to na-
tional standards: 46 per cent of the households owned an ITN and half 
of under-five children reportedly slept under an ITN in 2008 (GSS et al., 
2009).  
A panel was built on 400 households who were surveyed in Sep-
tember 2007 and re-surveyed after two years (September 2009). Seven 
households could not be traced in the second round and were replaced 
by neighboring households. All households live in the catchment area of 
a regional Catholic mission hospital, which commissioned the current 
research on the effect of insurance roll-out in their area of operation. 
The surveyed households are spread over eleven different communities, 
which were purposively sampled such that the selected communities re-
flect the existing variation in community size (ranging from 700 to 5,000 
inhabitants) and in distance from the main road (on which the hospital is 
located). Seven of the villages are located in Asutifi district and four in 
the adjacent Asunafo district. The latter communities, from which half 
of our sample is drawn, are particularly distant from the regional health 
infrastructure (two-hour drive from main road). Community selection 
was done in close cooperation with hospital staff knowledgeable on the 
composition of the catchment area. 
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The number of households interviewed in a community is pro-
portional to its population size and within communities households were 
randomly drawn for inclusion in the study. For the largest community 
(Nkaseim) a household register was available, which was used for ran-
domization, whereas in the other communities a random walk procedure 
was followed in the absence of a complete household list. In June 2010 a 
series of participatory debriefing sessions on the outcomes of the study 
were organized in five of the surveyed communities. Throughout the 
paper we make occasional reference to information gathered in these 
community meetings. The research was conducted jointly with local 
health authorities and prior consent was obtained from traditional lead-
ers in all communities under study. 
 In order to define a household’s insurance status, respondents 
who indicated to have registered for NHIS were asked to present their 
actual insurance card. A small number of very recent subscribers were 
not able to do so, given the time lag between registration and actual re-
ceipt of the card, without which healthcare providers do not consider the 
patient to be insured. If presented, the validity of the card was checked 
by the surveyor, since the insurance needs to be renewed annually and 
can thus be expired if no action was taken. We only consider households 
that could present a valid NHIS card to be insured.  
Thus defined, our data show that the fraction of insured house-
holds in the sample, which stood at 39 percent in 2007, had increased to 
53 percent by 2009 (Figure 6.1). This increase was concentrated among 
the poorest 25 per cent of households (as measured by expenditure), 
who doubled their participation from 23 to 47 per cent. By comparison, 
participation moved up from 53 to 62 per cent in the top quartile. De-
spite the 36 per cent overall increase in enrolment in two years, insurance 
penetration in our sample compares poorly with the corresponding fig-
ure for the entire Brong Ahafo region (77 per cent in 2008).  Bed net 
ownership, on the other hand, is relatively high: 4 out of every 5 house-
holds reportedly owned at least one bed net (treated or untreated) in 
2009, against roughly one in two households in the entire region.  
Table 6.1 (panel A) shows that in 2007 there is no significant dif-
ference in ownership of bed nets, either measured as dummy or in per 
capita terms, between households who remained uninsured between 
2007 and 2009 and those who gained insurance coverage between 2007 
and 2009. The same holds for acquisition rates of bed nets in the period 
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2007-09. These results on ownership should be interpreted with caution, 
however, as the insured may have acquired their nets before taking in-
surance. Since we do not have a pure baseline (pre-NHIS data), our anal-
ysis zooms in on the difference between those who gain insurance be-
tween the two survey rounds and those who remain uninsured 
throughout.  
Figure 6.1 
  NHIS enrolment (per cent of households) 
 
 
 
When analyzing use indicators for these two groups we make a 
distinction between two types of nets, i.e., those that are factory-treated 
(referred to as ‘FTN’) and ordinary nets that are periodically soaked in 
insecticides (referred to as ‘self-treated nets’ (STN)), where the former 
are more common. Once acquired, self-treated nets entail a substantial 
effort and cost compared to factory-treated nets. Hence, we posit that if 
there is ex-ante moral hazard it should be manifested more clearly in 
STN than in FTN adoption. We observe similar levels of FTN use in 
2007 and a negative change in its use over the two-year period for both 
groups. However, though not statistically significant, the decline in FTN 
use among those who gained insurance in this period exceeds the decline 
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for those who remained uninsured by 75%. STN use shows a markedly 
different picture. Those who gained insurance started with a significantly 
higher use of STNs, but over the two years their use rate declines sub-
stantially, while it increases for those households who do not take up 
insurance. The mean difference in change is statistically significant (p < 
0.01).  
This sharp drop in bed net use among those who gained insur-
ance relative to those who remain uninsured cannot be taken as firm evi-
dence of ex-ante moral hazard, as initial differences in household charac-
teristics could have brought about such a diverging trend. Panel B of 
Table 6.1, however, reveals minor initial differences in economic status. 
Among the list of measures of both permanent income and current in-
come presented in panel B, statistically speaking, only ‘the number of 
rooms in the house’ variable shows that those who gained NHIS are less 
poor than those who remained uninsured. Yet, statistical insignificance 
need not imply that the two groups are similar ex-ante. For example, 73 
per cent of households who remained uninsured live in a mud/thatch 
house rather than in a brick construction, which serves as a crude proxy 
for income poverty (cf. Sarpong et al., 2010), against only 63 per cent of 
those who gained insurance. The use of propensity score matching will 
help to avoid any such remaining systematic differences in these observ-
able characteristics.  
Those who gained insurance are not only better-off, they are also 
better informed about the actual cause of malaria, as confirmed in panel 
C. We solicited perceptions regarding potential causes (multiple answers 
possible) of both uncomplicated and complicated malaria, which are lo-
cally distinguished. Uncomplicated malaria is associated with fever, head-
ache, vomiting, chills and loss of appetite, whereas malaria cases are con-
sidered complicated when, in addition to these symptoms, they involve 
anemia, convulsions, general lethargy and a swollen body. Only misper-
ceptions on the causes of uncomplicated malaria are reported, as the re-
sponses are very similar for both types. Unfortunately, these data are 
available for 2009 only. Arguably, such perceptions are fairly static in the 
short run (yet, later in our analysis, we control for exposure to health ed-
ucation that could change these perceptions). It appears that throughout 
the sample, among those who gained insurance and remained uninsured 
alike, mosquito bites are perceived as the main transmission mechanism 
for malaria, but not as the unique one. Nevertheless, a significantly high-
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er percentage of those who remain uninsured report other causes of ma-
laria, e.g. witchcraft and drinking contaminated water, than those who 
gained insurance. Interestingly, both groups maintain similar perceptions 
regarding the effectiveness of ITNs, despite the larger degree of confu-
sion on malaria transmission among those who remain uninsured. We 
also do not find notable disparities in participation rates in health educa-
tion between the two groups.   
 As signaled by Dave & Kaestner (2009), insured households are 
likely to be more aware of the benefits of prevention than the uninsured 
via increased contact with health professionals and this may have an off-
setting effect on ex-ante moral hazard. In Table 6.2 we estimate the 
probability of a household reporting that malaria can be caused by fac-
tors other than mosquito bites, as well as the probability that a house-
hold indicates that bed nets are effective, on whether or not a household 
was ever insured (either in 2007 or 2009), thereby controlling for other 
covariates. While for most of these variables we do not find evidence 
that insurance creates awareness, being insured is associated with a lower 
probability of perceiving witchcraft as a cause of malaria. Due to the 
cross-sectional nature of the data it is unclear to what extent this percep-
tual difference stems from increased contact of the insured with health 
professionals, however. Assuming that insurance helps to create aware-
ness, our results presented in the next section should be considered as a 
lower bound of the true ex-ante moral hazard (as awareness due to in-
surance partly offsets the perverse incentive effect). 
  Finally, we checked the possibility that NHIS households 
switched from ITN use to alternative malaria prevention strategies, such 
as mosquito-proof window netting and clearing bushes or draining stag-
nant water around the house where mosquitoes breed. We also checked 
for use of mosquito coils and other insect repellents in the period be-
tween the two surveys. Simple non-parametric comparisons, reported in 
Table 6.3, do not reveal a diverging trend between those who remain 
uninsured and those who gained insurance for any of these strategies, 
except for the drainage of stagnant water around the house. While stag-
nant water was more frequently observed over time around the houses 
of those who gained insurance, the reverse trend is visible for those who 
remained uninsured, which is consistent with an ex-ante moral hazard 
argument.  
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Table 6.1  
Descriptive statistics 
 
 
 
 
Remain 
uninsured 
(mean) 
Switched to 
be insured 
(mean) 
p-value for 
difference 
A. Bed net ownership and use ( in 2007 and change) 
Household owns  1 net (treated or untreated), 2007 0.714 0.681 0.582 
             Change 2007-2009 0.192 0.161 0.646 
# of nets owned / # of household members, 2007  0.255 0.302 0.257 
             Change 2007-2009 0.190 0.123 0.211 
Slept under ‘factory-treated net’ (FTN) (# of members in 
household), 2007 1.299 1.351 0.786 
            Change 2007-2009 -0.349 -0.613 0.214 
Slept under ‘self-treated net’ (STN) (# of members in house-
hold), 2007 0.156 0.447 0.011** 
            Change 2007-2009 0.075 -0.290 0.002*** 
Note: The ‘change 2007-2009’ rows correspond to the  variable in the immediate preceding row 
B. Economic status ( in 2007 ) 
Mud/thatch house (vs. brick/concrete) 0.731 0.638 0.130 
Number of dwelling units in the house 4.267 4.543 0.429 
Number of rooms in the house 2.151 2.602 0.046** 
Ownership of the house (1=Yes; 0=No) 0.667 0.652 0.819 
Savings by head of household 0.295 0.319 0.687 
Savings by spouse 0.145 0.156 0.841 
Household consumption expenditure (excl. health expenses) 2839 3195 0.393 
C. Perceptions about causes of malaria and perceived effectiveness of bed nets (2009) 
Uncomplicated malaria is caused by (multiple answers possible):   
        Mosquito bites 0.952 0.936 0.575 
        Standing in sun for too long 0.952 0.936 0.584 
        Drinking unclean water 0.938 0.850 0.023** 
        Eating sweets 0.567 0.528 0.553 
        Witchcraft 0.284 0.090 0.000*** 
“Bed nets are effective in preventing uncomplicated malaria”  0.914 0.856 0.164 
*** and** refer to significance at 1% and 5% respectively; For effectiveness of bed nets, our instrument 
employs a scale variable (1=Strongly disagree, .. , 5=Strongly agree) which is then transformed to a dummy 
variable (agree/disagree) 
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Table 6.2 
 Effect of NHIS on perceptions  
 Malaria is caused by:  
 Witchcraft 
Drinking un-
clean water 
Eating 
sweets 
Excessive expo-
sure to sunlight 
Perceived  
effectiveness 
of bed net 
      
Insured in either 2007 or 2009 
-0.408** 
(0.183) 
-0.189 
(0.226) 
-0.155 
(0.161) 
-0.141 
(0.274) 
-0.189 
(0.222) 
number of observations 354 362 359 364 354 
Pseudo R-square 0.105 0.129 0.097 0.248 0.063 
Notes: Reported figures are coefficients from a probit model; ** represents statistical significance at 5% level; 
Variables included in the model: age, age square and sex of household head, share of household members who 
are female, below 15 and below 5, construction material of house, number of dwelling units in the house, num-
ber of rooms, whether the household owns the house and dummies for religion, major occupation of the house-
hold head and village dummies. 
 
Table 6.3 
 Alternative malaria prevention strategies 
Other malaria/mosquito prevention strategies 
Remained 
uninsured 
(mean) 
Switched to be 
insured 
(mean) 
p-value for 
differences in 
means 
    
Used any repellents (mosquito coils, insect repellents) 
in the past 2 years (1=Yes; 0=No) 0.403 0.396 0.913 
Expenditure on repellents in past two years (in GH¢) 10.31 14.00 0.448 
Dwelling has mosquito-proof windows (change) 0.096 0.096 0.998 
Bushes around the house (change) 0.027 0.117 0.211 
Stagnant water around the house (change) -0.014 0.085 0.076 
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6.4 Analysis 
6.4.1 Matching variables: exogenous determinants of participation 
The first step in our identification strategy is estimating propensity 
scores for the sampled households, which requires modeling NHIS par-
ticipation. The propensity score matching procedure aims to allow for a 
comparison of bed net ownership and use between NHIS and non-
NHIS households that have a similar ex-ante probability of participating 
in NHIS. Because the matching strategy builds on the conditional inde-
pendence assumption, it is only those variables that are unaffected by 
insurance, or anticipation of it, that should be included in this participa-
tion model (Caliendo & Kopeinig, 2008). Moreover, we only take into 
account exogenous variables that have a clear theoretical link with health 
insurance and preventive health behavior, so as to avoid problems relat-
ed to over-parameterization of the model (Augurzky & Schmidt, 2001; 
Bryson et al. 2002). Table 6.4 presents the variables that were included in 
the probit model to explain participation and their marginal effects. 
 First, we controlled for household demographic characteristics 
like age and sex of the household head, share of female members, share 
of members below 15 years, share of members below 5 years, and 
whether household size exceeds four (related to the fact that for some 
questions in the survey we only asked information up to four household 
members). These demographic characteristics might affect insurance up-
take and ITN use, as they could shape risk attitudes, and as suggested by 
Koch & Alaba (2010), indicate health status. Age and sex of the house-
hold head may also pick up differences in education, which we cannot 
include as a separate variable due to missing values on this variable. 
However, Table 6.4 does not show a significant effect for any of the de-
mographic factors.  
 Because insurance uptake and (to a lesser extent) ITN use are 
costly, covariates that proxy for economic status are considered. Savings, 
consumption and durables ownership are not included, because we reck-
on that their relatively liquid nature can serve to finance out-of-pocket 
health expenditure and thus fail the exogeneity test. We rely on more 
time-invariant indicators like construction material of the house, size of 
the house, ownership status and main occupation of the household head 
instead.  
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Table 6.4 
 Probit model for NHIS participation 
 
Variables Marginal effect Variables Marginal effect 
Demographics  Ethnicity of head (ref: Asante) 
    Age of head 0.004 (0.009)      Akwapim 0.046 (0.096) 
    (Age of head)2   0.000 (0.000)      Fanti 0.017 (0.113) 
    Sex of head (1=male; 0=female) 0.022(0.054)      Other Akan -0.224**(0.097) 
    Share of female members 0.045 (0.100)      Ga-Adangbe -0.193 (0.112) 
    Share of members below age 15 -0.112 (0.119)       Ewe -0.121 (0.090) 
    Share of members below age 5 0.067 (0.139)       Others  -0.042 (0.064) 
    Less than 4 household members -0.006 (0.062) Village (ref: Awewoho) 
Economic Status      Apenenadi 0.062 (0.118) 
    Mud/thatch house (vs.  brick/concrete) -0.147*** (0.047)     Wuramumuso 0.483*** (0.061) 
     # of dwelling units in the house 0.017* (0.009) 
 
    Obenkrom 0.306*** (0.097) 
     # of rooms in the house 0.010 (0.012)     Antwigyeikrom -0.287*** (0.082) 
     Ownership of house 0.084* (0.048)     Amanfrom 0.313** (0.107) 
Main occupation of head (ref: no occupation)      Ataneata 0.083 (0.176) 
     Agricultural wage labor -0.019 (0.174)      Mempehia 0.433** (0.116) 
     Non-agric. wage  labor 0.355** (0.134)      Nkrankrom 0.166 (0.103) 
     Agric. self employed 0.071 (0.156)      Pomakrom -0.156** (0.071) 
     Non-agri. self employed -0.015 (0.166)      Nkaseim 0.009 (0.089) 
Religion (ref: Presbyterian)  Observations 761 
     No religion 0.031 (0.197) Pseudo R-square 0.184 
     Catholic 0.112 (0.103)   
     Methodist 0.168 (0.107)   
     Pentecostal 0.005 (0.097)   
     Spiritualist 0.152 (0.138)   
     Other Christian 0.072 (0.107)   
     Muslim 0.035 (0.117)   
    Traditional -0.310 **(0.108)   
Standard errors in parentheses; ***,  ** and * represent statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10 per cent level 
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Table 6.4 corroborates that a better economic position raises the 
likelihood of being insured. Households living in a mud house are 14.7 
per cent less likely to be insured, for example, than those living in a brick 
construction. Also, households headed by non-agricultural wage laborers 
have a higher likelihood of being insured than those with  household 
heads in other occupational categories, which may partly be due to the 
strong incentive for certain groups of civil servants to register for  NHIS, 
given their contribution to the scheme through the social security sys-
tem.  
Other variables used in our specification include religion, ethnici-
ty, and a set of village dummies. These variables could proxy for socio-
cultural factors, in particular the strength of traditional beliefs regarding 
ill health, and physical distance from modern health infrastructure. It 
shows that households headed by a traditional believer are 31 per cent 
less likely to be insured compared to the reference category (Presbyteri-
an). Also, households in the remote village of Awewoho have a signifi-
cantly lower probability to enroll in NHIS than more proximate house-
holds in Wuramumuso, Obenkrom and Amanfrom, as expected.  
The matching procedure was successful in balancing the sample 
using the propensity scores, which range from 0.002 to 0.998. Overall, 
97.6 percent of the observations whose probability is estimated turn out 
to be in the region of common support (~0.073, ~0.998). The balancing 
property test is fulfilled based on the optimal number of blocks (six) that 
ensure that the mean propensity score in each of the blocks is not differ-
ent between insured and uninsured. 
6.4.2 Estimation results: non- parametric and fixed effects 
estimations 
In this section we investigate the causal effects of insurance on bed net 
ownership and use, for which we use the same four outcome variables as 
in panel A of Table 6.1. We present estimates of ATT based on 1) near-
est neighbor (NN) matching algorithm with replacement, and 2) a pro-
pensity adjusted fixed effects model. We also check for the robustness of 
results to different econometric concerns. 
Panel A in Table 6.5 shows the results for NN matching with re-
placement. This variant of the NN matching algorithm is chosen, be-
cause it decreases the bias by increasing the average quality of the match-
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ing. Even though this is traded off against an explosion in variance 
(Caliendo & Kopeinig, 2008; Dehejia & Wahba 2002), it provides the 
most appropriate estimator due to the fact that there are a relatively large 
number of insured households in the last block of propensity score 
compared to the uninsured. The estimates indicate a negative ATT both 
for sleeping under a factory-treated and self-treated net and a positive 
ATT for ownership variables. Bed net ownership in per capita terms has 
a significantly positive ATT while use of self-treated net has a significant-
ly negative ATT. Bootstrapped standard errors are used. This non-
parametric estimation indicates that bed net ownership increases with 
insurance, at least when measured in per capita terms, which is not in 
line with an ex-ante moral hazard argument. On the other hand, insur-
ance significantly reduces the use of self-treated nets (STNs), while the 
result for factory- treated nets (FTNs) is not significant.  
Let us now turn to our major baseline specification, which is re-
ported in panel B of Table 6.5. Here we employ the fixed effects regres-
sion model, which controls for time-constant unobservable factors, un-
like the propensity score matching estimator in panel A. The negative 
sign for all four outcome variables is suggestive of the prediction of ex-
ante moral hazard, even if it is only sleeping under STNs that is precisely 
estimated. Like the non-parametric estimation, the fixed effects model 
indicates that in 100 insured households, around 20 people do not sleep 
under STNs due to insurance uptake. Health insurance apparently in-
creases the benefit of curative care relative to preventive care, and most 
strongly so if the level of effort, cost and discomfort involved in preven-
tion is higher (the case of STNs).   
Notwithstanding its advantage in controlling for time-invariant 
unobservable factors, the fixed effects model does not, as indicated earli-
er, account for unobservable factors that are subject to change over rela-
tively short time periods. For instance, health shocks or a shift in health 
information through health education between the two waves of the sur-
vey may drive both insurance status and the use of these prevention 
strategies. As a robustness check, we present a fixed effects model that 
additionally controls for time-variant covariates reflecting health shocks, 
health information, use of alternative malaria prevention strategies, and 
measures of income and socio-economic status. The corresponding re-
sults in panel C of Table 6.5 are fairly similar to those reported in panel 
B. 
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Table 6.5 
 Effect of insurance on bed net ownership and use  
 
Bed net owner-
ship (dummy) 
Bed net ownership  
(per capita) 
# of members 
who slept under 
factory-treated 
net (FTN) 
# of members who 
slept under self-
treated net (STN) 
Panel A: Non parametric: Nearest Neighbor with replacement 
Insurance 
0.078  
(0.045) 
0.081**  
(0.040) 
-0.027  
(0.155) 
-0.244**  
(0.117) 
No. of observations 757 751 755 757 
Panel B: Household fixed effects (major baseline specification) 
Insurance 
-0.016  
(0.049) 
-0.050  
(0.045) 
-0.077  
(0.138) 
-0.196** 
 (0.082) 
No. of observations 740 735 739 740 
R-squared (within) 0.102 0.157 0.100 0.030 
Panel C: Robustness to time varying covariates, household fixed effects 
Insurance 
-0.007  
(0.055) 
-0.069 
(0.046) 
-0.086 
 (0.161) 
-0.198**  
(0.089) 
No. of observations 671 668 670 671 
R-squared  (within) 0.182 0.276 0.183 0.103 
Panel D: Robustness among sub- sample who had bed net in both rounds, household fixed effects 
Insurance 
  
-0.069 
(0.173) 
-0.248**  
(0.107) 
No. of observations   490 491 
R-squared (within)   0.291 0.046 
Panel E: Robustness: (Regressing change in outcome on change in insurance controlling for health infor-
mation variables regarding causes of malaria in 2009) 
Insurance 
-0.020 
 (0.049) 
-0.049 
 (0.041) 
-0.029 
 (0.154) 
-0.159* 
 (0.088) 
No. of observations 322 320 322 322 
R-squared 0.011 0.038 0.029 0.035 
Notes: ***,  ** and * represent statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10 per cent level; Standard errors in pa-
renthesis (bootstrapped standard errors for NN matching, robust standard errors for fixed effects); Num-
ber of groups in panel B(380), C(370) and D(250). In panel C, time varying covariates controlled for include 
i) indicators of health ( death of member of household past 2 years, at least one day lost due to poor 
health past month, diarrhea experience past year,  member experienced fever past month, serious injury 
or illness past two years), ii) indicators of health information (participation in health education, use of 
alternative malaria prevention strategies  such as window netting, absence of stagnant water and bushes 
near house), iii) measure of income (quartiles of consumption expenditure), iv) measure of socio-economic 
status (major occupation of the head, demographic features, different housing characteristics). 
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Another potential econometric concern with our analysis is relat-
ed to the fact that both insurance and bed net uptake are choice varia-
bles. Smith & Goodwin (1996) noted in the context of crop insurance 
that these two choice variables could be simultaneously determined in 
which case a recursive structure, where only insurance is allowed to af-
fect bed net ownership and use, is biased. However, this seems a minor 
problem in our case, given that malaria is only one of many health prob-
lems covered by NHIS. It seems implausible that households decide not 
to take insurance because they plan to acquire and use ITNs. The results 
presented in panel D of Table 6.5 are related to this, as they zoom in on 
the effect of insurance only for the subset of families that owned a bed 
net in both survey rounds, so that anticipated bed net acquisition does 
not play a role. As in the previous analyses, it appears that insured 
households have comparatively fewer members sleeping under FTNs 
and STNs, corroborating the perverse incentive effect. The coefficient 
for the latter is slightly higher than the estimate in panel B but maintains 
its statistical significance, while FTN use is still suggestive of ex-ante 
moral hazard (though not precisely estimated).   
Finally, as mentioned earlier, attitudes regarding the causes of 
malaria or the effectiveness of bed nets may be correlated with both in-
surance status and use of bed nets. While our descriptive statistics show 
that misperceptions are more frequent among the uninsured, which 
lends support to our interpretation, the data for these variables is only in 
levels (for 2009) and we cannot establish whether there was a diverging 
trend whereby the uninsured actually improved their awareness between 
2007 and 2009. One of the channels that could affect perceptions is 
health education. Controlling for this in panel C of Table 6.5 did not al-
ter the results. To further corroborate our evidence of ex-ante moral 
hazard, we regressed the change in outcome variables on the change in 
insurance, controlling for the list of variables that measure misperception 
(as in panel C of Table 6.1) in 2009. This robustness check is presented 
in panel E, Table 6.5. All variables indicate ex-ante moral hazard and, 
consistent with previous analyses, the number of members who slept 
under a self-treated net declines significantly as a result of insurance.  
6.4.3 Insurance, disease burden and health care utilization 
In order to assess the seriousness of ex-ante moral hazard in prevention, 
one would need to scrutinize the extent to which insured households 
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contract malaria more often than uninsured families, resulting from dif-
ferences in preventive effort. Our data unfortunately do not allow for 
this. Since insurance increases access to healthcare (and thereby official 
diagnosis of malaria), the trend in the number of medically indicated ma-
laria cases in the area is not a reliable guide in this respect. Self-reports of 
malaria are also extremely tricky, as symptoms vary by type of malaria 
and are shared with other ailments. A simple formal test on fever inci-
dence, however, shows that 44 percent of insured households had a 
member of their household who experienced fever against 36 percent for 
the uninsured. The difference is statistically significant at 5 per cent. Due 
to the possibility of adverse selection into insurance, however, this dif-
ference might not be attributable to a decline in preventive measures 
among the insured.  
Table 6.6 
 Effect of NHIS on disease burden and health care utilization  
 
A day lost 
due to poor 
health last 
month 
# of days 
lost due to 
poor health 
last month 
Utilized out-
patient 
health care 
last month 
Number of 
outpatient 
health 
care visits 
Utilized inpa-
tient health 
care past year 
Panel A: Household fixed effects 
Insurance 
0.103 
(0.065) 
0.501** 
(0.251) 
0.099* 
(0.055) 
0.193  
(0.136) 
0.099** 
(0.047) 
No. of observations 719 696 736 736 727 
No. of groups 379 379 380 380 379 
R-squared (within) 0.062 0.030 0.065 0.044 0.013 
Panel B: Robustness to controlling for time varying covariates, household fixed effects 
Insurance 
0.125* 
(0.066) 
0.497** 
(0.257) 
0.089* 
(0.053) 
0.196 
(0.127) 
0.124** 
(0.048) 
No. of observations 693 671 709 709 702 
No. of groups 370 370 371 371 371 
R-squared  (within) 0.105 0.056 0.121 0.104 0.128 
Notes: ***,  **, * represent statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10 per cent level; Robust standard errors in 
parentheses; In panel B, time varying covariates controlled for include i) measures of socio-economic status 
(ownership status of house, number of rooms and dwelling units in the house), ii) measures of health shocks 
(serious injury or illness in past two years), iii) indicators of health information (participation in health 
education, use of window netting), iv) presence of stagnant water/ bushes around the house v) measures of 
demographic features: share of female members, share of children below 5 and below 15). 
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Given that malaria is the leading cause of Ghana’s morbidity and 
mortality, we prefer to look into an alternative measure, i.e., days lost to 
poor health (DLPH), which indicates the overall disease burden that 
households face. Hence, we estimate the effect of insurance on i) wheth-
er or not a household lost a day of work by a sick member due to poor 
health in the last month, and ii) the number of DLPH in the last month. 
A fixed effects model is employed to control for a number of time-
invariant determinants of adverse selection to insurance. Our result for 
both outcome variables shows that insured households face a higher dis-
ease burden (Table 6.6, panel A, columns 1-2). In analogy to the analysis 
for bed net adoption in Table 6.5, we also take up more volatile unob-
servables such as health shocks in the model, which is reported in the 
first two columns of panel B, Table 6.6. It can be observed that the earli-
er result remains intact after inclusion of these variables. A decline in 
preventive measure due to insurance is a plausible explanation for the 
higher disease burden of those who gained insurance vis-à-vis the unin-
sured.  
If ex-ante moral hazard has indeed led to increased malaria inci-
dence (and possibly that of other diseases via a weakened immunity sys-
tem), it should be reflected in higher health care utilization.  In order to 
check if our model captures effects where we would expect these, we 
employ a fixed effect model in panel A of Table 6.6 (columns 3-5) to 
estimate the effect of insurance on i) whether a household has utilized 
outpatient health care in the last month, ii) the number of outpatient 
health care visits made in the last month, and iii) whether the household 
utilized inpatient health care in the past 12 months. Our estimates show 
that insured households utilize both more outpatient and inpatient health 
care. The estimate for frequency of outpatient health care is not precisely 
estimated at conventional levels but the coefficient is large and positive. 
We performed a similar robustness check to inclusion of time-varying 
covariates in panel B and results do not change nominally as a result. 
While there are concerns over ex-post moral hazard in the insurance lit-
erature, this increased health care utilization might not only be due to 
increased access NHIS provides, but in fact emerge from a genuine 
health care need as a result of a reduced commitment to prevention. 
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6.5 Conclusion 
The existence of ex-ante moral hazard in health insurance is a problem 
that is often acknowledged but as the same time trivialized without 
proper empirical underpinning. Our empirical analysis of the impact of 
the Ghanaian National Health Insurance Scheme on malaria prevention 
shows that such trivialization is unwarranted, or at least premature. We 
find that insured households in two districts of Central Ghana are less 
likely to sleep under a self-treated net and, despite lack of precision, our 
estimates for bed net ownership and sleeping under a factory-treated net 
point in the same direction. 
Unlike previous impact studies on NHIS, our analysis is based on 
panel rather than cross-sectional data, which allows to control for time-
invariant unobservable factors that influence both insurance and bed net 
uptake. The non-randomness of insurance uptake called for a propensity 
score matching method and we employed both non-parametric estima-
tion as well as a propensity adjusted fixed effects model to estimate the 
effect of health insurance on bed net ownership and use. The results 
from our main specifications are confirmed by various robustness checks 
and are in line with qualitative information obtained in a sub-set of the 
communities that are included in the study. As much as people see disu-
tility of illness, a high level of inconvenience is reported in sleeping un-
der bed nets and the cost-benefit analysis under insurance seems to tip 
towards treatment at the cost of prevention for a non-trivial part of the 
sample. 
At the same time, we acknowledge that the present analysis does 
not yet provide a definite answer to the existence of perverse incentives 
in the location under study. First of all, the data do not allow us to scru-
tinize the extent to which insured households contract malaria more of-
ten than uninsured families due to a decline in prevention efforts. Our 
findings that insured households face a higher disease burden and that 
enrollment has been accompanied by increased health care utilization are 
at least consistent with the presence of ex-ante moral hazard, however.   
A second issue that needs further probing concerns the fact that 
the observed decline in the use of self-treated nets among the newly in-
sured is only weakly reflected in the utilization trend of factory-treated 
nets. While STNs require more recurrent cost and effort, and therefore 
more susceptible to perverse incentives, we cannot rule out that other 
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mechanism are at work. For example, the availability of FTNs as com-
pared to that of STNs has grown substantially nation-wide, where the 
latter are gradually disappearing from the market. If this is also true for 
the location under study, it opens up the possibility that those who re-
mained uninsured tended to cling to their STN longer (and thus delayed 
switching to FTNs) compared to those who gained insurance. A relative 
lack of resources would be an obvious explanation, but since insurance 
uptake during the period under consideration was concentrated among 
the poorest households in the sample, an explanation in this direction 
does not entirely satisfy. This notwithstanding, more insight in local sup-
ply trends and acquisition patterns of bed nets is necessary to further 
validate our findings. More generally, the complexity of factors involved 
in both the decision to take up insurance as well as in defining one’s mix 
of malaria prevention strategies warrants more extensive qualitative work 
to ensure that no relevant factors have been overlooked.                
Despite these pending issues, we feel it is important to highlight 
ex-ante moral hazard as a potential backlash effect from the progress 
achieved by NHIS in opening up curative care for large sections of the 
population. If our results are corroborated and excess demand follows 
from reduced prevention, this holds risks for the scheme’s financial sus-
tainability as well as for the quality of services delivered. Educational and 
awareness-raising programs may go some way in redressing the balance 
of prevention versus treatment, but the introduction of incomplete cov-
erage, such as through co-payments, seems a more cost-effective strategy 
to neutralize perverse incentives. The latter likely implies a trade-off with 
the goal of broadening health access for the poor, however.  
We believe our paper underscores the importance of considering the 
unintended behavioral consequences of development interventions due 
to changes in incentive structures. This reduces the risk that perverse 
side-effects gradually undermine the success of programs that bring sub-
stantial benefits to their target group, as in the case of Ghana’s pioneer-
ing health insurance system. 
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7 Summary and Conclusion 
 
 
This thesis dealt with five issues related to the economics of 
health-risk and health insurance. These included, investigating if and why 
coping responses for health shocks are different from other shock types, 
identifying the channels of impoverishment due to ill-health, analyzing 
the impact of Ethiopia’s pilot CBHI scheme on household economic 
welfare, examining the presence and implication of adverse selection in 
the voluntary CBHI scheme and finally, investigating whether or not the 
Ghanian NHI suffers from problems of ex-ante moral hazard. Three 
rounds of panel household survey data (one baseline and two follow up) 
and in depth event-history interviews were employed in four of the es-
says on Ethiopia. The last chapter on Ghana was based on two rounds 
of panel household survey data and on qualitative information gathered 
from community meetings. 
Chapter two investigated which shocks trigger which coping re-
sponses and why. There were clear differences in terms of coping strate-
gies across shock types. Coping with relatively idiosyncratic health 
shocks was met by reductions in savings, asset sales and especially a far 
greater reliance on borrowing as compared to other shocks. Reductions 
in food consumption, a prominent response in the case of natural and 
economic shocks was notably absent in the case of health shocks. The 
analysis clearly showed that informal safety nets and reliance on friends 
and family for support, at least in the form of gifts, even in the case of 
idiosyncratic shocks was absent. While informal borrowing to deal with 
idiosyncratic shocks did appear to provide some assistance, it was often 
avoided. The chapter concluded by noting that the relative insensitivity 
of food consumption to health shocks, as noted in previous studies, does 
not imply insurability but indicates that it is not a viable response to such 
a shock as it does not provide cash to meet health care needs. From a 
policy perspective, the results suggest that at least in the Ethiopian con-
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text, the introduction of a formal protection system to deal with health 
risks is well-founded as informal insurance mechanisms do not seem to 
provide enough support.  
Chapter three focused on the channels of impoverishment due to 
a variety of ill-health measures. To this end, it went beyond the standard 
reduced form analysis that focuses on quantifying effects on consump-
tion. The study revealed, for example, that incidence of illness of the 
head of a household, on average, increased annual household health ex-
penditure by an amount equivalent to 4% of annual household con-
sumption expenditure. Although the labor supply of a household head 
declined due to ill-health, intra-household labor substitution limited the 
overall reduction in household labor supply. However, possibly due to 
productivity differences between the head’s labor and the substituted 
labor and diversion of productive resources for health care, there was a 
decline in household agricultural production. Ill-health was associated 
with asset depletion, increases in the probability of indebtedness and in 
the amount of outstanding loans. While households were able to main-
tain food consumption, imperfect insurance of non-food consumption 
was observed. This effect was larger for households with the lowest abil-
ity to self-insure. The chapter concluded by arguing that maintaining cur-
rent consumption through borrowing and depletion of assets and savings 
is unlikely to be sustainable in the long run and displays the need for in-
terventions that work towards reducing the financial consequences of ill-
health. Similar to the conclusion reached in chapter 2, the finding that 
consumption is maintained by borrowing and selling assets supports the 
decision to introduce a formal protection system.    
After making the case for public interventions, chapter four ana-
lysed the impact of the recently introduced pilot, voluntary, CBHI on 
measures of household economic welfare. Much of the existing evidence 
on impact of such schemes focuses on health care utilization and out-of-
pocket payments, often employing cross-section data and ignoring self-
selection. This chapter employed data collected before and after the in-
troduction of the CBHI pilot, to assess the impact of the scheme on 
household consumption, income, indebtedness and livestock holdings. 
The study revealed that enrolment leads to a 5 percentage point – or 13 
percent – decline in the probability of borrowing and is associated with 
an increase in household income. Both are outcomes that were found to 
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be affected by ill-health in the preceding chapter. There was no evidence 
that enrolling in the scheme affected consumption or livestock holdings.  
The chapter concluded by noting that the scheme enhances household 
economic welfare by reducing reliance on potentially harmful coping re-
sponses such as borrowing. In related work, Mebratie et al. (2013b) find 
that the CBHI scheme leads to greater health-care utilization and reduces 
the cost of accessing health care. These complementary findings, that is, 
the effect of the scheme on enhancing economic welfare and increasing 
access to health care, support a scaling up of the CBHI scheme.  
Chapter five and six examined potential problems of information 
asymmetry in the provision of health insurance. The presence and impli-
cations of adverse selection in the Ethiopian pilot CBHI scheme were 
examined in chapter five. For this, the chapter employed an innovative 
approach of eliciting beliefs about future spending on health care. The 
study showed that households do base expectations regarding future 
medical expenditure on past spending levels. Despite evidence that 
households are able to anticipate health care expenses, at least to some 
extent, there was little or no evidence that expectations influence the de-
cision to take out health insurance. The results presented in this essay 
suggest that, based on its current design, financial viability of the CBHI 
scheme is unlikely to be affected by adverse selection.  
Chapter six examined an empirically underexplored but theoretically 
acknowledged incentive problem in health insurance-- ex-ante moral 
hazard. The chapter investigated whether enrolment in the Ghanaian 
National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS) negatively affects ownership 
and the use of insecticide-treated bed nets (ITNs), the most prominent 
malaria prevention strategy in malaria endemic areas. The analysis 
showed that ex-ante moral hazard is present, especially when the level of 
effort and cost required for prevention is high. The chapter concluded 
by highlighting concerns regarding unintended consequences of devel-
opment interventions. Although not definitive, ex-ante moral hazard 
(changes in preventive behaviour) may be a concern for CBHI schemes 
as is found in the Ghanaian NHI. While the introduction of co-payments 
is the most straight forward policy implication to internalize externalities 
with respect to health-risk prevention, it is likely to compromise the 
move towards Universal Health Coverage. Complementary interventions 
(such as health education and awareness programs) maybe needed to re-
duce the implications of such perverse incentives. 
  
 
 Appendices 
 
 
 
Figure A2.1  
Number of shocks experienced by shock type  
(% of households) 
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Table A2.1 
Probability of relying on a specific coping response  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES Dissaved 
Reduced 
Consumption  Sold asset  Borrowed  
Received 
Support   
Adjusted 
labor supply  
No re-
sponse 
Shocks        
Crime/ con-
flict/family 0.0861 0.0320 0.142** -0.0240 0.0117 -0.00464 0.173*** 
 (0.0596) (0.0683) (0.0586) (0.0316) (0.0161) (0.0192) (0.0608) 
Health shock 0.174*** 0.0201 0.170*** 0.152*** 0.0336*** 0.0137 0.0314 
 (0.0480) (0.0481) (0.0407) (0.0236) (0.0116) (0.0128) (0.0420) 
Economic shock 0.267*** 0.241*** 0.0979*** 0.0678*** 0.00403 -0.00512 0.227*** 
 (0.0408) (0.0435) (0.0372) (0.0247) (0.00599) (0.0128) (0.0403) 
Natural shock 0.301*** 0.406*** 0.162*** 0.0348 0.00232 -0.00218 0.0693** 
 (0.0480) (0.0453) (0.0356) (0.0234) (0.00586) (0.0127) (0.0351) 
Demographics        
Household size -0.00108 0.0180 -0.0157* -0.00774 -0.00175 0.00298 0.0240*** 
 (0.00898) (0.0111) (0.00892) (0.00512) (0.00204) (0.00338) (0.00768) 
Adult share -0.0191 0.00655 -0.172** 0.0426 0.00778 0.0227 0.0838 
 (0.102) (0.120) (0.0730) (0.0620) (0.0210) (0.0308) (0.0937) 
Elderly share 0.330* 0.516** -0.337** -0.0898 0.0466 0.0143 0.00144 
 (0.189) (0.237) (0.157) (0.128) (0.0335) (0.0669) (0.170) 
Under 5 share 0.241* -0.410*** -0.147 -0.0292 -0.0197 -0.0486 0.0567 
 (0.130) (0.138) (0.108) (0.0757) (0.0229) (0.0514) (0.106) 
Male share 0.107 0.0938 0.128 -0.00954 -0.0304* -0.0216 0.0403 
 (0.0851) (0.0939) (0.0864) (0.0483) (0.0160) (0.0262) (0.0844) 
Head sex -0.0145 -0.0189 0.00239 0.0279 -0.000156 -0.00790 -0.00116 
 (0.0530) (0.0566) (0.0450) (0.0294) (0.00835) (0.0169) (0.0498) 
Head age -0.00226 -0.00223 0.000879 0.000451 0.000124 -0.000920 0.00161 
 (0.00172) (0.00192) (0.00148) (0.000974) (0.000262) (0.000645) (0.00165) 
Measures of economic status 
Asset quintile 2 0.0345 -0.0305 0.000619 -0.0304 -0.00548 -0.0109 -0.0224 
 (0.0596) (0.0523) (0.0557) (0.0249) (0.00747) (0.0134) (0.0439) 
Asset quintile 3 0.0560 -0.0848 -0.0429 -0.0295 -0.00959 -0.000674 -0.0775* 
 (0.0606) (0.0548) (0.0503) (0.0306) (0.00757) (0.0184) (0.0449) 
Asset quintile 4 0.0761 -0.0636 0.0739 -0.0292 -0.00676 0.00880 -0.0959** 
 (0.0563) (0.0603) (0.0565) (0.0299) (0.00861) (0.0215) (0.0385) 
Continued on next page 
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Table A2.1 (continued) 
Probability of relying on a specific coping response  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES Dissaved 
Reduced 
Consumption  Sold asset  Borrowed  
Received 
Support   
Adjusted 
labor supply  
No re-
sponse 
        
Asset quintile 5 0.0821 -0.137* 0.0950 -0.0447 0.000407 -0.00212 -0.129*** 
 (0.0690) (0.0717) (0.0636) (0.0341) (0.0131) (0.0201) (0.0468) 
 
PSNP beneficiary 
 
-0.0462 
 
0.0163 
 
0.120** 
 
0.0732** 
 
0.00501 
 
0.0143 
 
-0.0718* 
 (0.0448) (0.0464) (0.0483) (0.0343) (0.00754) (0.0149) (0.0373) 
Informal education -0.112** -0.0222 0.0530 -0.0352 -0.0132* -0.00942 -0.0814** 
 (0.0476) (0.0643) (0.0547) (0.0328) (0.00727) (0.0168) (0.0401) 
Primary education 0.000395 0.0279 0.00527 0.0345 -0.0115 0.00266 0.00511 
 (0.0412) (0.0418) (0.0382) (0.0225) (0.00785) (0.0120) (0.0349) 
Secondary (+) education 0.0640 0.172* 0.0492 -0.00663 -0.00712 -0.0163 0.0596 
 (0.0777) (0.0932) (0.0875) (0.0426) (0.0104) (0.0211) (0.0632) 
Social capital -0.132*** 0.00948 0.0275 0.0322 0.0312*** 0.0209* 0.0388 
 (0.0368) (0.0435) (0.0389) (0.0221) (0.0112) (0.0126) (0.0322) 
Iddir member 0.119* -0.0749 0.0456 -0.0122 -0.0201 0.0268 -0.220* 
 (0.0719) (0.0747) (0.0550) (0.0394) (0.0173) (0.0195) (0.118) 
Orthodox 0.0817 -0.254*** -0.0532 -0.0472 -0.00917 0.0619*** 0.150*** 
 (0.0777) (0.0776) (0.0538) (0.0309) (0.0102) (0.0223) (0.0520) 
Protestant 0.0308 -0.233** 0.102 0.00668 0.00220 0.310* 0.0185 
 (0.0930) (0.0970) (0.0851) (0.0519) (0.0149) (0.164) (0.0887) 
Other religion -0.0655 -0.287*** 0.111 0.0474 -0.000194 0.444 -0.0533 
 (0.129) (0.0983) (0.155) (0.0940) (0.0211) (0.292) (0.0951) 
Amhara -0.110 0.0970 -0.0651 -0.104** -0.0240** -0.0758*** 0.447*** 
 (0.103) (0.0940) (0.0799) (0.0421) (0.0102) (0.0223) (0.140) 
Oromiya 0.0344 -0.564*** -0.0948 -0.0582 -0.0167** -0.0283 0.504*** 
 (0.114) (0.0565) (0.0737) (0.0421) (0.00849) (0.0229) (0.137) 
SNNPR -0.166* -0.367*** -0.378*** -0.0399 -0.00173 -0.152*** 0.773*** 
 (0.0940) (0.0906) (0.0643) (0.0687) (0.0207) (0.0527) (0.0875) 
Observations 1,175 1,175 1,175 1,175 1,175 1,175 1,175 
Pseudo R2 0.139 0.311 0.107 0.100 0.236 0.187 0.246 
Notes:  The reference category for the asset quintile dummy is the poorest quintile; the reference category for the measure 
of human capital is the head of the household has no education at all; the reference category for the religion of the head is 
Muslim; the reference category for the region dummy is Tigray; the variable “social capital” refers to a dummy variable if the 
household has someone to rely on at times of shock. Marginal effects from a probit model are reported; clustered standard 
errors are in parentheses; ***,**,* refer to 1%, 5% and 10% significance, respectively 
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Table A2.2 
Summary statistics of variables in the regressions 
Variable name Variable definition Mean Std. Dev. 
    
Crime/conflict shock =1 if shock occurred 0.069 0.254 
Health shock =1 if shock occurred 0.312 0.463 
Economic shock =1 if shock occurred 0.327 0.469 
Natural shock =1 if shock occurred 0.473 0.499 
Asset quintile 1 Asset poorest 0.200 0.400 
Asset quintile 2 Asset second poorest  0.200 0.400 
Asset quintile 3 Asset third poorest 0.200 0.400 
Asset quintile 4 Asset second richest 0.200 0.400 
Asset quintile 5 Asset richest 0.200 0.400 
PSNP beneficiary Household is currently a benefi-
ciary of productive safety net 
program 0.229 0.420 
No  education Head has no education 0.466 0.499 
Informal education Head has an informal education 0.131 0.337 
Primary education Head has a primary education 0.361 0.480 
Secondary (+) education Head has a secondary education 0.042 0.201 
Household size  5.794 2.228 
Head age  46.227 14.036 
Head sex Male=1 0.860 0.347 
Male share Share of male members 0.502 0.191 
Adult share Share of adults aged [15-65] 0.498 0.209 
Elderly share Share of adults aged >65 0.049 0.149 
Under 5 share Share of adults <=5 0.149 0.157 
Muslim Head is Muslim 0.265 0.441 
Orthodox Head is Orthodox Christian 0.517 0.500 
Protestant Head is Protestant 0.194 0.395 
Other religion Other head’s religion 0.025 0.157 
Social capital 
Household has someone to rely on 
if shock happens 0.381 0.486 
Iddir member 
Member of a traditional associa-
tion for financial assistance at 
times of difficulty 0.717 0.451 
Note: Note: Sample size is equally distributed across regions 
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Table A2.3  
Linear probability model with region fixed effects 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES Dissaved 
Reduced Con-
sumption  Sold asset  Borrowed  
Received 
Support   
Adjusted 
labor 
supply  
No re-
sponse 
Crime/conflict/family 
(0/1) 0.0874* 0.0147 0.129** -0.0200 0.00951 -0.00958 0.151*** 
 
(0.0496) (0.0460) (0.0534) (0.0277) (0.0187) (0.0264) (0.0489) 
Health shock (0/1) 0.162*** 0.0186 0.159*** 0.147*** 0.0487*** 0.0205 0.0361 
 
(0.0421) (0.0341) (0.0373) (0.0226) (0.0164) (0.0154) (0.0368) 
Economic shock (0/1) 0.245*** 0.168*** 0.0924*** 0.0589** 0.00826 -0.0183 0.200*** 
 
(0.0368) (0.0313) (0.0342) (0.0254) (0.0119) (0.0197) (0.0372) 
Natural shock (0/1) 0.293*** 0.318*** 0.151*** 0.0445 0.0150 -0.00774 0.0727** 
 
(0.0481) (0.0403) (0.0349) (0.0287) (0.0144) (0.0196) (0.0336) 
Observations 1,175 1,175 1,175 1,175 1,175 1,175 1,175 
R-squared 0.173 0.367 0.129 0.083 0.098 0.102 0.276 
Notes: Standard errors (reported in parentheses) are clustered at kebele level. Selected coefficients from a linear 
probability model are reported. The specifications include the full set of control variables shown in Table A2.1; ***,**,* refer 
to 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance, respectively. 
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Table A2.4 
 Linear probability model with kebele fixed effects 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES Dissaved 
Reduced 
Consumption  
Sold 
asset  Borrowed  
Received 
Support   
Adjusted 
labor supply  
No re-
sponse 
Crime/conflict/family 
(0/1) 0.0132 0.0354 0.110* -0.0219 0.00657 0.00645 0.142** 
 
(0.0547) (0.0507) (0.0568) (0.0353) (0.0216) (0.0283) (0.0544) 
Health shock (0/1) 0.150*** 0.0500 0.180*** 0.155*** 0.0437*** 0.0206 0.0311 
 
(0.0435) (0.0336) (0.0369) (0.0237) (0.0156) (0.0161) (0.0407) 
Economic shock (0/1) 0.211*** 0.244*** 0.144*** 0.0525* 0.00297 -0.000332 0.192*** 
 
(0.0383) (0.0347) (0.0376) (0.0289) (0.0133) (0.0188) (0.0451) 
Natural shock (0/1) 0.273*** 0.385*** 0.184*** 0.0291 0.0198 0.0217 0.0570 
 
(0.0531) (0.0427) (0.0347) (0.0318) (0.0161) (0.0202) (0.0393) 
Observations 1,175 1,175 1,175 1,175 1,175 1,175 1,175 
R-squared 0.315 0.453 0.270 0.185 0.183 0.292 0.343 
Notes: Standard errors (reported in parentheses) are clustered at kebele level. Selected coefficients from a linear probability 
model are reported. The specifications include the full set of control variables shown in Table A2.1. The specification 
controls for kebele fixed effects (96 kebele dummies) instead of regional fixed effects. ***,**,* refer to 1%, 5% and 10% level 
of significance, respectively.  
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Table A2.5 
Probit model with region fixed effects 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES Dissaved 
Reduced 
Consumption  
Sold 
asset  Borrowed  
Received 
Support   
Adjusted 
labor supply  
No re-
sponse 
Crime/ conflict/family 
shock (#) 0.0806 0.0160 0.105** -0.0254 0.00765 -0.00863 0.150*** 
 
(0.0509) (0.0720) (0.0526) (0.0338) (0.0108) (0.0192) (0.0453) 
Health shock (#) 0.100** -0.0172 0.138*** 0.125*** 0.0229*** 0.00756 -0.00553 
 
(0.0410) (0.0494) (0.0382) (0.0198) (0.00695) (0.0102) (0.0371) 
Economic shock (#) 0.180*** 0.159*** 0.0495* 0.0508*** 0.00123 -0.00395 0.188*** 
 
(0.0303) (0.0344) (0.0260) (0.0189) (0.00458) (0.00998) (0.0276) 
Natural shock (#) 0.179*** 0.268*** 0.0813*** 0.0269* -0.000407 -0.00984 0.0204 
 
(0.0326) (0.0404) (0.0203) (0.0144) (0.00339) (0.00683) (0.0231) 
Observations 1,175 1,175 1,175 1,175 1,175 1,175 1,175 
Pseudo R2 0.148 0.329 0.107 0.109 0.231 0.189 0.256 
Notes: The shock variables are now the number (#) of shocks experienced by a household rather than the incidence of a 
shock. Standard errors (reported in parentheses) are clustered at kebele level. Selected marginal effects from a probit 
model are reported The specifications include the full set of control variables shown in Appendix A1; ***,**,* refer to 1%, 
5% and 10% level of significance, respectively. 
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Table A2.6 
 Linear probability model with kebele fixed effects 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES Dissaved 
Reduced Con-
sumption  
Sold 
asset  Borrowed  
Received 
Support   
Adjusted 
labor supply  
No re-
sponse 
Crime/ conflict/family 
shock (#) 0.0150 0.0183 0.0865 -0.0189 0.00423 -0.00130 0.137*** 
 
(0.0482) (0.0452) (0.0539) (0.0307) (0.0187) (0.0245) (0.0511) 
Health shock (#) 0.0873*** -0.000307 0.137*** 0.144*** 0.0348** 0.00938 -0.000163 
 
(0.0321) (0.0288) (0.0339) (0.0236) (0.0148) (0.0121) (0.0330) 
Economic shock (#) 0.143*** 0.164*** 0.0932*** 0.0463* -0.00332 -0.00386 0.168*** 
 
(0.0281) (0.0247) (0.0259) (0.0242) (0.0133) (0.0132) (0.0318) 
Natural shock (#) 0.134*** 0.220*** 0.103*** 0.0259 0.00673 0.00207 0.00873 
 
(0.0235) (0.0214) (0.0193) (0.0198) (0.00699) (0.00846) (0.0251) 
Observations 1,175 1,175 1,175 1,175 1,175 1,175 1,175 
R-squared 0.316 0.480 0.276 0.191 0.182 0.290 0.351 
Notes: The shock variables are now the number (#) of shocks experienced by a household rather than the incidence of a 
shock. All standard errors (reported in parentheses) are clustered at Kebele level. Selected coefficients from a linear 
probability model are reported. The specifications include the full set of control variables shown in Appendix A1; ***,**,* 
refer to 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance, respectively. 
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Table A3.1  
Effect on health expenditure, labor supply and income 
(robustness check for inclusion of CBHI) 
 Health expendi-
ture 
Labor supply 
(head) 
Labor supply 
(others) 
Labor supply 
(household) 
Crop out-
put 
Total 
income 
ADL index 1,670*** -17.01* 36.56 25.16 -3,132 -3,484 
 (540.8) (9.528) (30.15) (35.63) (2,049) (2,469) 
Prolonged illness 1,108*** 1.406 20.95 21.39 -1,247* -805.7 
 (301.9) (4.766) (12.94) (14.22) (638.4) (1,931) 
Illness 876.3*** -0.188 16.68** 15.84 -2,017** -591.8 
 (168.6) (3.316) (7.918) (9.751) (910.2) (852.2) 
(Very) poor SAH 792.4*** -12.23*** 10.62 -4.476 -1,232* -1,559 
 (253.7) (4.638) (14.82) (17.33) (688.4) (1,005) 
Notes: Each coefficient is from a separate linear regression of equation (3.1). Number of observations ranges between 
[2662-3104]. Not reported but included in the specification are village fixed effects and measures of economic status, 
human capital, social capital, demographics, religion, year and shock dummies. Clustered standard errors (at 
Kebele/village level) are reported in parentheses. 
Statistical significance: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. 
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Table A3.2 
Effect on health expenditure, labor supply, income and loans 
(Quartic root dependent variable) 
 Health ex-
penditure 
Labor 
supply (head) 
Labor supply 
(others) 
Labor supply 
(household) 
Crop 
output 
Total 
income 
Loan 
amount 
ADL index 1.548** -0.777*** 0.0783 -0.139 -1.091** -0.873 1.046** 
 (0.614) (0.167) (0.242) (0.191) (0.448) (0.530) (0.405) 
Prolonged illness 1.919*** -0.144 0.138 0.0713 -0.532*** -0.469* 0.515** 
 (0.268) (0.0886) (0.120) (0.0842) (0.179) (0.250) (0.213) 
Illness 2.314*** -0.127** 0.217*** 0.0938* -0.277** -0.253* 0.609*** 
 (0.176) (0.0500) (0.0726) (0.0485) (0.120) (0.134) (0.146) 
(Very) poor SAH 1.481*** -0.396*** 0.0945 -0.0918 -0.370** -0.473** 0.555*** 
 (0.302) (0.0820) (0.138) (0.0937) (0.171) (0.191) (0.206) 
Notes: Each coefficient is from a separate linear regression of equation (3.1). Number of observations ranges between 
[2664-3110]. Not reported but included in the specification are village fixed effects and measures of economic status, 
human capital, social capital, demographics, religion, year and shock dummies. All dependent variables are have 
undergone a quartic root transformation. Clustered standard errors (at Kebele/village level) are reported in parentheses. 
Statistical significance: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. 
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Table A3.3 
Effect on health expenditure:  
Poison fixed effects and two part models 
 Poisson fixed 
effects 
Two part models: Cross-section 
Probit 
(First part) 
OLS in log 
(Second part) 
GLM 
(second part) 
ADL index 2.600*** 0.280*** 1.087*** 1.559*** 
 (0.556) (0.0711) (0.288) (0.309) 
Prolonged  illness 1.483*** 0.384*** 0.534*** 0.628*** 
 (0.211) (0.0307) (0.104) (0.123) 
Illness 1.562*** 0.484*** 0.321*** 0.340*** 
 (0.159) (0.0240) (0.0836) (0.102) 
Poor/very poor SAH 0.996*** 0.304*** 0.342*** 0.483*** 
 (0.210) (0.0363) (0.111) (0.134) 
Notes: Each coefficient is from a separate regression. Number of observations for the first column ranges 
between [2821-2849]. Number of observations for the first part of the two part models ranges between 
[4750-4767]. For the second part it ranges between [1444-1453]. Control variables include measures of 
economic status, human capital, social capital, demographics, religion, shock dummies, year dummies and 
village dummies. Robust standard errors [column 1] and standard errors clustered at Kebele/village level 
[column 2-4] are reported in parentheses. 
GLM is estimated using log link and gamma distribution. 
Statistical significance: *10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. 
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Table A3.4 
Effect on health expenditure, labor supply, income and loan 
(Log (Y+1) dependent variable) 
 Health ex-
penditure 
Labor supply  
(head) 
Labor supply 
(others) 
Labor supply  
(household) 
Crop 
output 
Total 
income 
Loan 
amount 
ADL index 1.415** -1.123*** 0.0671 -0.241 -0.851** -0.629 1.193** 
 (0.646) (0.245) (0.328) (0.251) (0.336) (0.405) (0.471) 
Prolonged illness 2.118*** -0.218* 0.174 0.0730 -0.342** -0.399** 0.615** 
 (0.288) (0.128) (0.165) (0.110) (0.154) (0.179) (0.246) 
Illness 2.732*** -0.195*** 0.305*** 0.117* -0.127 -0.217** 0.676*** 
 (0.193) (0.0719) (0.100) (0.0609) (0.0978) (0.0998) (0.161) 
(Very) poor SAH 1.641*** -0.572*** 0.128 -0.130 -0.266* -0.375** 0.620** 
 (0.322) (0.118) (0.188) (0.117) (0.141) (0.147) (0.237) 
Notes: Each coefficient is from a separate linear regression of equation (3.1). Number of observations ranges between 
[2664-3110]. Not reported but included in the specification are village fixed effects and measures of economic status, 
human capital, social capital, demographics, religion, year and shock dummies. All dependent variables are log-transformed 
(log(Y+1)). Clustered standard errors (at Kebele/village level) are reported in parentheses. 
Statistical significance: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. 
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Table A3.5 
Effect on indebtedness and asset stock  
(robustness check for CBHI inclusion) 
 Any loan Loan 
amount 
Goat Sheep Bulls Calves Oxen 
ADL index 2.646** 420.9** -0.203 -0.622** -0.0656 -0.170 -0.165* 
 (1.209) (188.0) (0.377) (0.284) (0.0856) (0.109) (0.0889) 
Prolonged illness 1.680** 105.7 -0.149 -0.181 0.000665 0.0274 -0.0505 
 (0.349) (92.92) (0.137) (0.141) (0.0463) (0.0623) (0.0351) 
Illness 2.065*** 277.4*** -0.0538 -0.0569 0.0200 -0.0131 -0.0323 
 (0.302) (86.24) (0.0982) (0.110) (0.0468) (0.0442) (0.0290) 
Poor/very poor SAH 1.813*** 289.0** -0.127 -0.364** -0.0126 -0.0406 -0.0197 
 (0.383) (133.4) (0.130) (0.167) (0.0492) (0.0646) (0.0394) 
Notes: Each coefficient is from a separate regression of equation (3.1). The column labelled, “Any loan”, 
contains odds ratios from a logit fixed-effects model. Number of observations for this column ranges 
between [1892-1926]. The rest of the coefficients are from linear regression estimates of (3.1). Number of 
observations for these ranges between [3061-3108]. Not reported but included in the specification are 
village fixed effects and measures of economic status, human capital, social capital, demographics, 
religion, year and shock dummies. Clustered standard errors (at Kebele/village level) are reported in 
parentheses. 
Statistical significance: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. 
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Table A3.6 
Consumption insurance 
(robustness check for CBHI inclusion) 
  Total Food Non-food 
ADL index Full sample 0.117 0.159* 0.167 
  (0.0787) (0.0814) (0.117) 
 Poor -0.132 -0.0857 -0.165 
  (0.139) (0.153) (0.210) 
 Non-poor 0.222** 0.279*** 0.280** 
  (0.0952) (0.0908) (0.136) 
Prolonged illness Full sample 0.00450 0.0198 -0.0840* 
  (0.0294) (0.0329) (0.0454) 
 Poor -0.0808 -0.0750 -0.150* 
  (0.0517) (0.0654) (0.0888) 
 Non-poor 0.0406 0.0589 -0.0540 
  (0.0430) (0.0449) (0.0647) 
Illness Full sample 0.000358 0.00913 -0.0332 
  (0.0286) (0.0293) (0.0354) 
 Poor -0.0551 -0.0392 -0.0509 
  (0.0628) (0.0618) (0.0764) 
 Non-poor 0.0108 0.0186 -0.0338 
  (0.0303) (0.0318) (0.0395) 
(Very) poor SAH Full sample 0.0114 0.0257 -0.00929 
  (0.0383) (0.0392) (0.0513) 
 Poor -0.121 -0.0931 -0.266*** 
  (0.0794) (0.0838) (0.0927) 
 Non-poor 0.0569 0.0686 0.0766 
  (0.0429) (0.0437) (0.0554) 
Notes: Each coefficient is from a separate linear regression of equation (3.1). Number of observations for 
the full sample, ‘poor’ sample and ‘non-poor’ sample range between [2934-3075], [747-783] and [2187-
2292] respectively. Not reported but included in our specification are village fixed effects and measures 
of economic status, human capital, social capital, demographics, religion, year and shock dummies. All 
dependent variables are log-transformed. Clustered standard errors (at Kebele/village level) are 
reported in parentheses. 
Statistical significance: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. 
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Table A4.1  
Welfare effects of CBHI (robustness to excluding covariates) 
 FE before matching FE after matching 
 All 
districts 
control 
districts 
Pilot 
districts 
All 
districts 
control 
districts 
Pilot dis-
tricts 
Crop output 673.6 497.8 1,105** 670.2 474.1 1,112** 
 (476.8) (577.5) (466.0) (481.7) (576.5) (477.6) 
Total income 971.6* 755.7 1,484** 942.1 695.2 1,466** 
 (564.7) (631.3) (587.8) (571.3) (631.8) (600.5) 
Total consumption 25.59 24.98 20.34 -1.546 -3.115 -8.523 
 (28.75) (33.50) (32.68) (20.81) (26.83) (24.99) 
Food consumption 
26.35 27.59 19.39 -0.494 -0.301 -9.072 
 (27.86) (32.57) (31.65) (19.87) (25.83) (23.97) 
Non-food consumption 0.210 -1.143 2.167 0.206 -1.137 2.136 
 (2.907) (3.451) (3.075) (2.986) (3.606) (3.131) 
Loan (0/1) -0.0539** -0.0572** -0.0412* -0.0526** -0.0537** -0.0417* 
 (0.0221) (0.0237) (0.0237) (0.0221) (0.0231) (0.0240) 
Loan amount -43.50 -39.48 -29.20 -38.95 -31.77 -24.24 
 (70.60) (78.52) (72.77) (70.79) (78.63) (73.35) 
Livestock       
Goats # -0.0801 -0.00357 -0.111 -0.0820 0.00597 -0.122 
 (0.145) (0.126) (0.157) (0.149) (0.129) (0.162) 
Sheep # -0.0434 0.0190 -0.0817 -0.0430 0.0176 -0.0808 
 (0.114) (0.132) (0.113) (0.116) (0.135) (0.115) 
Bull # 0.0445 0.0368 0.0285 0.0471 0.0399 0.0285 
 (0.0352) (0.0398) (0.0343) (0.0357) (0.0410) (0.0343) 
Calves # 0.00694 -0.00756 0.0164 -0.000696 -0.0150 0.0111 
 (0.0634) (0.0583) (0.0631) (0.0649) (0.0596) (0.0649) 
Oxen # 0.0558 0.0723 0.0439 0.0559 0.0749 0.0418 
 (0.0474) (0.0514) (0.0476) (0.0484) (0.0526) (0.0487) 
Notes: The column headings refer to the choice of control group: all districts (all non-insured house-
holds included), control districts (only non-insured households in control districts included), and pilot 
districts (only non-insured households in pilot districts included). Standard errors (in parentheses) are 
clustered at the village level. Range of number of observations: first column (4265-4707), second col-
umn (2837-3126), third column (3181-3555), fourth column (4080-4510), fifth column (2734-3019), sixth 
column (3068-3433). 66 out of 1548 observations are outside the common support region [0.086-0.869]. 
Statistical significance: *** 0.01, ** 0.05, * 0.1 
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Table A4.2 
 Placebo Test: (Treatment=1 if uninsured lives in pilot district, 0 otherwise) 
 Coefficients (St. errors) 
  
Crop output -460.3 
 (558.0) 
Total income -637.2 
 (663.1) 
Total consumption -4.244 
 (21.75) 
Food consumption 
-1.333 
 (20.38) 
Non-food consumption -2.904 
 (3.091) 
Loan (0/1) -0.0176 
 (0.0213) 
Loan amount -34.51 
 (95.76) 
Goats # 0.0366 
 (0.0888) 
Sheep # 0.134 
 (0.145) 
Bull # 0.0268 
 (0.0384) 
Calves # 0.0250 
 (0.0402) 
Oxen # 0.000696 
 (0.0391) 
Notes: All estimates are based on OLS regression of change in outcome variables, 
controlling for covariates (given in table 4.3) and time dummy. In the case of 
livestock we exclude the asset index quintiles as the index includes number of 
livestock. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the village level. 
Number of observations ranges from 1561 to 1805. 
Statistical significance: *** 0.01, ** 0.05, * 0.1 
 
 
166 ESSAYS ON THE ECONOMICS OF HEALTH-RISK AND INSURANCE 
 
 
Table A5.1 
 Means of medical expenditures and selected covariates by whether obser-
vation is dropped due to subjective probability non-response or enumera-
tion error, and whether subjective probabilities exhibit logical inconsisten-
cies 
 
Excluded due to non-response / enu-
meration error 
Subjective probabilities exhibit logical 
inconsistencies 
 
Yes 
(N=89) 
No 
(N=3093) 
No difference 
p-value 
Yes  
(N=432) 
No  
(N=2668) 
No difference  
p-value 
CBHI enrolled 27.0% 33.6% 0.189 19.9% 35.8% 0.000 
Outpatient expense 42.1 53.7 0.648 50.8 54.1 0.788 
Inpatient expense 10.7 54.1 0.416 46.7 55.2 0.745 
Ln (average of Min & Max ex-
pected OOP) 5.615 5.944 0.008 6.002 5.934 0.196 
Et[lnYt+1] 5.456 5.692 0.055 5.714 5.689 0.622 
Illness > 30 days 12.4% 11.9% 0.895 13.9% 11.6% 0.177 
Sensory impairment 18.0% 15.5% 0.523 18.1% 15.2% 0.126 
Paralysis/mobility problem 24.7% 17.7% 0.088 21.8% 17.1% 0.019 
Death in last year 2.2% 1.9% 0.818 1.2% 2.0% 0.222 
Poor/very poor health 19.1% 14.8% 0.267 13.4% 15.1% 0.373 
Poorest assets quintile group 36.0% 19.6% 0.000 30.6% 17.8% 0.000 
Assets quintile 2 13.5% 20.2% 0.118 15.7% 20.9% 0.014 
Assets quintile 3 21.4% 20.0% 0.745 21.1% 19.8% 0.527 
Assets quintile 4 12.4% 20.2% 0.067 18.3% 20.6% 0.265 
Richest assets quintile group 16.9% 20.1% 0.458 14.4% 20.9% 0.002 
Has bank account 5.6% 12.1% 0.062 9.7% 12.5% 0.099 
Covered  by safety net pro-
gramme 25.3% 20.5% 0.282 24.1% 20.0% 0.052 
Forgone care when sick 6.7% 2.5% 0.013 3.7% 2.3% 0.089 
Minutes to nearest health center 57.4 59.9 0.560 52.4 61.1 0.000 
Educated head 46.6% 54.1% 0.162 54.4% 54.1% 0.884 
Non-agricultural employment 2.3% 3.8% 0.461 5.6% 3.5% 0.036 
Shock 39.3% 47.6% 0.125 48.6% 47.3% 0.623 
Ln(househod size) 1.458 1.666 0.000 1.616 1.674 0.013 
Muslim 15.9% 26.9% 0.021 20.1% 28.0% 0.001 
Note: Definitions of the variables are provided in Table A5.3. 
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Table A5.2 
 Sample statistics of expected and realized medical expenditure, 2013 (ETB) 
   Cross-section statistics 
   Mean Std. 
dev. 
Min. Median Max. Obs. 
 Expected Expenditure (t+1)       
  Mean 674 830 16.00 390 10325 1303 
  Standard deviation 255 427 3.14 123 8443 1303 
  Coeff. of variation 0.36 0.18 0.03 0.34 0.96 1303 
 Realized Expenditure (t)       
  Simple extrapolation 365 1496 0 0 34800 1303 
  Regression extrapola-
tion 367 1095 ~0 120 25945 
1287 
If realized expenditure >0       
 Mean expected expenditure 
(t+1) 814 923 28 478 7038 
362 
 Realized expenditure (t) 1315 2611 12 510 34800 362 
Notes: Simple and regression extrapolation of realized expenditures refer to method of es-
timating annual spending on outpatient care from reported expenditure in past two months, 
as explained in text.  Sample size for regression extrapolation is slightly smaller due to miss-
ing values on covariates. ETB = Ethiopian Birr, US$1=ETB 18.45 (April 2013) 
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Figure A5.1 
 Sample means of reported probabilities of medical expenditure lying in 
household-specific intervals, 2013 (N=1303) 
 
Notes: A=min+k, B=A+k and C=B+k, where k=(max-min)/4. P(X>A), P(X>B) and P(X>C), where 
X is medical expenditure, are reported directly for each household, as are min and max. 
Probability of X lying in each interval is computed from these reported probabilities. Sample 
restricted to observations for whom correct order of thresholds calculated and responses are 
logically consistent. 
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Table A5.3 
 Summary Statistics of Variables in the Regressions 
Variable 
 
 
Description 
2012 (N=1365) 2013 (N=1303) 
Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
  
    
CBHI enrolled Member of community based health insurance 33.0% 47.0% 38.7% 48.7% 
Outpatient expense 
Out-of-pocket outpatient payment (past 2 
months) 56.5 217.3 51.5 233.1 
Inpatient expense 
Out-of-pocket inpatient payment (past 12 
months) 54.3 541.1 56.1 503.7 
Ln (average of Min & Max 
expected OOP) 
Log of simple average of minimum and maxi-
mum expected health expenditure 5.8 1.0 6.1 1.1 
Et[lnYt+1] Mean of log expected health expenditure 5.6 0.9 5.8 1.1 
Illness > 30 days 
At least one member with chronic illness (symp-
toms stayed more than 30 days) 10.6% 30.8% 12.7% 33.3% 
Sensory impairment 
At least one member has difficulty to 
hear/speak/ or see 12.6% 33.2% 17.9% 38.3% 
Paralysis/mobility problem 
At least one member has some sort of paralysis 
or difficulty to stand up after sitting down 13.6% 34.2% 20.8% 40.6% 
Death in last year Household member died in the past 12 months 2.6% 15.8% 1.5% 12.0% 
Poor/very poor health 
At least one member has poor/very poor self-
assessed health 12.5% 33.0% 17.8% 38.3% 
Poorest assets quintile 
group 
Asset poorest 
18.6% 38.9% 17.0% 37.6% 
Assets quintile 2 Asset second poorest  20.5% 40.4% 21.3% 40.9% 
Assets quintile 3 Asset third poorest 19.4% 39.6% 20.1% 40.1% 
Assets quintile 4 Asset second richest 20.5% 40.4% 20.7% 40.5% 
Richest assets quintile 
group 
Asset richest 
21.0% 40.7% 20.9% 40.7% 
Has bank account Household has saving bank account 11.6% 32.1% 13.4% 34.1% 
Covered  by safety net 
programme 
Household member of productive safety net 
program (PSNP),  yes=1, no=0 (a targeted pro-
gram in food insecure Woredas) 20.5% 40.4% 19.5% 39.6% 
Continued on next page 
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Table A5.3 (continued) 
 Summary Statistics of Variables in the Regressions  
Variable 
 
 
Description 
2012 (N=1365) 
2013 
(N=1303) 
Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
  
    
Forgone care when sick 
Someone was ill in last two months but did not 
receive treatment because of one of the follow-
ing: a) health care/medicines are too expensive 
b) health facilities are too far c) could not take 
time off work / lose income 2.5% 15.6% 2.1% 14.5% 
Minutes to nearest 
health center 
Travel time to nearest health center (minutes) 
62.8 41.3 59.3 39.9 
Educated head  Head has at least informal education 56.4% 49.6% 51.6% 50.0% 
Non-agri employment 
Head’s main occupation: non-agricultural em-
ployment 2.9% 16.9% 4.1% 19.8% 
Ln(househod size) Log household size 1.684 0.446 1.664 0.455 
male [<=5] Share of male aged<=5 0.070 0.109 0.065 0.103 
female [<=5] Share of female aged<=5 0.068 0.113 0.062 0.103 
male [6-18]  Share of male aged [6-18] 0.198 0.163 0.202 0.169 
female [6-18] Share of female aged [6-18] 0.186 0.161 0.184 0.160 
male [19-45]  Share of male aged [19-45] 0.155 0.137 0.150 0.139 
female [19-45] Share of female aged [19-45] 0.162 0.119 0.161 0.122 
male [46-60]  Share of male aged [46-60] 0.044 0.081 0.046 0.087 
female [46-60]  Share of female aged [46-60] 0.051 0.109 0.057 0.122 
male [>=61]  Share of male aged >=61 0.039 0.109 0.041 0.104 
female [>=61]  Share of female aged >=61 0.027 0.109 0.033 0.123 
Muslim Religion of the head is Muslim 27.1% 44.5% 29.0% 45.4% 
Shock 
Household experienced Crime/conflict shock 
(divorce, land / water conflict, theft of crops, 
theft of livestock), economic shock (decline in 
price of output, unemployment, loss of equip-
ment, death of livestock) or natural shock 
(flood, storm, fire, drought, untimely rain, 
insect damage) in the past 12 months. 44.2% 49.7% 50.7% 50.0% 
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Table A5.4 
 Regressions of the Mean of Log Expected Medical Expenditure (separately 
for each year) 
  OLS LAD 2SLS 
VARIABLES 2012 2013 2012 2013 2012 2013 
              
Ln(outpatient expense) t 0.0167 0.0243** 0.0102 0.0148 0.0495 0.138** 
 
(0.0116) (0.0108) (0.0146) (0.0167) (0.0445) (0.0682) 
Ln(outpatient expense) t-1 0.0349*** 0.0254** 0.00745 0.0259 0.0366 0.00469 
 
(0.0125) (0.0116) (0.0141) (0.0166) (0.0301) (0.0553) 
Ln(inpatient expense) t 0.133*** 0.156*** 0.125*** 0.137*** 0.127*** 0.140*** 
 
(0.0261) (0.0337) (0.0370) (0.0364) (0.0261) (0.0358) 
Ln(inpatient expense) t-1 -0.00788 0.00978 -0.00826 0.0332 -0.00710 0.00267 
 
(0.0307) (0.0301) (0.0446) (0.0407) (0.0302) (0.0349) 
Someone in household experi-
enced:       
    Illness > 30 days 0.171* 0.244*** 0.0660 0.451*** 0.125 0.167** 
 
(0.0932) (0.0790) (0.0951) (0.124) (0.107) (0.0851) 
   Sensory impairment -0.0387 0.00367 -0.0135 -0.0208 -0.0353 -0.0420 
 
(0.0853) (0.0838) (0.106) (0.102) (0.0840) (0.0876) 
   Paralysis/ mobility problem 0.0203 -0.0655 0.103 -0.114 0.0132 -0.0727 
 
(0.0789) (0.0654) (0.0799) (0.0987) (0.0800) (0.0669) 
   Poor/very poor health 0.00254 0.0279 0.0395 -0.0122 -0.0377 -0.0731 
 
(0.104) (0.0723) (0.102) (0.106) (0.113) (0.107) 
   Death in last year 0.122 0.232 0.135 0.363 0.129 0.271 
 
(0.166) (0.202) (0.179) (0.302) (0.165) (0.215) 
2nd poorest assets quintile 
group 0.219*** 0.138* 0.279** 0.0651 0.214*** 0.119 
 
(0.0809) (0.0761) (0.114) (0.105) (0.0817) (0.0860) 
Assets quintile 3 0.322*** 0.165** 0.425*** 0.163 0.316*** 0.149* 
 
(0.0826) (0.0765) (0.128) (0.114) (0.0826) (0.0780) 
Assets quintile 4 0.454*** 0.248*** 0.449*** 0.180 0.443*** 0.245*** 
 
(0.0913) (0.0914) (0.137) (0.123) (0.0947) (0.0907) 
Richest assets quintile group 0.613*** 0.545*** 0.569*** 0.542*** 0.605*** 0.525*** 
 
(0.0868) (0.0963) (0.149) (0.132) (0.0910) (0.0952) 
Enrolled in PSNP -0.0740 -0.0355 -0.0853 -0.0654 -0.0784 -0.0252 
 
(0.0709) (0.0831) (0.0959) (0.0900) (0.0700) (0.0829) 
Has bank account 0.00908 0.132 0.0313 0.173 0.00598 0.0973 
 
(0.0813) (0.0898) (0.0871) (0.120) (0.0808) (0.0960) 
Continued on next page 
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Table A5.4 (continued) 
Regressions of the Mean of Log Expected Medical Expenditure (separately 
for each year) 
  OLS LAD 2SLS 
VARIABLES 2012 2013 2012 2013 2012 2013 
              
Non-agricultural employ-
ment 0.292* -0.0578 0.323 0.186 0.276* -0.0918 
 (0.149) (0.171) (0.218) (0.152) (0.148) (0.172) 
Educated head 0.135*** 0.0897 0.148** 0.113 0.136*** 0.101* 
 (0.0472) (0.0594) (0.0668) (0.0745) (0.0460) (0.0609) 
CBHI enrolled 0.0834 -0.00163 0.113 0.00236 0.0887 0.0448 
 
(0.0572) (0.0590) (0.0770) (0.0750) (0.0556) (0.0633) 
Forgone care when sick -0.131 -0.138 -0.227 -0.158 -0.120 -0.0585 
 
(0.160) (0.179) (0.184) (0.192) (0.155) (0.181) 
Minutes to nearest health 
center -0.000760 0.00181** -0.000814 0.00125 -0.000727 0.00156* 
 
(0.000586) (0.000756) (0.000621) (0.000917) (0.000575) (0.000812) 
Shock 0.131** 0.0481 0.185*** 0.0936 0.126** 0.0600 
 
(0.0587) (0.0622) (0.0601) (0.0696) (0.0577) (0.0639) 
Ln(household size) 0.0465 0.0739 0.214** 0.152 0.0311 0.0412 
 
(0.0775) (0.0775) (0.0969) (0.116) (0.0787) (0.0809) 
Constant 3.560*** 3.895*** 3.595*** 3.821*** 3.580*** 4.050*** 
 
(0.307) (0.277) (0.257) (0.478) (0.296) (0.285) 
       Observations 1,353 1,278 1,353 1,278 1,353 1,278 
R2/Pseudo R2 0.300 0.427  0.163 0.261  
  F-test (P-value) for joint 
significance:       
     All variables 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
     Health variables 0.361 0.032 0.584 0.004 0.716 0.136 
     Age-sex composition 0.006 0.005 0.152 0.090 0.002 0.006 
Notes: Regressions also include the share of household member in gender specific age groups and district 
dummies. Standard errors in parentheses. Corrected for clustering at Kebele level for OLS and 2SLS. Boot-
strap standard errors with 200 repetitions for LAD. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A5.5 
 Regressions presented in Tables 5.6 and 5.8 with dependent variable being: 
log of average of minimum and maximum expected medical expenditure  
  Levels First difference 
 
LAD OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS 
          
Ln(outpatient expense) t 0.0240** 0.0251*** 0.104* 0.0424*** 0.251*** 
 
(0.0111) (0.00833) (0.0537) (0.0149) (0.0861) 
Ln(outpatient expense) t-1 0.0254** 0.0392*** 0.121*** 0.0522*** 0.262*** 
 
(0.0122) (0.00903) (0.0411) (0.0158) (0.0878) 
Ln(inpatient expense) t 0.154*** 0.140*** 0.128*** 0.112** 0.117** 
 
(0.0410) (0.0228) (0.0251) (0.0504) (0.0542) 
Ln(inpatient expense) t-1 -0.00258 -0.00426 -0.0203 -0.0429 -0.0643 
 
(0.0253) (0.0230) (0.0245) (0.0480) (0.0554) 
Someone in household experi-
enced:    
  
    Illness > 30 days 0.130 0.172** 0.0594 0.0164 -0.0238 
 
(0.0886) (0.0756) (0.0952) (0.146) (0.147) 
   Sensory impairment 0.0323 0.0112 0.00769 -0.0478 -0.0658 
 
(0.0852) (0.0599) (0.0611) (0.0952) (0.108) 
   Paralysis/ mobility problem -0.0397 0.0241 -0.00416 0.177** 0.160* 
 
(0.0750) (0.0561) (0.0600) (0.0825) (0.0834) 
   Poor/very poor health 0.134* 0.0619 -0.0444 0.0830 -0.0504 
 
(0.0805) (0.0790) (0.0859) (0.121) (0.134) 
   Death in last year 0.147 0.0969 0.0500 0.168 0.205 
 
(0.183) (0.133) (0.142) (0.248) (0.273) 
2nd poorest assets quintile 
group 0.212** 0.222*** 0.213*** 0.0615 -0.00627 
 
(0.0933) (0.0620) (0.0635) (0.102) (0.102) 
Assets quintile 3 0.274*** 0.314*** 0.306*** 0.204 0.105 
 
(0.0944) (0.0655) (0.0658) (0.123) (0.128) 
Assets quintile 4 0.360*** 0.422*** 0.395*** 0.254** 0.198 
 
(0.0962) (0.0683) (0.0727) (0.122) (0.134) 
Richest assets quintile group 0.578*** 0.660*** 0.614*** 0.630*** 0.589*** 
 
(0.106) (0.0759) (0.0798) (0.152) (0.155) 
Enrolled in PSNP -0.0954 -0.0259 -0.0154 0.176 0.244 
 
(0.0753) (0.0569) (0.0620) (0.168) (0.171) 
Has bank account 0.00416 0.0706 0.0591 0.195* 0.267** 
 
(0.0719) (0.0672) (0.0691) (0.118) (0.118) 
Continued on next page 
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Table A5.5 (continued) 
 Regressions presented in Tables 5.6 and 5.8 with dependent variable being: 
log of average of minimum and maximum expected medical expenditure  
  Levels First difference 
 
LAD OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS 
          
Non-agricultural employ-
ment 0.242* 0.142 0.117 0.196 0.108 
 (0.138) (0.127) (0.124) (0.235) (0.245) 
Educated head 0.104** 0.0746* 0.0642 0.123 0.0927 
 (0.0503) (0.0400) (0.0418) (0.0897) (0.0959) 
CBHI enrolled 0.0515 0.0348 0.0537 0.0234 0.0541 
 
(0.0586) (0.0453) (0.0441) (0.0843) (0.0797) 
Forgone care when sick -0.244 -0.0551 -0.0295 -0.0293 -0.0660 
 
(0.186) (0.121) (0.128) (0.167) (0.192) 
Minutes to nearest health 
center 0.00103 0.000781* 0.000710 0.00105 0.00108 
 
(0.000672) (0.000453) (0.000483) (0.00111) (0.00123) 
Shock 0.154*** 0.147*** 0.144*** 0.135* 0.145* 
 
(0.0551) (0.0526) (0.0535) (0.0794) (0.0803) 
Ln(household size) 0.0185 -0.0522 -0.114 0.464* 0.531** 
 
(0.0883) (0.0708) (0.0797) (0.239) (0.256) 
Year 2013 0.253*** 0.254*** 0.285***   
 (0.0496) (0.0729) (0.0697)   
Constant 3.964*** 3.840*** 3.921*** 0.281*** 0.336*** 
 
(0.281) (0.192) (0.203) (0.0740) (0.0677) 
  
 
 
  
Observations 2,631 2,631 2,631 1,097 1,097 
R-squared  0.149 0.269 
 
0.078   
F-test (P-value) for joint 
significance:    
  
     All variables 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
     Health variables 0.190 0.068 0.969 0.290 0.493 
     Age-sex composition 0.186 0.003 0.001 0.475 0.273 
Notes: Regressions also include the share of household member in gender specific age groups. 
In columns 1-3, district dummies are also included. Standard errors in parentheses. Corrected 
for clustering at Kebele level for OLS and 2SLS. Bootstrap standard errors with 200 repetitions 
for LAD. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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Table A5.6 
 Regressions of the standard deviation of log expected medical expenditure 
(first differences) 
  (1) (2) 
 
OLS 2SLS 
        
Ln(outpatient expense) t -0.00171 (0.00473) -0.0184 (0.0241) 
Ln(outpatient expense) t-1 0.000470 (0.00451) -0.00863 (0.0205) 
Ln(inpatient expense) t 0.00854 (0.0111) 0.00846 (0.0110) 
Ln(inpatient expense) t-1 -0.00651 (0.0115) -0.00558 (0.0113) 
Someone in household experienced:     
    Illness > 30 days -0.0499* (0.0290) -0.0399 (0.0358) 
    Sensory impairment -0.0173 (0.0245) -0.0149 (0.0245) 
    Paralysis/ mobility problem 0.0702*** (0.0244) 0.0704*** (0.0246) 
    Poor/very poor health 0.000649 (0.0275) 0.0128 (0.0341) 
    Death in last year 0.0340 (0.0444) 0.0258 (0.0495) 
2nd poorest assets quintile group 0.0243 (0.0268) 0.0320 (0.0313) 
Assets quintile 3 0.0717* (0.0407) 0.0811* (0.0459) 
Assets quintile 4 0.0366 (0.0405) 0.0445 (0.0436) 
Richest assets quintile group 0.0813 (0.0512) 0.0853 (0.0521) 
Enrolled in PSNP -0.00303 (0.0428) -0.00518 (0.0417) 
Has bank account 0.0232 (0.0239) 0.0202 (0.0247) 
Non-agricultural employment 0.0476 (0.0493) 0.0563 (0.0502) 
Educated head 0.00628 (0.0226) 0.00686 (0.0224) 
CBHI enrolled 0.0268 (0.0236) 0.0226 (0.0260) 
Forgone care when sick 0.0240 (0.0468) 0.0252 (0.0475) 
Minutes to nearest health center 0.000166 (0.000317) 0.000148 (0.000323) 
Shock 0.00593 (0.0175) 0.00652 (0.0186) 
Ln(household size) 0.123** (0.0603) 0.123* (0.0655) 
Constant 0.00271 (0.0166) -0.000543 (0.0171) 
  
 
 
 
Observations 1,097  1,097  
R-squared 0.029  
 
 
F-test (P-value) for joint significance:     
     All variables 0.004  0.000  
     Health variables 0.026  0.040  
     Age-sex composition 0.196  0.447  
Notes: Regressions also include the share of household member in gender specific age groups. Standard 
errors in parentheses are corrected for clustering at Kebele level for OLS and 2SLS. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1 
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Table A5.7 
 Probit estimates of plans to enrol in CBHI scheme for households not en-
rolled in 2012 (for each year separately) 
  2012  2013  
        
Mean log expected medical exp. 0.00816 (0.0302) 0.0115 (0.0310) 
Std. dev. log expected medical exp. 0.210** (0.100) 0.459*** (0.107) 
2nd poorest assets quintile group 0.158*** (0.0599) 0.108 (0.0696) 
Assets quintile 3 0.146** (0.0738) 0.182*** (0.0690) 
Assets quintile 4 0.137* (0.0768) 0.192** (0.0746) 
Richest assets quintile group 0.0862 (0.0860) 0.0493 (0.0938) 
Enrolled in PSNP -0.167* (0.0887) 0.203*** (0.0752) 
Has bank account -0.0386 (0.0827) -0.137 (0.0976) 
Educated head -0.114*** (0.0402) 0.0787 (0.0586) 
Official position held (head) -0.00153 (0.0504) 0.196*** (0.0737) 
Forgone care when sick 0.0463 (0.136) 0.138 (0.123) 
Minutes to nearest health center 0.000729 (0.000639) -0.00137** (0.000675) 
Perceived quality of care -0.130 (0.0820) -0.0919 (0.0708) 
Ln(household size) 0.348*** (0.0785) 0.0778 (0.0758) 
Head is Muslim -0.100 (0.0963) -0.248*** (0.0697) 
Tigray region 0.342*** (0.0943) 0.0976 (0.115) 
Amhara region 0.113 (0.107) -0.148 (0.120) 
Oromiya region 0.350*** (0.0952) 0.190* (0.106) 
  
 
 
 
Observations 600  468  
Pseudo R2 0.153  0.153  
Note: Marginal effects reported. The dependent variable is an indicator of whether the household 
respondent reported that the household planned to enrol. The models also include the share of 
household members in gender specific age groups. Standard errors in parentheses are corrected for 
clustering at Kebele level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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In an attempt to achieve the goal of Universal Health Coverage by 2030 
and to break the bridge between ill-health and impoverishment, several 
developing countries are undergoing various healthcare financing re-
forms. One of these is the introduction of health insurance. The aim of 
this thesis is to provide evidence regarding the need for health insurance 
in rural Ethiopia and to investigate the effectiveness and potential prob-
lems of (pilot) health insurance schemes in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
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